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ABSTRACT 
 
The study was carried out against a background of a general perception that 
participatory budgeting (PB) in developing countries is an annual ritual exercise to 
comply with pressure from supranational agencies to adopt New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms, rather than a practical process that involves citizens in formulating 
and developing local government plans and budgets that incorporate their needs and 
priorities. The study adopts a qualitative interpretive approach and a case study 
design, using Uganda and Wamala District Local Government as country and study 
sites respectively, to explore how PB is implemented in practice and whether the 
desired outcomes are achieved. It further explores the underlying factors that restrict 
or enhance PB in a decentralised LG framework. The study argues that adapting 
NPM reforms to the local environment, and citizens exercising their rights and 
responsibilities, are critical to the achievement of desires, goals and outcomes. The 
findings of the study demonstrate that owing to power relations, inadequate locally 
raised revenues, citizens’ lack of knowledge, skills and competencies in public sector 
financial management, and inherent cultural norms and values, PB may not achieve 
the desired goals and outcomes in developing countries under a decentralised local 
governance system. The contribution to accounting theory from this study is that 
institutional pressures (coercive, mimetic and normative) can be mitigated by 
empowering citizens to exercise their civil, social, political and economic/financial 
citizenship rights and responsibilities effectively. This could lead to strengthening 
management accounting systems, and result in policy reforms (that are donor driven) 
achieving desired outcomes. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and General Background 
1.1   Introduction 
In the 1970s, developed countries like Australia, Denmark, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom implemented public sector reforms that greatly enhanced the efficiency and 
accountability and effectiveness of public sector organisations (Lapsley and Wright, 2004). 
Public sector reforms as adopted and implemented in developed countries came to be 
commonly referred to as the New Public Management (NPM). According to Navarra and 
Cornford (2006), the introduction of NPM was aimed at addressing new public management 
issues that arose with the changing circumstances and demand in managing public affairs. 
Based on the experience of the developed countries, NPM reforms were advanced as a  
solution that would make public sector organisations more accountable, efficient and 
democratic, which were considered to be the main constraints to service delivery by public 
sector organisations (Weiss, 1976; Hood, 1983; Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 2003;). The thinking 
behind NPM advocates was that to enhance efficiency accountability and transparency, 
organisations in the public sector should be structured and operated on the same principles 
like organisations in the private sector.  
Following NPM reforms, the principles of bureaucratic hierarchy and centralisation were 
replaced with a market enterprise culture based on transparency, accountability, participation 
and equity (TAPE) in public service management. The running and management of public 
affairs came to be referred to as public management other than public administration. 
International agencies identified lack of accountability, ineffectiveness and inefficiency as 
impediments to effective service delivery by public sector organisations in developing 
countries (Awio et al., 2007). To address this constraint to development, led by the 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), they engineered and imposed 
NPM reforms as a pre-condition for granting aid and accessing donor funding. 
Reforms in the public sector implemented in developing countries over the last thirty years 
have been part of the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which were initiated by the WB in the 1980s (Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2003). Decentralisation and privatisation are part of the NPM 
reforms aimed at achieving efficiency, accountability and effectiveness in public sector 
organisations (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). The WB (1997) has argued that 
decentralisation has the potential to improve the delivery of poverty related services to the 
community. Decentralisation of government functions to lower local governments is widely 
recognised as one of the strategies to increase local participation and ownership of the 
political and development process (World Bank, 1997). Reduction in Poverty Levels to 15% 
by 2015 is one of the eight United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set 
in 2000 (UN Millennium Goal Report, 2010). Based on the experience and success of Porto 
Alegre in Brazil, decentralisation and citizen participation in the budgeting process are 
viewed as effective strategies for poverty reduction. Decentralisation has thus been adopted 
by many developing countries since the 1990s. However, some scholars argue that 
participation by local citizens is still low, because the NPM method is grounded on the 
concept of value for money, that is, economy, effectiveness and efficiency (Frederickson, 
1997; Lynn, 2002). 
Decentralisation involves undertaking reforms in public sector financial management and 
accounting. Participation by all stakeholders in the budgeting process is at the centre of NPM 
reforms in public sector financial management, regarded as one of the crucial elements for 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
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enhancing democracy necessary for improving service delivery for the benefit of all 
stakeholders (Economic Commission for Africa, 2003;World Bank, 1997). 
Since 1987, the Government of Uganda (GoU) has been committed to an economic recovery 
programme to reverse the sharp economic decline of the 1970s and early 1980s. The recovery 
programme has included macro-economic adjustment and structural reforms with strong 
support from multilateral and bilateral creditors and donors. The objectives of the public 
sector reforms were to increase efficiency of resource allocation while reducing the direct 
role of government in production and commercial activities. At the same time, the reforms 
were aimed at promoting the private sector as the main engine of economic growth. The first 
phase of the reforms was stabilisation and the second was the implementation of measures to 
remove structural distortions in the economy. The third phase, which started in 1997, focused 
on improving public service delivery, the removal of impediments to private sector growth 
and participation in social service delivery. This third phase commits government to the 
overriding priority of tackling poverty through decentralisation and privatisation policies 
(MoFPED, 2000; USAID, 1998; MoFPED 2002). 
Uganda’s NPM reforms in public financial management have focused on planning, budgeting 
and accountability. As Rubin (1990) observed, planning and budgeting have merged. In 
Uganda budgets are derived from the three–year development plan, both at national and local 
government level. Since the early 1990s, local government budget processes have changed 
substantially due to NPM reforms and the availability of information technology. The 
decentralisation policy (one of the NPM reforms) was adopted as a local governance system 
and enshrined in the 1995 Constitution. The concept of participatory budgeting (PB) as part 
of the decentralisation policy was operationalised in 1997 under the Local government Act 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
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1997. Therefore, by law citizens are expected to be involved in the process of planning and 
budgeting at all levels of local governments in Uganda. 
After adopting decentralisation, local government budgeting processes changed substantially, 
as more focus was put on principles of good governance as advocated by donor agencies, 
who at the time were funding more than 60% of the national budget (MoFPED, 2000; 
USAID, 1998, MoFPED & PEAP 2002). 
Participatory Budgeting (PB), the extent to which stakeholders are involved with and have 
influence on the determination of their budgets (Brownell, 1982), has been embraced by both 
developed and developing countries as a strategy for poverty reduction. Scholars and 
practitioners based on the success in Latin America hypothesised that citizens’ participation 
in resource allocation (through the budgeting process) leads to addressing the priority 
concerns of the citizens in their communities, and therefore their well-being, through poverty 
reduction (Sterling, Grunfelder and Borges, 2006). The hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that participants in the budgeting process are fully involved in determining their local needs 
by identifying service options for investment and disinvestment, evaluating these options, 
based on available evidence and data, to make resource allocations. Based on the above 
assumptions stakeholders involvement in the process of budgeting in local governments, is 
considered to be one of the means of increasing and enhancing service delivery as it promotes 
accountability efficiency and effectiveness   (Franklin and Ebdon, 2004).  
This study explores how the process of participatory budgeting introduced by supranational 
agencies under NPM reforms operates in developing countries, and whether the desired 
outcomes are achieved. The study was undertaken in the context of Uganda’s decentralised 
local government system. 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
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1.2   Statement of the Problem 
The subject of participatory budgeting has received considerable attention in the normative 
and descriptive literature (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1980; Ebdon, 2002; Acioly et al., 2002; 
Awio and Northcott, 2001; Kelly, et.al, 2008), yet there is “…persistent evidence that citizen 
participation occurs infrequently and has little influence on decision-making” (Franklin and 
Ebdon, 2004:210). Though there are many studies on participatory budgeting, no rigorous 
analytical study has been conducted on how the design features and preconditions of 
participatory budgeting influence its desired outcomes (Goldfrank, 2005). Second, the design 
and how local context affect outcomes has not been theoretically explained. 
Uganda has embraced all public sector reforms as recommended by supranational agencies 
and has been cited as a ‘success’ story in public sector reforms by these agencies (Ellis and 
Freeman, 2004).  The decentralisation policy adopted in 1997 as a system of local governance 
is also referred to as a showcase of potential gains from a neo-conomic reform agenda 
(Hickey, 2003). As Arnstein noted, “there is a critical difference between going through the 
empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the 
process” (Arnstein, 1969:216).  
The above scenario raises a pertinent question: is participatory budgeting process an end in 
itself or a means of addressing the needs and priorities of participants? 
There is little empirical evidence on the goals and outcomes of participation. As Yahya 
(2008) observed, “the benefits of citizen participation have therefore largely remained unclear 
for the local communities, leading to varying expectations and little means for determining 
whether the outcomes of citizen participation are acceptable or even exceed the costs of the 
process” (Yahya, 2008:443). 
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Since the 1980s, a number of African countries (Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, Senegal, 
Mauritius, etc.) have been implementing public sector reforms with the assistance of 
international institutions and agencies. However, according to Amoako (2003), there is scant 
progress and evidence of their impact on these countries (Economic Commission for Africa, 
2003). The existing literature on participatory budgeting has focused on municipalities and 
cities in developed and developing countries (Ebdon, 2002; Ebdon and Franklin, 2004, 2006, 
2007; Rubin, 1990).The social and economic setup in rural areas, especially in developing 
countries, is quite different from the cities and municipalities. Therefore, there is a need to 
explore whether the processes of PB in rural areas are the same and achieve the same 
outcomes as those in municipalities and cities. 
Public sector reforms based on the NPM concept were expected to enhance service delivery 
by making public sector organisations more efficiency and effectiveness (Uddin and Hopper, 
2003; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2004). They further argue that ethnicity, corruption and 
nepotism are rampant, which has affected the success of NPM reforms (Uddin and Hopper, 
2001; Rahaman and Lawrence, 2004). Stglitz’s view is that NPM reforms have failed because 
they do not take into account the local environment within which they are implemented 
(Stglitz, 2002).  
A study conducted by Kasumba (2009) on accounting for local government reforms focused 
on the micro processes and macro-dynamics involved in the adoption and implementation of 
changes in budgeting practices in LG in Uganda. The study was undertaken in Kampala 
District, which is the capital and the only city in Uganda. He recommended further research 
on the effect of the changes in budget practices on resource allocation, utilisation and 
reporting in other local governments, especially in developing countries. Therefore, this study 
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will build and enhance on his work by focusing on the process and outcomes of  participatory 
budgeting using a rural district as a case site. 
Using Uganda as a case study, the study explores and examines whether PB, one of the 
reforms advocated by donor agencies, achieves the desired goals and outcomes in a 
developing country under a decentralised LG form of governance.  
Against the above background comes the need to study whether the blind imposition of NPM 
reforms on developing countries improves the delivery of public services. 
Therefore, this study explores the NPM reforms in public sector financial management by 
examining the process and outcomes of PB in local governments, using Wamala
1
 District 
Council Local Government.  
The study is motivated by the researcher’s desire to study the technical and organisational impact of 
changes in the budgeting systems as part of the management control system advocated by NPM 
donor-led global reforms in addressing the needs of the poor in developing countries. Given the 
researcher’s rural background and the social constructivist discourse orientation, the researcher is 
interested in examining how citizens exercise their rights and responsibilities in matters of public 
financial management. 
1.3   Purpose and Objectives of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to explore and provide a structured account of how the process 
of participatory budgeting operates in a decentralised local government system in a 
developing country. 
The objectives of the study were to: 
                                                     
 
1
 Wamala is  a pseudo name, the real name has been  disguised for purposes of confidentiality 
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1) Explore how participatory budgeting works in a decentralised local government system of 
a developing country, focusing on the process and outcomes. 
2) Examine factors that enhance or inhibit participation by citizens in the process of 
budgeting. 
3) Examine whether involving citizens in the budgeting process achieves the desired goals 
and outcomes. 
 4) Provide policy recommendations that can be made for the PB process that will enhance 
benefits to local communities, especially the poor. 
1.4    Research Questions 
The study explored the following question: How does PB work in a decentralised local 
government system in a developing country? 
In order to contribute to both knowledge and practice, the question is broken down into 
empirical, theoretical and policy relevant sub-questions as below: 
Empirical questions: 
i) How is the PB process conducted in a decentralised local government system in Uganda? 
ii) Is the design of the process and mechanisms for participation appropriate for effective 
citizen participation? 
iii) What are the factors that influence participation? For example, might any political, social, 
economic or environmental circumstances affect the outcome of participation? 
Theoretical question: 
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 How can the process and outcomes from PB be theoretically explained? 
Policy question: 
How might experiences and lessons from the case study be used to improve the PB 
concept?  
Two dimensions of the study are identified: first, the process through which citizens 
participate, focusing on the government environment, participation mechanisms, and the 
design of the participation process; and second, the desired goals and outcomes of 
participation as an outcome from the process. 
1.5   The Structure of the Study 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters that are categorised into four parts as follows; 
 Introduction and Background (Chapter One) 
 Literature Review, Philosophical View and Methodology (Chapters Two, Three and 
Four) 
 Case sites and Findings (Chapters Five and Six) 
 Discussion, Analysis and Conclusions (Chapters Seven and Eight) 
Chapter One provides an introduction and background to the study, the purpose and 
objectives of the study, study justification, motivation, the problem statement, research 
questions, and the structure of the thesis. 
The second part of the thesis comprises three chapters covering the literature review, 
philosophical assumptions and methodology. A review of the extant literature on PB, types of 
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budgeting methodology, participatory budgeting mechanisms and dimensions of participative 
budgeting is presented in Chapter Two. This chapter also examines and analyses literature on 
PB in developing countries, focusing on the experience of Porto Alegre in Brazil and other 
developing countries. A research theoretical model was developed from the reviewed 
literature. 
Chapter Three discusses the theories of Citizenship and Neo-Institutional Sociology (NIS), 
examining the origins and foundation of each. Based on the strengths and weaknesses of each 
theory, a theoretical framework is developed that is selected to be used as a lens in analysing 
and discussing findings from the study.  The selection of a theoretical framework was based 
on applicability and relevance. The chapter discusses the justification and relevance of the 
theory in understanding the PB phenomenon under study. 
Chapter Four has two main sections. The first explains the philosophical assumptions that 
form the basis of selecting the methodology. In the second section the methodology and 
methods applied in the study are described. 
The fifth chapter reviews literature on the Ugandan environment, focusing on public sector 
reforms since 1986. The focus is on reforms that affected the LG in Uganda. This chapter 
explains the evolution of Uganda’s local governance system and public sector financial 
management, focusing on budgeting in local governments. The same chapter provides the 
background for the case sites.  
In Chapter Six finding guided by the research objectives and questions are presented. 
Using the theoretical framework developed, Chapter Seven provides discussion and analysis 
guided by the research objectives and questions. 
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Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter of the study. It reflects on the appropriateness of the 
methodology used in the study, summarises major findings, recommendations arising from 
the findings are made, and contributions to practice and knowledge stated. Finally, limitations 
and research areas that could be of interest for future research are also outlined. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A Review of the Related Literature 
2.1   Introduction 
A literature review is defined as “the selection of available documents, both published and 
unpublished, on the subject of research that contain information, ideas, data and evidence 
relating to the research question” (Hart,1998:13). “A review of the relevant existing literature 
on the problem to be researched is one of the initial vital assignments in undertaking 
academic research” (Kumar, 2005:30). Kumar (2005) argues that a review of relevant 
literature enables the researcher to locate the theoretical roots of the study, clarify ideas and 
develop appropriate methodology to guide the study. A comprehensive review of literature, 
"gives a good basic framework to proceed further with the investigation" by clarifying the 
research problem and identifying likely variables (Sekaran, 1992:38). Therefore, literature 
review needs to relate and explain the research question, identify relevant information, and 
outline existing knowledge regarding the research topic. 
This chapter therefore is divided into two main parts. The first part reviews extant literature, 
both published and unpublished, on budgets, budgeting, budgeting techniques, the history of 
participatory budgeting, and PB in developing countries in general; the second part reviews 
literature on the process and outcomes of participatory budgeting (PB), the focus of this 
study. As recommended by Hart (1998), a research gap was identified from the reviewed 
literature that created a research space for this study and enabled the positioning of this 
research in the context of previous research. 
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2.2   The Concepts of Budget and Budgeting 
2.2.1 Budget 
A budget has been defines by scholars as a plan expressed in quantitative terms, resources 
required to achieve set goals and objectives over a given period of time (Shah, 2007; Ahmad 
et al., 2003; Awio and Northcott, 2001; Lucy, 1996). The budget provides costed activities to 
be undertaken to achieve goals and objectives set out in organisational plans. A budget has 
two components; the revenue side that shows the source of funds, and the expenditure side 
that shows how the money raised will be spent (Lucy, 1996). There are two types of budget: 
(1) the recurrent budget that focuses on general spending policies; (2) the development or 
capital budget that focuses on long term projects or investments.  
Conceptually, a budget is the principal mechanism through which the policy intentions of any 
organisation are translated into concrete actions and results on the ground. In all (developed 
and developing) countries, the budget is an important policy document through which 
governments establish their economic and social priorities and set the direction of the 
economy. In the public sector, budgets are legal instruments that authorise the levying of 
taxes and incurring of public expenditure. Therefore, any budgeting process adopted by a 
public sector organisation should be evaluated on the basis of its effectiveness as a central 
policy tool to achieve set goals and objectives. Lucy (1996) also concluded that budgets of 
public sector organisations should reflect fundamental social, political and economic 
intentions of governments.  
The definition of a budget and its relevance as a management tool for organisations is not in 
contention by scholars. The requirement to have a budget in place for public sector 
organisations is not an option but a legal requirement, whereas in the private sector it is 
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considered best practice. The process of coming up with a budget is what is referred to as 
budgeting. 
2.2.2 Budgeting 
Budgeting is a process that involves planning, allocating resources, and coordinating an 
organisation's activities. The main purpose of budgeting is to aid planning; coordinate 
activities; communicate plans to various responsible managers; motivate employees; control 
activities by comparing actuals with budgets; evaluate performance; and express conformity 
with social norms (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2001; Preston, 1995, Emmanuel and Otley, 
1985; Ezzamel and Hart, 1987; Luft and Shields, 2003). Based on the above listed objectives 
for budgeting, Uddin (2005) concluded that budgets have an important role in a management 
control system of both public and private sector organisations. However, it is not clear 
whether when citizen are involved in the process of budgeting, chances of achieving desired 
budgeting objectives are enhanced in a decentralised local government system in a 
developing country. 
2.3   Budgeting Techniques 
Budgeting techniques are economic frameworks specifically designed to aid those charged 
with the responsibility of setting priorities, to ensure that they maximise the benefits from the 
available resources. The technique or approach adopted by an organisation in the preparation 
of a budget has an effect on its implementation and outcomes (Lucy, 1996; Luft and Shields, 
2003). The focus of scholars up until the 1950s was on the normative theory of budgeting, 
trying to identify the most theoretically appropriate budgeting technique. After the 1950s, the 
focus changed to descriptive theory focusing on the most appropriate budgeting techniques to 
achieve the desired budget objectives (Forrester and Adams, 1997).  
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Budgeting reforms resulting from pressures for efficiency, accountability and effectiveness in 
resource allocation led to the rationality based budgeting system known as the performance 
budgeting approach. This approach was built on the realisation that, in order to cause change 
in budget outcomes, there was a need to change the budgeting process (Kelly and Rivenbark, 
2011). However, reforms over the years have not changed the traditional line item format of 
budgets and the incremental approach to budgeting (Kelly and Rivenbark, 2011). Thus we 
have two approaches to budgeting: incremental and performance budgeting techniques that 
are examined below. 
2.3.1 Incremental Budgeting  
The incremental approach (also referred to as the traditional budgeting system) begins with 
the previous budget figures as a base; the previous estimates are reviewed to take into 
account changing conditions like inflation and other variables that are considered relevant for 
the coming fiscal year. The incremental budgeting system is mainly aimed at making the 
budget a tool for financial compliance (Wildavsky, 1964). In this regard, the technique 
ignores key issues such as objectives which the government wants to achieve, how these 
objectives are linked to the budget and how inputs can be efficiently combined to deliver the 
desired services. 
Rubin (1998) and Wildavsky (1964) also noted that incremental budgeting does not take into 
account budgeting for programmes that cut across departments, and ignores the effect of the 
budgeting environment on the budgeting process. Stakeholders are not considered to be 
relevant in the budgeting process, with emphasis being placed on bureaucrats and conflict 
avoidance, which results in clientelism in the budgeting process. This represents a budgeting 
system that describes consensus amongst budget actors rather than institutional competition, 
helping to minimise budget conflicts among stakeholders over resource allocations (Kelly 
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and Rivenbark, 2008). At the same time, it has been argued that because the approach is 
premised on historical performance, power relations are re-enforced and this undermines the 
ability of those involved in the process in making analysis as expected during the budgeting 
exercise (Schick, 1998). 
However, Wildavsky (1986) maintained that the incremental budgeting technique, with its 
line–item format, did not need reform, arguing that other formats tried had failed. He later 
realised that owing to political and economic environment changes, budget processes are 
variable, depending on the level of resources, local culture and history of the organisation. 
The incremental method of budgeting has the advantage of being simple. This is because the 
incremental budgeting technique is basically a review of the previous budget. Being a review 
of the previous budget implies that in most cases previous shortcomings of the previous 
budget are automatically carried forward in the new budget.  
2.3.2 Performance Budgeting Techniques 
As a result of shortcomings in the incremental budgeting technique, and as part of the NPM 
reforms in developed and developing countries in the 1980s, budgeting focus turned to 
budgetary reforms that aimed at macro-economic stability. The techniques of performance 
budgeting include the following approaches:1) zero-base budgeting; 2)  Kaizen Budgeting;  
3) Planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) and 4) Output Budgeting. 
2.3.2.1 Zero base budgeting (ZBB) 
Zero base budgeting emanates from public management theory under the concept of rational 
public management that emphasises the measurement of performance and rewarding of 
employees based on documented results (Lerner and Wanat, 1992). Under this approach 
items to be included in the budget must be justified by analysing the benefits to be obtained 
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from each expenditure allocations. Previous expenditures whose benefits are lower than the 
cost are dropped in the new budget. The approach of justifying all budget items enables 
budget officers to address the weakness of incremental budgeting, as they are able to 
eliminate the inefficiencies of the previous budget. Thus, under ZBBB only activities and 
programmes whose benefits to the organisation are expected to exceed costs will be included 
in the budget. This leads to better allocation of resources, one of the principal objectives of 
budgeting. However, it is also argued that by focusing on cost benefit analysis in making 
budgeting decisions, there is a danger that long term strategic objectives may be sacrificed for 
short term objectives.  
2.3.2.2 Kaizen Budgeting 
This budgeting technique is attributed to Deming, an American statistician, drawn from his 
experience in Japan after World War II (Lawless, 2006). “The concept Kaizen comes from 
two Japanese words: ‘kai’ meaning ‘change’ and ‘zen’, meaning ‘good’. Thus, Kaizen 
implies continuous improvement” (Cane, 1996:3). The Kaizen approach to budgeting has 
four stages; the first, “analyses every part of a process down to the small detail; second sees 
how every part can be improved; third looks at how employees’ actions, equipment, and 
materials can be improved and lastly looks at ways of saving time and reducing waste” 
(Cane, 1996:8). The process of designing a Kaizen budget integrates improvements expected 
at the start of the year. It also encourages analysis of performance improvements and cost 
savings and views employees as key to solving organisational problems (Atkinson et al., 
2001). The comparison of benefits and costs of any improvement is examined in terms of cost 
reductions under dynamic conditions that best fit the organisation. Budgeting under the 
Kaizen approach is evaluated based on both the numbers achieved, as well as the achieving 
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the expected improvements: “The budget numbers are based on changes that are to be 
implemented, rather than on current practices or methods” (Horngren, 2006:185). 
2.3.2.4 Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) 
The need to also take the qualitative aspect of expenditure into account is given as the basis 
for launching the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS), in 1965 (Schick, 1966; 
Wildavsky, 1969). According to Solem and Werner (1968:222), “The basic objectives of a 
PPB system are: (a) to define jurisdictional objectives clearly and to relate them to defined 
needs and goals; (b) to review and analyse existing and  new programs to justify their 
inclusion in the new budget (c) to link the planning and budgeting process through the annual 
review of multiple year plans; (d) to measure actual and planned performance; and (e) to 
provide a systematic way of integrating all of these elements in order to arrive at a more 
effective system for the allocation and management of resources”. PPBS was introduced with 
an objective of overcoming administrative compartmentalisation and to integrate special 
programmes and projects into decision making during the budgeting process. This was done 
by making programmes independent of established organisational structures and affiliation 
(Harper and Kramer, 1969). Programme budgeting and PPBS-like approaches were attempted 
repeatedly in many developed countries in the late 1960s and 1970s, but were gradually 
dropped in the 1980s (Argarwala, 1984).  
2.3.2.5 Output Budgeting 
Extensive accounting literature discusses changes in budgetary practices in the public sector 
organisations (Lapsley, 1999; Lapsley and Pallot, 2000; Ezzamel,, 2007; Lapsley, 2008). The 
main features of changes in budgetary practices in the public sector include the preparation of 
annual budgets shifting from line-item budgets to output and outcome-orientated budgets 
(Ridder et al., 2005; Monsen, 2002; Bogt, 2008), based on development plans formulated on 
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the medium term (World Bank, 1998; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005; Anipa et al., 
1999). The critics of line-item budgeting argue that such budgeting cannot lead to the optimal 
allocation and utilisation of scarce resources (Hope and Fraser, 2003; Preston, 1995). The 
reviewed literature suggests that there are different techniques of developing budgets. The 
determinant factors on which technique to apply depend on various factors that include: the 
environment within which the organisation operates; information needs of stakeholders and 
the technical competence of key players in the budgeting process (Wang and Gianakis, 1999; 
Willoughby and Melkers, 2000). However, from extant literature it is clear that participatory 
budgeting is not a technique, but a method, or an approach to budgeting. This budgeting 
approach is addressed next. 
2.4   The Concept of Citizen Participation 
The concept of citizen participation in the budgeting process has been extensively examined 
by scholars (Herian, 2011; Miller and Evers, 2002). Various scholars are all in agreement that 
participation of stakeholders in the budgeting process adds value (Stivers, 1990; Awio, 
Lawrence and Northcott, 2007; Ho and Coates, 2002). Scholars’ interest mainly lies in 
examining how citizens’ involvement the process of budgeting influences service delivery to 
the satisfaction of those who participate (Halverson, 2003; Kweit and Kweit,  1987). Zanetti 
(1998) recognised the concept of citizen participation in public financial management. It has 
been argued that by allowing citizens to participate in matters that concern them, should not 
be seen as a means of achieving consensus, but also as an avenue to sensitise and educate 
citizens, to develop their highest capacities (Stivers, 1990). Similarly, Frederickson argues 
that managers of public organisations and institutions should take into account management 
practices that are likely to enhance stakeholders’ involvement if they are to embrace changes 
that will have an impact on achieving desired goals and objectives (Frederickson, 1997). 
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According to Moynihan, citizens’ participation can be categorised into three levels: full, 
partial and pseudo participation. At each level, the representation of citizens can either be 
narrow or broad as summarised in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1 Typology of Citizen Participation 
                                  Representativeness 
Level Broad Narrow 
Full 
Decisions Public officials make decisions 
but citizens have strong 
influence. 
Public officials and selected interest groups 
make decisions. 
 
Participation Large, diverse groups of citizens 
engage in meaningful discourse 
with government. 
Interest groups exert significant influence; 
most citizens lack opportunities to 
participate. 
Partial 
Decision Public officials make decisions; 
citizens have limited influence. 
Government elite make decisions; interest 
groups have limited influence. 
Participation Large, diverse groups of citizens 
engage in limited discourse with 
government. 
Interest groups exert influence; most citizens 
lack opportunities to participate. 
 
Pseudo 
Decisions Public officials make decisions. Public officials make decisions in a non-
transparent manner. 
Participation Participation is symbolic but 
involves large, diverse groups of 
citizens. 
Participation is symbolic, involving only a 
small number of citizens 
 
Source: Adapted from Moynihan 2003. 
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2.5   The Concept of Participatory Budgeting 
The concept of PB is deeply rooted in the principles of democracy, transparency and 
accountability (Monfardini, 2005). Anderson (1995) made similar observations after the 
Porto Allegro experience in 1989 that involving citizens in the budgeting process enhances 
democracy, transparency and accountability. Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) stated that, budgets 
can either be participatory or imposed. Thus the concept of stakeholder participation is the 
underlying principle of PB. Based on this categorisation, PB is not a budgeting technique or 
method but a description of a process mechanism through which a budget can be developed 
and managed. Therefore, PB is a budgeting method whereby all stakeholders in the budget to 
be developed participate in the entire process of its preparation, approval, management and 
evaluation (Share, 2001; Acioly and Herzog et al., 2002; UNHABITAT, 2004;Allegretti, 
2006; Shah, 2007; Wampler, 2007; MDP-ESA, 2007). Thus, unlike budgeting techniques, PB 
goes beyond the development phase and extends to involving stakeholders in the 
management and evaluation stages of the budget. It is therefore possible for the process of 
participatory budgeting to use any budgeting technique outlined above in developing a 
budget. This supports the argument by various scholars that performance budgeting requires a 
participative approach to performance measurement (Ingraham, Thompson and Sanders, 
1998; Julnes and Holzer, 2001; Joyce, 2003). The whole process of budgeting works under 
uncertainty, as it is concerned with future projection. Benefits associated with a participative 
approach include: 1) ability to access knowledge and experience; (2) enhancing chances of 
integrating new ideas into organisational procedures; (3) promoting unanimity among 
stakeholders; and (4) promoting a culture of performance throughout the organisation (Julnes, 
2001; Burke and Costello, 2005; Yang and Hsieh, 2008; Lu, 2008). Abers (2000) identifies 
three problems of participation: a) Implementation - the powerful often resist changes; b) 
Inequality - social-economic inequalities inhibit the effective participation of certain groups 
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of people; and c) Co-option - control of information and resources leads to manipulation of 
participatory avenues by government officials. According to the World Bank (2004), the 
principal goal of participation is empowering social groups that have been typically ignored 
by social and economic development policies: participation means having an opportunity to 
present views and influence decision on a given subject matter. The World Bank also asserts 
that in participation, multilateral organisations seek “…transparency, accountability and 
voice of local people particularly the poor” (World Bank, 1994:42). 
This raises a pertinent question: What is participation? And what does stakeholders’ 
participation in the budgeting process mean and involve? 
According to Miller and Monge (1986), three models of participation influence decision-
making: cognitive, effective and contingency. The cognitive concept is premised on the 
thinking that participation improves the flow of information from bottom to top, leading to 
quality decision-making. The effective model reasons that participation enhances self-
realisation, as advocated by McGregor’s (1960) theory about motivation. The effective model 
thus concerns itself with the focuses on the passionate gains of participation. On the other 
hand, the contingency model assumes that the level and effectiveness of participation depend 
on circumstances. While the cognitive and effective models express the logic behind 
participation, it has been argued that the contingency model states that to be effective, certain 
conditions for participation must be in place, including: participants’ attitudes, organisational 
context and the kind  of decisions to be made (Connor, 1992; Sagie, 1994; Scully et al., 
1995).  
Participation is also viewed from the political point of view, whereby it is seen as part of 
democracy, that is, looked at in the context of citizens’ rights to participate in matters that 
concern them. It has also been argued that participation enhances democratic values that are 
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necessary for enhancing and improving service delivery in public organisations. Top-down 
incremental budget formulation processes in the public sector are criticised for their 
inadequacy in being able to lead to the optimal allocation of resources (Hope and Fraser, 
2003; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This leads to the question: What does stakeholders’ 
participation mean?  
There have also been considerable arguments in favour of participatory approaches to 
decision-making (Wampler, 2000, 2007; Askim and Hanseen, 2008; Irvin and Stansbury, 
2004; Orr and McAteer, 2004; Callanan, 2005); in particular, changes in budgetary control in 
the public sector, especially in local governments, are intended to promote participatory 
approaches, involving various stakeholders in the management of financial resources, which 
is believed to lead to effective and transparent resource utilisation (Wampler, 2000, 2007).  
Moynihan (2003) analysis also revealed that civil society plays an important role in ensuring 
that PB achieves its intended outcomes, as in most cases non-government organisations 
(NGOs) represent the citizen, especially the poor, in presenting and disseminating their views 
to government.  
Songco (2001:28) states that “transparency of the budget process opens up the government’s 
budget to public scrutiny and will certainly make it more efficient”. But there is no 
convincing evidence that there is transparency in the budgeting process in the developing 
countries where citizens have been involved in that process. On the contrary, there is 
evidence that in most cases transparency is lacking, leading also to lack of accountability, 
which is examined in the next section.  
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2.5.1 Accountability 
Various scholars have studied and developed the concept of accountability from different 
perspectives (Bovens, 2005). Accountability can be analysed from the financial perspective, 
examining how resources received were applied; it can be conceptualised from the social 
dimension, focusing on how an organisation or individual is accountable to the wider public 
or community; and it can be analysed from the political viewpoint, focusing on how elected 
political leaders fulfil their manifesto and give feedback to their electorate. Thus, the concept 
of accountability has political, social and financial dimensions. Transparency aims at 
enhancing accountability to all stakeholders, focusing on the above three dimensions 
(financial, social and political). Therefore, this study limits its analysis to external 
accountability of the PB process in terms of desired outcomes, focusing on these three 
dimensions.  
In this study, PB is reviewed as a process that involves formulation, approval, 
implementation, control, monitoring and evaluation of both recurrent and development 
income and expenditure of public resources. The focus of the study is to explore the process 
of PB and whether participation by stakeholders achieves desired goals and outcomes. The 
aim of the study is to make a contribution to the financial management body of knowledge on 
how, in practice, an interactive participative budgeting process is conducted in developing 
countries, and its outcomes. The next section describes the extent to which PB has been 
embraced by developing countries. 
2.5.2 PB and Developing Countries 
The relevance of participatory budgeting in developing countries has been based on the 
following arguments: a) the process of participatory budgeting provides an opportunity for an 
open and transparency mechanism for policy making and this reduces the clientilism common 
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in most developing countries; b) participatory budgeting increases the chances of allocating 
more resources to those areas that are more likely to benefit low income groups; c) by 
involving marginalised groups in the process of resource allocation, a forum is created that 
enables low income citizens to put forward and advocate for their priority needs; d)  
participatory budgeting provides an opportunity to government to educate their citizens on 
their rights and responsibilities as citizens, which in the long run also promotes social justice; 
e) it is also believed that when developing countries involve their citizens in the budgeting 
process, accountability, transparency and efficiency are enhanced, as  citizens are made 
aware of government operations and how resources are mobilised and utilised for the 
common good (Shah, 2007). Shah (2007) further states that tremendous achievements in 
terms of political, social and economic development have been made in those local 
governments of both developed and developing countries where citizens have been involved 
in the budgeting process. 
Transparencies, lack of democracy and corruption have been identified as key hindrances to 
effective service delivery. Donor countries believe that to address the above hindrances, 
stakeholders especially in local governments, should participate in all affairs that concern 
them including the budgeting process (World Bank, 1992, 2000; Fjelstad et al., 2004; United 
Nations, 2003). In Porto Alegre, Brazil, where PB was part of a large programme to extend 
and deepen democracy, there was evidence that, as a result of PB, low income people and 
neighbourhoods were getting increasing benefits from public resource allocations and 
spending ( Wampler and Avritzer, 2004). The World Bank Report (2007) also reported that in 
Porto Alegre there was an increase in government spending in areas considered occupied by 
the poor after their involvement in the process of budgeting. It was also observed that this 
also led to increased efficiency and reduced corruption in these areas that is attributed to their 
participation in the budgeting process. This experience was the basis used by donors in the 
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1990s to encourage developing countries to embrace PB as a means to enhance democracy 
and address poverty. Thus a number of developing countries adopted changes in budgetary 
practices as part of NPM reforms (complying with ‘best practices’) promoted by 
supranational agencies as a way of ensuring continued access to international development 
financing (Uddin and Hopper, 2003; Tambulasi, 2007). Advocates of NPM reforms in 
developing countries believed that they would promote informed decision-making (Modell 
and Lee, 2001; Pendlebury, 1994; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005). Heimans (2002) also 
argues that PB matters because it promises to improve social and economic outcomes while 
increasing confidence in public institutions. 
Literature on the success of PB in developing countries is mixed. Scholars from international 
agencies like WB show evidence that PB leads to optimal allocation and utilisation of 
resources in developing countries (Wampler, 2000; 2007; Moynihan, 2007; World Bank, 
2006; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). The World Bank Report (2006) argued that PB could lead 
to better allocation and utilisation of resources in developing countries. Hickey and Mohan 
(2006) have also stated that in the Indian states of Bengal and Kerala, PB contributed to 
enacting pro-poor policies. However, they also concurred with various scholars (Callanan, 
2005; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Francis and James, 2003), that the processes and structures 
of PB were dominated by the elites. The existing literature also shows evidence that in some 
cases PB processes are undertaken for purposes of securing legitimacy, and the process is 
reduced to mere consultation, whereby input from participants is not reflected in the final 
budgets (Bräutigam, 2004; Lapsley, 2008). This school of thought was well articulated in the 
Harare Communiqué (2007), which asserted that PB was a mere rhetoric, as challenges 
facing developing countries such as low levels of literacy, information asymmetry and 
inadequate funding were not conducive to a an effective PB process (Wampler, 2000, 2007). 
This reinforced the view that the implementation of PB by developing countries was a 
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strategy of gaining legitimacy from donor agencies that linked PB to good governance 
(Wampler, 2000, 2007; Lapsley, 2008). In the context of developing countries, the World 
Bank (1998) attributes poor budgeting outcomes to a lack of integration of the processes of 
policy formulation, planning and budgeting (Hopper et al., 2003; Wickramasinghe and 
Hopper, 2005). According to the World Bank (1998), the lack of integration of development 
planning and annual budgeting does not lead to the optimal allocation and utilisation of 
scarce resources in developing countries. In Nigeria, Agbakoba and Ogbonna (2004) noted 
that local governments, because of corruption, incompetent staff and high dependence on 
central government funding, failed to achieve their goals due to poor budget implementation. 
This confirms the observation by some scholars that lack of technical capacity, effective 
mechanisms, transparency and accountability affect budget management and controls in 
developing countries (Peters, 2002; Mase and Devas, 2004). 
Thus the available literature indicates that PB enables those citizens who were previously 
excluded from the decision making process in matters that concern them, because of their 
social status, to have a platform to express their priorities in the allocation of public 
resources. In developing countries, PB has been used for political, social, economic and other 
purposes in the disguise of promoting equity, efficiency, accountability and transparency. 
This leads to another question: How have developing countries implemented these reforms? 
2.5.3 Reforms in Implementing Participatory Budgeting 
In developing countries, reforms in the local government system were aimed at empowering 
local governments to play a leading role in delivering services to residents in their areas of 
jurisdiction, while central government focuses on policy making, providing legal 
frameworks, oversight and evaluating performance. This was based on the argument that: 
since local governments are closer to the people, they are better placed to know the needs and 
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priorities of their residents and thus the services required to meet their needs (Wampler, 2000, 
2007; Lapsley, 2008) 
The adoption of NPM reforms in developing countries, especially in Africa, was imposed by 
donor countries as a condition for accessing aid. As a result, although many African countries 
have committed themselves to new public management reforms such as decentralisation and 
privatisation, implementation of these reforms has to a large extent not achieved desired goals 
and objectives due to a number of factors, which is a subject of this study (Harare 
Communiqué, 2007).  
Goldfrank (2007) studied the adoption of participatory budgeting in Latin America. He 
observed that adoption of PB was successful where: a) there was commitment on the part of 
political leaders; b) civil society organisations were active and willing to get involved in 
policy debates on allocation of public resources; c) the  political environment was conducive 
and people could freely express themselves; d) resources were made available to finance 
projects identified by participants in the during the budgeting process; e) legal frameworks 
were in place giving legal backing to PB; f) there was fiscal transparency; and, g) the local 
government systems were effective. Based on the above , he concluded that “the design 
features that ultimately aided the deepening of democracy in Porto Alegre, a high degree of 
participant decision-making power, a wide range of issues under debate, and an informal 
structure were contingent upon a decentralized national state that afforded resources and 
responsibilities tithe municipal government and a set of weakly institutionalized local 
opposition parties that failed to resist the participation program forcefully” (Goldfrank, 
2005:9). This concurs with Goldfrank and Schneider’s (2006) observation that adoption of 
PB is a political decision that is subject to opposition by other political organisations.  
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Governments planning to implement participatory budgeting should be prepared to undertake 
reforms. The political leadership should be willing to embrace reforms and practices that 
have been successful in other countries (World Bank, 1998).  
2.5.4 Experiences of PB in Developed and Developing Countries 
2.5.4.1 Experiences in developed countries 
A number of studies have been carried out in developed countries, for example the United 
Kingdom, Spain Italy and Germany (Abers, 2000; Herzberg, 2001; Avritzer, 2002; Allegretti, 
2003; Baiocchi, 2005; Gret and Sintomer, 2005; Ebdon, Krane and Franklin, 2012). Success 
in these countries has been attributed to three main factors: a) the existence of grassroots 
democracy; b) evidence that more resources are allocated to those areas that have a deficient 
infrastructure than areas with a high quality of life; c) citizens’ contributions to the budgeting 
process are taken into account in the final budget, thus they believe that they have control 
over the process. Ebdon, Krane and Franklin (2012) carried out a study in which they 
compared citizens’ participation in China, the US and Brazil. Their findings have been 
analysed and summarised in Table 2.2 below, using a framework developed by Ebdon and 
Franklin (2006).  
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From the above analysis, they concluded that participatory budgeting can only succeed if the 
following contextual conditions exist: a) a legal framework that provides for citizen 
participation, provides some degree of autonomy to local governments and accessibility to all 
budget documents and information; b) vibrant civil social organisations that are able and 
willing to mobilise citizens to participate in the budgeting process; and c) technical officers 
and government officials who are committed and willing to involve citizens in decision 
making regarding resource allocations. Their findings are consistent with similar research 
findings by Shah (2007) from other countries. 
2.5.4.2 Developing Countries 
A number of developing countries have a legal framework requiring citizens’ participation in 
the planning and budgeting process (Dodoo, 1998; Hope and Chikulo, 2000). The 1993 
Constitution of South Africa, contains provisions that are aimed at ensuring citizen 
participation in local government affairs (Shall, 2007). However, a number of challenges 
have been cited that include poor communication, different educational background making it 
difficult to understand documents prepared by technocrats, different social status and petty 
conflicts between technical staff and political leaders and the perennial shortage of resources 
(Moore, 2007; Olowo, 2002). 
Krylova in her survey of Ukraine’s experience in participatory budgeting, established that 
failure by government to mobilise citizens, unavailability of materials for training, and 
information asymmetry among key player in the budgeting process were responsible for poor 
participation in the process of budgeting process by stakeholders in Ukraine. Krylova’s 
(2007) results are in agreement with Fölscher’s (2007) findings in Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand that PB can enhance service delivery that are 
required by the residents and generate more resources for local development. The two 
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surveys also concurred that conditions facilitating effective participation include: good 
information; combinations of more than one mechanism; raising awareness and education of 
stakeholders; provision of incentives to participants; and clear rules for participation and 
decision-making. Fölscher recommended that initiatives need to be established to put these 
conditions in place before introducing participatory budgeting. 
Some researchers have claimed that the concept of participatory budgeting does not 
effectively work in developing countries, in private or public sector organisations (Hoque, 
1993). This view is based on cited problems of implementing participatory budgeting in 
developing countries that include: (1) budgets are considered as a pressure to the subordinates 
(Argyris, 1952); (2) most organisations in developing countries use traditional historical cost 
information (Knanam and Ahmed,1997); (3) most decisions are centralised and involve less 
delegated management (Uddin and Hopper, 2001); (4) job insecurity due to high 
unemployment (Uddin and Hopper, 2001); (5) prevalence of political interference in 
developing countries (Hoque and Hopper,1993); and (6) lack of education and experience in 
budgeting in top management (Uddin, 2005). 
Experiences in participatory budgeting in both developed and developing countries are 
summarised in Table 2.3 below: 
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2.6   Budgeting Process 
The budgeting process has two components that in total have five stages, see Figure 2.1.  
        
 5. Control      1.Planning 
 Investigate variances 
 Take corrective action •Develop goals and objectives 
 
  
 4. Monitoring 2.Development 
 •Follow up on        •Agree and cost activities
 agreed activities  for each goal and objective 
 Compare actual and plan  •Estimate revenues 
3. Implementation 
 Undertake agreed activities and Record transactions (Fin. System) 
Figure 2.1 Budgeting Process 
Source: Adapted from University of Colorado at Boulder, Departmental Financial 
Management Guide (2003) 
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2.6.1 Planning Phase 
The planning phase identifies the desired outcomes of the planning organisation and the 
required resources necessary. As Shah (2007) pointed out, a participatory budgeting process 
involves stakeholders debating, analysing, prioritising and mobilising resources, monitoring 
and evaluating the expenditure of public funds and investments as well as influencing the 
allocation of public resources. Therefore, stakeholders should be involved in the two main 
phases of the budgeting process (Figure 2.1). The factors and the actual role played by the 
stakeholders and how this affects the outcome of the budget is the concern of this study. This 
phase involves developing goals and objectives as a starting point. Stakeholders in the 
budgeting process include: political leaders, technical staff and citizens including business 
communities (Wampler, 2007). According to Wampler (2007), each of these stakeholders has 
a motive for participation, which may be different. Therefore, the challenge is how to 
harmonise the different interests of the stakeholders in agreeing on budget goals and 
objectives. Sub national governments are faced with a further challenge of meeting the 
expectations of the central government, whose priorities may be different from those of the 
local stakeholders. According to Ebdon (2004), an effective participatory process should 
meet the following criteria: (1) budget input should be representative of the community; (2) 
the process should give an opportunity to a large number of citizens to participate; (3) budget 
input should occur early in the process; (4) participants should be able to sincerely reveal 
their preference/willingness to pay; (5) there should be a free-flow of information among all 
stakeholders; and (6) Inputs by participants in the process should be taken into account in the 
final budget. 
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2.6.2 Control Phase 
The control phase focuses on implementation, monitoring and control of the budget, see 
Figure 2.2. 
                                                         Review Performance 
 
 
                                                  Review Budget 
Figure 2.2 The Budget Control Process 
Source: Gleaned from literature  
In this phase, the financial accounting system provides reports of actual performance during 
the implementation and monitoring stage (normally on a monthly basis). Actual performance 
is compared to the plan. Where performance does not match the plan, corrective action is 
taken to either enhance performance or review the budget and make it more realistic. 
The next section reviews the four elements that impact on the PB process that have emerged 
from the reviewed literature.  
2.7   Elements of the PB Process 
Ebdon and Franklin (2008) identified four key elements (variables) of the participatory 
budgeting process: (1) government environment; (2) participation mechanisms; (3) design of 
the participation process; and (4) goals and outcomes of the budget. They categorised the four 
elements into two dimensions: process and outcomes. The study’s focus is on these two 
dimensions, which are examined and analysed below. 
Budget 
Figures 
Compare 
actual & 
budget 
(Variances) 
Take 
corrective 
action 
Implement 
& monitor 
(Financial 
System) 
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2.7.1 Government Environment 
Ebdon and Franklin (2004), in their study of citizen participation in Topeka and Wichita, 
concluded that in designing a budgeting process that aims at involving stakeholders’ 
participation, consideration should be given to political and environmental issues as they can 
negatively impact on the process and outcomes. Extant literature indicates that the process of 
PB will not be effective where: (a) the government is not committed to empowering the 
participants; (b) matters to be considered are of little interest to participants or to technical for 
them to comprehend; and (c) it is regarded as a one-off project (Moynihan, 2007; Folscher, 
2007b; Goldfrank, 2007; Ebdon and Franklin, 2008; Ebdon and Franklin, 2004; Franklin, 
2001). 
Franklin (2001) observed that where participatory processes do not recognise the dynamics of 
local politics, economic conditions and social setting, the participatory processes can be 
captured by elites and this may negatively affect the desired outcomes.  
2.7.2 Design of the Participation Process 
Various scholars have recommended that the design for an effective participatory process 
should take into account various factors that include expected goals, mechanism for 
participation, implementation procedures and the environment within which participation will 
take place (Franklin, 2001;Wampler, 2007; Moynihan, 2007; Folscher, 2007b; 
Goldfrank,2007). Therefore, the design of the process has an impact on the suitability of 
mechanisms for participation, which is examined in the next section. 
2.7.3 Participation Mechanisms 
Ebdon and Franklin (2004) concluded that coming up with an appropriate mechanism for 
citizen participation requires adequate resources in terms of time and effort by key players 
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A variety of mechanisms to involve stakeholders in the budgeting process at local level have 
been used in government budgeting (Ebdon and Franklin, 2007). The commonly used 
mechanism in developing countries has been come one come all public meeting, conferences 
and consultative meetings involving key and influential stakeholders. In Uganda structures 
that were established from village level to national level have been used as mechanisms for 
citizens’ participation. According to Suwnmala (2007) in Thailand focus group arrangements 
for participation in the budgeting process have been successfully used to produce desired 
outcomes.  
2.7.4 Goals and Outcome of PB 
Two sets of outcomes have been identified as a result of involving citizens in the budgeting 
process: enhanced democracy, transparency and accountability; and the material benefits for 
low income groups, in terms of better services and anti-poverty programmes (Navarro, 1998; 
Blair, 1998; Songco, 2001). Heimans (2002) argued that participatory budgeting matters 
because it promises to improve social and economic outcomes while increasing confidence in 
public institutions. Therefore, to effectively implement development strategies and achieve 
intended goals and outcomes, there is a need to link policies plans and budgets, and to 
involve citizens (beneficiaries) in the process (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006). Navarro (1998) 
highlights factors that helped Porto Alegre to success with PB: (a) participation by citizens 
was constitutionalised; (b) existence of political will for stakeholders’ participation in the 
planning and budgeting process; and (c) there was an established network of association in 
the municipal local government.  
Songco (2001) and Heimans (2002) identified four direct benefits to the poor as a result of 
PB: (a) pro-poor policies can be adopted that takes into account their priorities; (b) provides 
opportunities to access resources in the budget; (c) due to transparency and demand for 
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accountability corruption and mismanagement can be reduced; (d) scarce resources are more 
effectively utilised for the benefit of all stakeholders; and (e) quality and  delivery of services 
is likely to be improved and enhanced. 
This research focuses on three areas that are considered to constitute evidence of outcomes. 
First, the information generated from the participatory process will be used by the local 
council to influence budget allocation to priorities identified by participants in the budgeting 
process (Long and Franklin, 2008). Second, transparency and accountability will be enhanced 
through two-way communication. Third, the capacity of participants in public financial 
management will be enhanced and lead to their satisfaction and motivate them to participate 
in future budgeting processes. When outcomes are achieved, it is more likely that citizens 
will be motivated to participate in future and this will make the participatory budgeting 
concept sustainable. 
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2.8   Participatory Budgeting Framework 
Figure 2.3 summarises the participatory budgeting literature reviewed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Participatory Budgeting Framework 
Source: (Adapted from Ebdon and Franklin, 2006; Heimans, 2002). 
The PB process involves six stages, outlined in the first box. The PB process is influenced by 
the government environment, design of the process and mechanism of participation adopted, 
as listed in the second box. The PB and capabilities processes are expected to lead to the 
desired outcomes listed in the last box. This study explores how the above relationship works 
in a decentralised local government system and the likely factors that influence and affect the 
above relationship. 
2.9   Summary 
This chapter has established that there has been a shift from line-item budgets that emphasise 
compliance and expenditure control to performance based budgeting that is result orientated. 
It has also emerged that participatory budgeting is not a budgeting technique but an approach 
to the way in which budgets are formulated, approved and implemented. Factors that inhibit 
and enhance citizens’ participation in the budgeting process have been identified from studies 
undertaken by various scholars in different countries, both developed and developing. It has 
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 Planning 
 Formulation 
 Approval 
 Implementation 
 Monitoring/Control 
 Evaluation 
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emerged that participatory budgeting as part of NPM reforms promoted by donor 
supranational agencies is forced on developing countries without taking the local 
environment into account. The reviewed literature also provides evidence that involving 
stakeholders in the allocation of resources using the PB concept brings benefits to all 
stakeholders. However, its implementation involves a number of challenges that hinder the 
achievement of these benefits, and these need to be explored. Similarly, the key question of 
this research: How in actual practice participatory budgeting is conducted in a decentralised 
local government system in a developing country and whether desired outcomes are 
achieved, has not been fully answered. The reviewed literature is also inconclusive on what 
needs to be done by developing countries to ensure that the desired objectives are achieved. 
In Chapter Three, the theoretical framework used in the thesis to fill the identified gap in 
literature reviewed and to conceptualise PB in a decentralised local government framework is 
presented. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Theoretical Framework 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework which informs the study. The chapter is 
divided into four sections. The second section discusses the role of theory in academic 
research. In Section Three, some theories used by scholars in management accounting 
research are examined in order to identify those most applicable to this study. The last section 
provides a summary. 
3.2   The Role of Theory 
This section discusses the justification and relevance of theory in understanding the 
participatory budgeting phenomena under study. Roy (2008) explained that theories are 
important to researchers as they enable analysis and discussion of research findings to come 
up with conclusions that can be used as a basis of making predictions and generalisation. 
Thus, theories give guidance to the researcher on the likely outcome of the research and assist 
the researcher to explain the subject that is being researched, explain observed behaviour, and 
provide testable predictions within existing knowledge of the research findings of the study 
(Bourne and Russo, 1998). This was well summarised by Ahrens and Chapman (2006) when 
they stated that theories help researchers to:  
to generate findings that are of interest to the wider management accounting 
research community, the qualitative field researcher must be able to continuously 
make linkages between theory and findings from the field in order to evaluate the 
potential interest of the research as it unfolds. (837) 
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Bourne and Russo (1998) also pointed out that a theory guides the researcher to focus on the 
relevant factors and stimulates logical explanations of results attained from the research. 
Therefore, the theory selected by the researcher should prompt the right questions to be asked 
that will be answered by the study and at the same time act as a lens through which the 
findings are analysed. In summary, theories enable researchers to make testable predictions 
about observable behaviour and to systematise experiences so that the researcher focuses on 
the relevant factors. The next section examines some theories and provides the theoretical 
framework that guided this study. 
3.3.   Proposed Theoretical Framework 
This section reviews the origins and foundation of some theories that have dominated 
management accounting research. Based on the strengths and weaknesses of each, the most 
appropriate theory or combination of theories was selected. Thus, this section provides a 
theoretical framework that was developed and used as a lens through which this study was 
discussed and analysed. 
The two theories that have dominated management accounting research are Agency Theory 
and Contingency Theory (Macy and Arunachalam, 1995; Bale and Dale 1998; Gruening, 
2001; Monfardini, 2005). The two theories are examined in the next two sub-sections; the 
third sub-section provides the adopted theoretical framework. 
3.3.1 Agency Theory 
Researchers in management accounting discipline have used agency theory to explain and 
understand contractual relationships between parties (Moe, 1990; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 
1985). This theory assumes a dual relationship of a principal and an agent, whereby the agent 
undertakes to work under the instructions and interests of the principal for an agreed-upon 
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reward or incentive. Therefore, an agency relationship exists where an individual or a group 
of individuals (the principal[s]) assigns duties and responsibilities to another individual or 
group of individuals (the agent) with power and resources to perform those responsibilities on 
behalf of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The theory regards the relationship 
between the principal and the agent as contractual and thus uses the metaphor of a contract 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus the theory focuses on the most efficient contractual 
governing relationship between the principal and the agent based on certain assumptions 
about people. These assumptions include the ideas that people have self-interest and different 
appetites for risk and are of bounded rationality. It further assumes that people within the 
same organisation have goal conflicts and that information is a commodity that can be traded. 
Since information is regarded as a commodity with a cost, and it can be purchased, the theory 
implies that there is no information asymmetry, which in reality is not the case in local 
governments. Table 3.1 below gives an overview of agency theory. 
Table 3.1 Overview of Agency Theory 
Perspective Assumptions 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect 
efficient organisation of information and risk 
bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions  Self interest 
 Bounded rationality 
 Risk aversion 
Information assumptions Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems  Agency (moral hazard and adverse 
selection) 
 Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and 
agent have partly differing goals and risk 
preferences 
 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989: 59) 
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In summary,  agency theory is anchored in the goal conflict that is inherent when individuals 
who have different interests come together to pursue a common objective but have different 
preferences, and the binding metaphor is that of the contract (Eisenhardt,1989). Thus, the 
focus of the agency theory is on “determining the optimal contract, behaviour versus 
outcome, between the principle and the agent” (Eisenhardt, 1989:60). Therefore, the assumed 
rational utility maximising behaviours by contracting parties does not exist in reality; it is 
instead dominated by conflict arising out of self-interests (Jongwook et al., 2005). Moe 
(1984) viewed the relationship between citizens and political leaders as well as that with 
technical officers as a principal–agent relationship. However, in reality, the relationship 
among the three parties does not reflect a principal-agent relationship, as the citizens who are 
supposed to be the principals and political leaders and technical officers as agents to provide 
the required services act as the exact contrary.  
Carpenter (1980) argued that government accounting models based on agency theory ignore 
the reality that: accounting in public organisations is negatively impacted on by both 
institutional and organisational pressures. As Kunz and Pfaff (2002) observed, agents, being 
rational human beings, will pursue their own interests, which might not conform to the 
interests of the principal. The theory also ignores organisational power struggles that are 
common in local government between political leaders and technical staff, all struggling for 
supremacy in resource allocation and utilisation (Shapiro and Matson, 2008; Lukka, 2007). 
This study examines the process and outcomes of participatory budgeting in actual practice. 
As pointed out by Perrow (1986), agency theory is “hardly subject to empirical test since it 
rarely tries to explain actual events” (Perrow, 1986: 224). Agency theory, if adopted, will 
present a partial view of the world and will not cater for the complexity of the local 
government setting in a developing country (Eisenhardt, 1986). Therefore the agency theory 
is not the most appropriate for analysing participatory budgeting processes, where there is no 
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clear principal agent relationship as  every citizen is regarded as a principal and the rational 
behaviour assumed by the theory does not in most cases exist. 
3.3.2 Contingency Theory 
According to Cadez and Guilding (2008), contingency theory is regarded as a dominant 
paradigm in management accounting research. Contingency theory postulates that 
organisational effectiveness depends on various variables that influence how an organisation 
is managed. Therefore, to achieve the organisational objectives, identifying how different 
behaviour, strategies operate in different setting is important (Macy and Arunachalam, 1995). 
The theory is also premised on the belief that, that there are various ways of managing and 
organising organisations to achieve desired objectives. Thus the performance of an 
organisation depends on how it is structured to fit in different settings. This theory, like 
agency theory, assumes markets with perfect competition and rational agents. Once its 
assumptions are accepted, it becomes a deductive theory that requires almost no contact with 
empirical data (Nadeau, 2003). In some cases, the assumptions fit with human behaviour, 
which makes the theory a useful tool.  The theory primarily focuses on outcomes and not on 
the dynamics through which those outcomes are achieved. Contingency theory is a theory 
about an organisation weighing different situational setting and choosing among various 
alternatives as it also questions the existence of a single best way of organising and managing 
an organisation (Macy and Arunachalam, 1995). The theory’s emphasis is how organisations 
and the managers of those organisations can adapt and survive in different settings. The 
adoption of NPM reforms and implementation of changes in budgetary practices by local 
government goes beyond situational influences that affect the management of an 
organisation. They involve macro dynamics and processes that extend to all citizens. 
Therefore, they may not be properly discussed and analysed using the contingency theory. 
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The objective of this study is to explore how the process of participatory budgeting is 
conducted in a decentralised local government system and whether the desired results are 
achieved, and not how local governments are managed and organised. Therefore, process and 
outcomes of PB cannot be appropriately explored using the contingency theory framework. 
The next sub-sections provide the adopted theoretical framework. 
3.3.3 The Adopted Theoretical Framework 
The study is based on the triangulation of two theories: Citizenship Theory (CT); and Neo-
Institutional Sociology Theory (NIS). 
3.3.3.1 Citizenship Theory 
Citizenship theory has its origin in Public Administration in the field of Administrative Ethics 
(Monfardini, 2005). The theory is derived from the idea of democracy that advocates for 
democratic rights and responsibilities for all citizens. The basic idea behind the theory is that 
public administrators are also citizens whose role is to serve other citizens who pay them for 
that service. This is why public administrators’ are also referred to as public servants 
(Cooper, 2004).  
The theory is anchored on two main concepts: citizen participation and accountability. It 
posits that all citizens should be involved in the affairs of government by exercising their 
rights that are: a) civil/legal; b) political; and c) social rights and responsibilities (Downing, 
1988; Marshall, 1983). It is the responsibility of citizens to ensure that government utilises 
public resources for the benefits of citizens who pay taxes, expecting delivery of public 
services (Forrester, 1999; Bailey and Yalley, 1999). In this sense, the theory views the role of 
the public servant as extremely important (Monfardini, 2005). Mann (1987) noted that 
citizenship can be categorised into two forms: active and passive. He argued that citizenship 
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developed from grassroots generates active citizenship participation, whereas citizenship 
developed from above or merely handed over is likely to take on a passive and negative form. 
Marshall (1977), in his liberal theory of citizenship, classified citizens’ rights and 
responsibilities under three dimensions: civil or legal aspects; political, right to vote, 
associate and participate in government affairs; and social aspects; rights to access welfare 
services like housing, education, healthcare, etc. 
The reforms in public sector management under the NPM have raised issues of democracy 
and ethics that are inherent when private sector management practices and involvement of 
non-elected public servants in the management of public finances are introduced in public 
sector organisations. This trend has led to a greater demand for accountability from public 
sector employees and organisations. Citizen participation in public administration, as one of 
the reforms under NPM, is regarded as one way of enhancing transparency in organisations, 
as it enables citizens to scrutinise decisions and actions of public employees (Osborne and 
McLaughlin, 2004; Alford, 2002;).  
Stivers (1998) views a public servant as a ‘listening bureaucrat’ who must take into account 
the needs and priorities of citizens who he is employed to serve. Public servants are at the 
centre budgeting and do greatly influence the outcome of the process. The citizenship 
framework provides a lens though which the role of public servants is analysed regarding 
whether they enhance or inhibit citizen participation and the achievement of outcomes. 
The theory is criticised for taking for granted that citizens are involved in matters regarding 
government decisions on public management. However, the literature has shown that in a 
number of cases, citizen participation is minimal (Ebdon and Franklin, 2004).  
Citizenship theory was adopted to provide an insight on how citizens’ participation influences 
adoption of NPM reforms and whether their participation influences the outcomes of PB 
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processes. The citizenship theory is also considered to be the main approach in understanding 
the conduct and behaviour of public administrators as citizens, who as good citizens should 
be accountable and promote other citizens’ participation in matters of public administration 
(Marshall, 1997). Scholars in the United States have used this theory extensively in analysing 
and studying the democratic rights and responsibilities of public administrators (Monfardini, 
2005). Citizenship theory was also used by Monfardini (2005) in a case study  of Sweden and 
Italy provided a model for measuring the concepts of accountability and participation by 
citizens. 
3.3.3.2 Institutional Theory 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 151) ‘identified three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs: (1) coercive isomorphism’’. (2) Mimetic isomorphism refers to a 
situation when an organisation adopts practices copied from other organisations within which 
it operates. (3) Normative processes is grounded on professionalization, its focus is to 
legitimise the autonomy of an organisation. According to the theory, the three types are 
interrelated in an empirical setting. However, due to different operating environments, the 
outcomes may also be different.  
The theory hypothesises that organisations may make decisions based on the following : (a) 
pressure from organisation that in normal business operations have a dependency 
relationship; (b) they may copy practices of other organisation they consider to be more 
successful in their industry or sector; and (c) through professional associations pressure may 
be exerted to compel organisations to comply (Greenwood et al., 2002).  
Oliver hypothesises that organisations “respond to institutional pressures that affect them” 
(1991:145) by employing acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate strategies. The 
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'acquiesce' strategy refers to organisations adhering to institutional pressures by adopting 
recommended practices and complying with rules and acceptable norms of behaviour. A 
'compromise' strategy refers to balancing the conflicting expectations of the various 
organisations and stakeholders through bargaining. Organisations may 'avoid' the necessity to 
conform to institutional pressures by concealing their non-conformity or changing their 
activities. Some organisations may 'defy' rules and norms by dismissing, challenging or 
attacking them, while others may 'manipulate' rules and norms by attempting to co-opt, 
influence or control them. 
The main strength of institutional isomorphism is that it brings out changes in organisation 
structures that reflect various factors in their operating environment. Secondly, it seeks to 
provide a holistic explication of social phenomena, to include all institutions that surround the 
organisation under investigation as well as power relations among actors (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). The theory also takes into account the dynamics behind the adoption of 
changes in organisational practices and the processes involved in their implementation at 
organisational level (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008; Ezzamel et al., 2007; Lounsbury, 2002, 
2008). The third argument is that new practices will emerge out of “local innovation” 
(Greenwood et al., 2002) as the organisations interact with each other (Lawrence et al.,1994). 
The theory is criticised for its lack of clear methodology for conceptualising the role of 
institutions in influencing human behaviour. It places much emphasis on the taken-for-
granted nature of institutional rules, norms and beliefs, as bounded rationality by which 
organisations structure themselves and realise equilibrium (Selznick, 1949, 1957; Berger and 
Luckman, 1967). 
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The literature provides evidence of various institutional pressures which determine the 
choices of accounting practices adopted and implemented by nation-states, especially in 
developing countries (Tambulasi, 2007; Economic Commission for Africa, 2003).  
Institutional isomorphism has been adopted based on contemporary concepts of NIS, because 
the theory takes into account the forces and pressures that are exerted on developing countries 
by donor agencies to adopt NPM reforms such as participatory budgeting as a way of 
improving efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, so as to achieve better service 
delivery. Institutional theory recognises that organisations are not autonomous agents seeking 
to maximise economic opportunities, but are set within a social construct of norms and 
expectations that constrain and shape managerial choice. The theory emphasises the 
institutional nature and regulatory role of the environment. Similarly, budgets are a legal 
requirement with which local government must comply. Local governments, by their very 
nature as largely depending on central governments to fund their services, can be considered 
as agents of central government, and the principal-agency theory becomes relevant in 
understanding the relationship between central government and local government and their 
likely role in the participatory budgeting process. 
The concept of institutional isomorphism can inform the study in understanding the 
institutional pressure that LGs face in reforms advocated by supranational agencies. The 
institutional isomorphic concept provides a framework that can be used to analyse and 
discuss local governments that are compelled by law that budgeting should involve all 
stakeholders and take into account their needs and priorities. Institutional theory has been 
adopted because it recognises the external forces and political environment.  
The institutional isomorphism framework was used by Lai, Wong and Cheng (2005) in their 
research of a Hong Kong company that had adopted information technology to enhance 
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efficiency in supply chain management. The same theoretical approach was also used by 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) in their study of adoption of generally accepted accounting 
principles by four states in the United States. 
3.3.4 The Integrated Framework 
The theoretical framework shown in Figure 3.1 was developed by combining citizenship 
theory and institutional theory. The two theories have been triangulated, first, to take into 
account the institutional pressures from supranational agencies; and second, to examine the 
two concepts of citizen participation and accountability in the participatory budgeting 
phenomenon.  
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical Framework 
Source: (Developed by Author) 
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According to the framework, institutional pressures from donor countries influence 
developing countries in adopting NPM reforms. The decentralisation policy adopted by 
Uganda in 1993 is part of the NPM reforms, and PB methodology of budgeting is one of the 
key public sector financial management strategies of the decentralisation policy as a means of 
devolving power to the people to enhance democracy and accountability and improve service 
delivery at local community level. Therefore, the framework illustrates that decentralisation 
is an initiative that directly emanated from donor countries and PB is part of the 
decentralisation policy. 
In the same framework, citizenship is presented as entailing four dimensions: a) civil, b) 
political, c) social and d) economic. Citizens have a responsibility to exercise their civil, 
social, political and economic rights and responsibilities through participation in issues of 
governance and to seek accountability from those charged with the responsibility to manage 
public affairs for the benefit of citizens. Institutional pressures have an impact on the 
citizenship concept and both influence the adoption of NPM reforms, decentralisation and PB 
approach to public sector financial management. 
To analyse the PB process, we examined: a) the government environment; b) the design of 
the participation process; and c) the mechanism for citizens’ participation. Outcomes from 
the PB process were analysed in terms of a) how inputs from citizens influence budget 
decisions; b) how transparency and accountability is enhanced; and c) the education of 
citizens to enhance their capacity to exercise their rights and responsibilities in the PB 
process. 
3.4   Summary 
This chapter has presented the theoretical framework to be used as a lens to interpret the 
results of the study. A triangulated approach was adopted whereby citizenship theory and NIS 
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were combined into a theoretical framework that is used in the study. The triangulation of the 
two theories enabled the researcher to understand the social, economic and political factors 
involved in the process of PB. 
The next chapter presents the methodology, philosophical assumptions and methods. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  Methodology 
4.1   Introduction 
This chapter discusses the philosophical assumptions and research methods used in this 
study. The first main section reviews the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study. 
The four dominant research paradigms, as suggested by a number of scholars (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979; Morgan, 1980; McLaughlin, 2003; Walsham, 2006; Cooper and Hopper, 
2007), are first examined and analysed in terms of strengths and weaknesses. This review is 
the basis of choosing the methodology presented in section two. The section describes the 
methodology and methods adopted. It describes the methodology adopted, followed by the 
selected design and its justification. The scope of the study is followed by ethical 
considerations. The study population, sampling methods, data collection and analysis are 
described, followed by strategies put in place to ensure internal and external validity. 
4.2   Philosophical Assumptions Underlying the Study 
As Myers (1997) stated, in any academic research undertaking, stating underlying 
assumptions is important as it shows the researchers’ view of the world and brings out the 
discourse within which the research is undertaken Khazanchi and Munkvold (2002) state 
that: academic research is guided by three main research perspectives namely; ontological, 
epistemological and methodological. According to them, the three perspectives constitute the 
core frame of the nature of the research and also define the position of the researcher. 
Scholars such as McLaughlin (2003), Walsham (2006) and Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
include two other philosophical assumption perspectives: axiological, or human nature; and 
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rhetorical assumptions, to what constitutes valid research. Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest 
that researchers need to make their philosophical assumptions explicit before embarking upon 
a research study. Therefore the purpose of the first part of this chapter is to comply with Guba 
and Lincoln in outlining the underlying philosophical assumptions in this study. 
4.2.1 Ontological Assumptions 
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994) the question ontological assumptions attempt to 
answer is: “What is the form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there that can be 
known about it?” (Lincoln 1994, p.108). The issue of concern is whether reality exists 
independently of human actors or is constructed by their actions (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
The focus of ontology is on explaining the role of human beings in shaping the physical and 
social world focusing on objectivity and subjectivity of human behaviour. 
4.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions 
Epistemological assumptions are about knowledge and how it can be obtained. These 
assumptions address the issue of whether knowledge can be acquired or it must be 
experienced? (Walsham, 1995). Epistemology, therefore, looks at the criteria for constructing 
and evaluating knowledge. Epistemological assumptions are thus important in answering 
questions relating to the nature of the research and the subject being researched (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). 
4.2.3 Axiological Assumptions 
Axiological assumptions are concerned with values, and attempt to address the role of values 
in research. The issue of concern is whether there exist opportunities for human actors to 
exercise their ‘free will’ (voluntarism) or whether their behaviour is constrained by structural 
properties (determinism) (Walsham, 2006). 
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4.2.4 Rhetorical Assumptions 
Rhetorical assumptions involve the language used by the researcher to communicate 
knowledge or claims generated by the research. According to Khazanchi and Munkvold 
(2002), some researchers mould their research findings to make claims that are relevant. 
Rhetorical assumptions address the question: “Does the language used to communicate 
research findings match the research paradigm?” 
4.2.5 Methodological Assumptions 
The role of methodological assumptions is to guide the research process by answering the 
question: “What is the process of research?” Methodology, therefore, focuses on the research 
procedures or methods most appropriate for generating valid knowledge. This is important, as 
the link between practice and theory provides justification for undertaking research and also 
provides the purpose of knowledge in practice (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991).  
The table below summarises the philosophical assumptions discussed above   
Table 4.1 Philosophical Assumptions 
Assumption Question Characteristics Implications for Practice 
(examples) 
Ontological What is the nature of 
reality? 
Reality is subjective 
and multiple, as seen 
by participants in the 
study. 
Researcher uses quotes and 
themes in words of participants 
and provides evidence of 
different perspectives. 
Epistemo-
logical 
What is the 
relationship between 
the researcher and 
that which is being 
researched? 
Researcher attempts to 
lessen distance 
between themselves 
and that which is being 
researched. 
Researcher collaborates, spends 
time in field with participants, 
and becomes an ‘insider’. 
Axiological What is the role of 
values? 
Researcher 
acknowledges that 
research is value laden 
and biases are present. 
Researcher openly discusses 
values that shape the narrative 
and includes own interpretation 
in conjunction with 
interpretations of participants. 
Rhetorical What is the language 
of research? 
Researcher writes in a 
literary, informal style 
Researcher uses an engaging 
style of narrative, may use first-
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using the personal 
voice, qualitative 
terms and limited 
definitions. 
person pronoun, and employs the 
language of qualitative research. 
Methodo-
logical  
What is the process 
of research? 
Researcher uses 
inductive logic, studies 
the topic within its 
context, and uses an 
emerging design. 
Researcher works with 
particulars (details) before 
generalisations, describes in 
detail the context of the study, 
and continually revises questions 
from experiences in the field. 
 
Source: Adapted from (McLaughlin, 2003; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Walsham, 1995; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994; Khazanchi and Munkvold, 2002). 
4.2.6 Research Paradigms 
Research paradigms as “very basic meta-theoretical assumptions, which underwrite the frame 
of reference, mode of theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate 
within them” (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:23). As illustrated in Figure 4.1, they categorised 
research into two areas: radical change research, research aimed at questioning the status quo 
by asking the ‘why’ question; and regulation research, aimed at facilitating systems to work 
more effectively by asking the ‘how’ question. The two categories constitute the main 
research paradigms: the positivism and post-positivism paradigm and the 
constructivism/intepretivism paradigm. The positivists are regarded as objective and the 
constructivists as subjective (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
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Figure 4.1 Research Paradigms 
Source: Adopted from Burrell and Morgan’s sociological framework (1979:23) 
Under the radical change category falls the critical theory or radical humanism paradigm, 
focusing on how to make the human actor bring out change, thus taking a subjective 
paradigm stance.  
On the objective dimension, the radical structuralist paradigm is grounded in Marxist theory, 
which focuses on giving a voice to the workers. The regulation research category also has the 
two dimensions of subjective and objective research paradigms. Subjective research under 
this category is referred to as interpretative research, which focuses on trying to understand 
how systems work and how they can be made better. The objective or positivist approach is 
referred to as functionalism, the focus of which is on understanding the function of a system 
and how it can be made better. It is driven by a belief that everything happens for a purpose.  
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4.2.7 Qualitative or Quantitative Debate 
Various scholars have debated the merits and de-merits of the qualitative and quantitative 
research paradigms (Morgan, 1983; Yin, 1991; Creswell, 2007; Guba and Lincoln, 1998). 
Ontologically qualitative researchers view social reality as being relative, they argue that 
individuals construct the world or reality as they see it. On the contrary, quantitative 
researchers believe that the real world exists irrespective of human action. Therefore, the 
social world exists as strongly as the physical world and the challenge to the researcher is to 
discover it. 
Epistemologically, qualitative researchers’ view is that to understand the social world, one 
has to experience or observe it believe that the social world can better be understood by 
experiencing it or observing its behaviour. They also think that knowledge generated by 
social science research is not objective (Creswell, 2007). Quantitative researchers believe 
that, it is important to investigate and analyse patterns and relationships between people. 
They also believe that generating knowledge is not an event but a process that involve 
coming up with hypotheses and testing them (Morgan, 1983). 
Methodologically qualitative researchers believe in being part of the subject under study and 
exploring the detailed background and history through in-depth interviews, observations, and 
documentary reviews. Quantitative researchers, on the other hand, rely on scientific methods, 
and hypothesis testing using standardised research tools like questionnaires, personality tests 
and surveys. The two main research paradigms and their ontological, epistemological and 
methodological characteristics are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Research Paradigms and their Main Characteristics 
Source: Adapted from Fitzgerald and Howcroft (2006, p.27) 
The difference between qualitative and quantitative research is based on the fact that humans 
are able to express themselves through speech and discussion, which is distinct from the 
natural world. Therefore, qualitative research approach is more suitable and relevant where 
the objective of the researcher is to explore patterns, meanings and people’s behaviour and 
Epistemologically 
Methodologically 
Ontologically 
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thinking in regards to a given phenomenon, while quantitative research is more relevant and 
appropriate where the objective of the researcher is to explore the relationships between 
discrete measurable variables and outcomes (Britten, Jones, Murphy and Stacy, 1995). The 
view of a qualitative researcher is that, the world is a construct by individuals within a social 
setting (Guba and Lincoln, 1998). It belongs to the discourse of the constructive paradigm. 
4.2.8 Adopted Paradigm 
Academic research according to Guba and Lincoln (1994) has four underlying paradigms 
namely: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism/interpretivism. Chua 
(1986) combined positivism with post-positivism and regarded them as one. Thus she came 
up with three categories: positivist, interpretive and critical theory. Although the 
epistemologies are distinct philosophically, it is possible, according to Myers (1997), for the 
different research paradigms or underlying epistemologies to be accommodated within one 
study. 
Figure 4.3 below, adapted from Myers (1997), gives a diagrammatic presentation of the 
qualitative research paradigm as Chua (1986) suggests. 
 
Figure 4.3 Qualitative Research Paradigms 
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Source: Myers (1997: 241) 
4.2.9 The Positivist Paradigm 
According to Chua (1986), research that adopts a positivist approach assumes that the reality 
is out there for the researcher to confirm or uncover. The researcher therefore takes an 
objective independent view in investigating a phenomenon (Chua, 1986). Positivists stand is 
that reality can be explained by numbers that are independent of the researcher thus in their 
view reality is objectively established and is measurable by instruments desired by the 
researcher. Post-positivists argue that in search of knowledge, the context of the phenomenon 
is needed; therefore, the context free experimental design as advanced by the pure positivist 
is insufficient to test theory. (Myers, 2009).  
The researcher shares Baker and Bettner’s (1997) view that: “the type of research … 
characterized by a positivist methodological perspective and an emphasis on quantitative 
methods, is incapable of addressing accounting for complex ramification”. (Baker and 
Bettner, 1997:293). This study looks at how PB works in a decentralised framework, not at 
the relationship among the various variables in the PB process. Therefore this paradigm is not 
considered appropriate. 
4.2.10 The Critical Theory Paradigm 
The critical paradigm assumes that people who are under-privileged should emancipated by 
transforming alienating restrictive or repressive social conditions. Therefore, a critical 
research focuses on changing the status quo by searching for ways through which the 
economic, social and environmental conditions of society can be transformed.  The focus of a 
critical researcher is to try to construct a society that is just. This study is not about to explore 
the distribution of resources but to explore how PB works in a decentralised local government 
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framework, not to question why it is implemented. Therefore this paradigm was found not to 
be appropriate. 
4.2.11 The Interpretive Paradigm 
The interpretive paradigm is grounded in the belief that each individual constructs their own 
reality so there are multiple interpretations. This is also referred to as constructivism 
(Creswell, 2009). As stated by Myers (1997) researchers adopting an interpretive approach 
researchers are aware that that this research paradigm focuses on understanding and 
interpreting the behaviour of people within their environment. An interpretive researcher 
believes that the world is created by people who construct and reconstruct it as they interact 
with the world around them. To them a phenomenon can only be understood by examining 
and analysing the meanings assigned to it by those that are involved (Baroudi, 1991). 
Scholars argue that the positivist approach will not yield meaningful results because it 
ignores the subjective element of human nature (Laughlin, 1995; Walsham, 1993;  Kaplan and 
Maxwell, 1994).  
The underlying epistemology determines the research paradigm for any research undertaking. 
The main purpose of this study is to explore and provide a structured account of the 
participatory budgeting (PB) process in a decentralised local government system by 
examining its outcomes. The focus of the study is on the phenomenon of PB, which is 
recommended by supranational agencies (as part of NPM reforms) as a means of enhancing 
efficiency and accountability in public sector organisations.  
This study, therefore, adopts an interpretive research paradigm to interpret the meanings, 
texts and actions of the organisational actors in respect to changes in organisational practices, 
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such as budgetary practices, and at the same time maintains a critical view of the changes 
(Cooper and Hopper, 2007).  
Interpretive research is not only about reporting facts; it is also about reporting interpretations 
of individuals’ perceptions and/or attitudes (Klein and Myers, 1999). Since interpretive 
research requires the researcher to interact with key stakeholders though interviews, the 
interpretive approach is most suitable to achieve the research objectives of this study.  
Taking into consideration the philosophical assumptions as explained above, the researcher 
identifies himself as an interpretive researcher. However, as Myers (1997) observed, it is 
possible for different research paradigms or underlying epistemologies to be accommodated 
within one study. Therefore, where necessary, the research adopted the appropriate paradigm 
so as to enhance flexibility in examining the phenomenon of PB adopted by developing 
countries as part of NPM reforms. By doing this the researcher was able to more effectively 
address the ‘how and why’ questions of the PB concept in local governments. 
The section below outlines the research strategy under a qualitative interpretive approach. 
4.3.   Research strategy 
4.3.1 Methodology 
Methodology is the strategic approach (and not the technic) adopted by researchers in the 
search for knowledge and carrying out their research (Wainwrights, 1997). In this study, as 
outlined above, the interpretive paradigm was adopted as the dominant philosophical 
assumption underlying the research and as illustrated in Figure 4.1, a qualitative 
methodological approach was the main method of gathering and analysing data. 
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Methodology is concerned with the logical and philosophical underlying assumption of  a 
particulars research method and this makes it different from methods (Tolich and Davidson, 
1999).Qualitative research is different from the traditional quantitative methods because its 
goals are quite different and forms the point of departure of the two research paradigms.  
The qualitative methodology adopted was therefore appropriate to ensure that study 
objectives are achieved. The methodology enabled analysis of multiple realities that are 
associated with the PB concept (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
4.3.2 Research Method, Design and Justification 
Myers (2009) identified three distinct stages of a research method namely: defining 
underlying philosophical assumptions; determining a research design; and collection of data. 
According to Creswell (2007) there are four qualitative research methods: (1) action; (2) case 
study; (3) ethnography; and (4) grounded theory research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; 
Creswell, 2007).  
The purpose of a research design is to design a strategy and justify why and how certain data 
will be collected, the type and sources of data that will be collected, who will collect it, and 
finally how the data collected will be analysed  to achieve the research objectives (Creswell, 
2007). As stated by Zikmund (1991:42) “a research design is a master plan specifying the 
methods and procedures". Hussey and Hussey (1997:114) referred to a research design as 
“detailed plan which you will use to guide and focus your research”.  
A single-case study design approach was adopted in this study. A case study is “an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its context using multiple 
sources of evidence” (Noor, 2008:1602). The aim of a case study approach is to develop an 
in-depth rather than a broad generalisable understanding (Ellis and Levy, 2009). 
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Consequently, from the interpretive perspective, sufficient data for analysing the research 
problem from the selected cases can be obtained through a case study design. 
The next section gives the justification.  
4.3.3 Justification 
Cooper and Morgan (2008), in their article on case study research in accounting, state that: 
“the case study research approach is useful where the researcher is investigating: 
 Complex and dynamic phenomena where many variables including variables that are 
not quantifiable are involved 
 Actual practices, including the details of significant activities that may be ordinary, 
unusual or infrequent (e.g. changes in accounting regulation) 
 Phenomena in which the context is crucial because the context affects the phenomena 
being studied (and where the phenomena may also interact with and influence its 
context)” (Cooper and Morgan, 2008:160)  
Further arguments in favour of case study design are: it will allow the researcher to 
purposively select participants and sites that will best help in understanding the research 
problem and question (Croswell, 2009); the researcher is able to explore, describe and 
explain the PB phenomenon within its natural setting (Yin, 1984); participants are free to 
exercise their rights without being manipulated (Yin, 2003); able to reflect best practice and 
effective organisations(Cooper and Morgan, 2008); and “Case research focuses on context 
specific, in-depth knowledge, and this emphasis makes it particularly useful in examining the 
application of values and power in complex and messy situations” (Cooper and Morgan, 
2008:164). 
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The literature indicates that case studies have been used to make valuable contributions in 
management accounting that have led to examined organisations  to revisit the way their 
accounting and management practices are conducted (Bery, 1995). A case study method was 
selected because the focus of this study was on contemporary phenomena that required 
exploration within the real-life context (Yin, 2003). 
4.3.4. Scope of the Study 
4.3.4.1 Setting 
The study country is Uganda and the study site is Wamala District Local Government 
(WDLG). WDLG was selected because: (i) It has received awards for preparing compliant 
district development plans and budgets since its inception; (ii) its financial reports have over 
the years been unqualified; (iii) it was the first LG to introduce a tax assessment system that 
involves all residents of the area being assessed  (Ssewakiryanga, 2004); (iv) it is composed 
of both rural and urban LLGs; (v) the researcher had access to the ‘gatekeepers’, thus could 
easily access the required information and data. The unit of analysis was the participatory 
budgeting process in WDLG, not WDLG as an organisation. The case analysed was the PB 
process and outcomes, not the individuals involved. The research strategy adopted was to 
conduct multiple case studies in three lower local governments within the higher LG of 
WDLG, to see how citizens are involved in the process of budgeting at the lower LG and how 
inputs from lower local governments are incorporated into the budgets of higher government. 
The informants were technical officers, political leaders, civil society leaders and individual 
citizens. We observed two district council meetings, five district sector meetings, one 
integration budget meeting, four lower local government sector meetings and two lower 
government council meetings. Appropriate previous records relevant to the study like 
budgets, newspaper articles were also reviewed and analysed from the archives.  
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
84 
 
4.3.4.2 Ethical Considerations 
The University of Birmingham has a documented code of practice for research that requires 
all researchers to conform to the highest ethical standard. The process for ethical review is 
illustrated in Appendix 3. The researcher complied with the process and obtained the letter of 
approval shown in Appendix 4. Participants’ rights in the study were respected through the 
following safeguards: (1) research objectives were clearly explained to informants; (2) 
informants were informed of all data collection tools and activities; (3) confidentiality was 
observed where requested; and, (4) the final decision regarding informant anonymity rested 
with the informant. 
4.4   Methods of Generating and Collecting Data 
4.4.1 Study Population 
The study targeted residents within the study site aged 18 years and above. These are the 
people eligible to participate in the district local government budgeting process. They 
included technical officers, political leaders, civil society leaders and individual ordinary 
citizens. 
4.4.2 Sampling 
A purposive sampling strategy was used so as to provide adequate evidence and to take into 
consideration alternative perspectives (Yin, 2009). As Wilmot (2005) stated, with purposive 
non-random sampling, the number of people interviewed is less important than the criteria 
used to select them. Purposive sampling is also considered as “the best kind of non-
probability sampling to identify primary participants” (Groenewald, 2004:45). It was applied 
to technical, political and civil society leaders, as these are considered to be key categories of 
informants. By selecting a rural and an urban local government we are able to look at the 
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budgeting process in flux and seek diverse perspectives, so as to meaningful analyse instead 
of focusing on general properties shared by all LG. Table 4.2 gives the list of interviewees. 
Table 4.2 List of Interviewees 
Location Interviewee Category  No. Inter-
viewed 
Role in PB 
District Hqs. Chairperson Political 1 Chairs DEC 
CAO Tech. Staff 1 Chairs TPC 
Chairperson of Sector 
Committees 
Political 5 Recommend budgets 
Heads of Departments Technical 5 Preparation and 
implementation 
Councillors Political 10 Approval, monitoring, 
evaluation 
Junior Technical staff  10 Preparation and 
implementation 
Sub-County Chairperson Political 3 Chairs EC 
 SAS Tech. Staff 5 Chairs TPC 
 Chairperson of Sector 
Committees 
Political 5 Recommends budgets 
 Heads of Departments Technical 3 Preparation and 
implementation 
 Councillors Political 10 Approval, monitoring, 
evaluation 
  Junior Technical staff Technical 10 Preparation and 
implementation 
 NGOS Civil Society 2 Formulation 
 CBOs Civil Society 2 Formulation 
Parish Chairpersons Political 5 Chairs PDC 
(Formulation) 
 Executive Council 
Members 
Political 5 Formulation 
Village Chairperson Political 5 Chairs VC Formulation 
 Executive Members Political 5 Formulation 
 Residents Political 10 Formulation 
 
4.4.3 Data Collection Framework  
Each stage of the PB process outlined in Figure 3.1was investigated in terms of the key 
elements of the process (government environment, design of the process, mechanism for 
citizen participation) and the stakeholders involved. The framework below outlines the 
objectives of the research, the main research questions, the type of information that was 
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sought from the field, the source of the required information, and the methods of data 
collection applied. This framework formed the basis against which the questionnaire and 
interview guides in Appendix 2 were developed. The questionnaire had four sections which 
corresponded to the four research objectives. 
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4.4.4 Respondents in pilot study 
The questionnaire and interview guides were pre-tested with fourteen participants 
representing key players in the budgeting process as presented in Table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4 Pilot Study Respondents 
Stakeholder Number Responsibility in the budgeting 
process 
District budget desk  staff 1 Prepare budget and provide technical 
guidance 
District political leaders 2 Formulate and approve budget  
Lower government technical 
staff 
2 Prepare budget and provide technical 
guidance 
Lower government political 
leaders 
2 Prepare budget and provide technical 
guidance 
Civil society members 1 Advocate for interests of disadvantaged 
groups 
Ordinary citizens 3 Submit their priorities for inclusion in 
the budget 
 
Pre-testing and piloting the questionnaire and interview guide enabled the research to review 
them so as to ensure that they addressed the research objectives and questions. Pre-testing 
enabled the researcher to confirm that the questions and responses were valid and reliable. 
After piloting the questionnaire, questions that were not providing relevant information to the 
study were eliminated and those that were found to need more clarification were refined. 
General questions regarding level of education, political affiliation, religion, ethnicity, etc. 
that were considered offensive or harmful to respondents were also removed. The order of 
questions was also revisited so that the interview would start with questions that were less 
sensitive and easier to answer and then progressively address the sensitive issues so as to 
build interest and rapport with respondents. Finally a general open-ended question was 
included to give an opportunity for respondents to express themselves and raise issues that 
they considered important from their own perspective. 
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4.4.5 Data Collection 
The fieldwork was conducted at the sites from March 2012 to September 2012. The choice of 
data collection tools was based on their appropriateness to answer the research question 
(Brewerton and Millward, 2001).Tashakkori and Teddlie recommend that a researcher should 
have a data collection strategy before embarking on the data collection exercise. In line with 
this, and in order to enhance understanding of this complex issue of the process and outcomes 
of PB, a multi-method data collection strategy of data collection methods of interviews, focus 
groups and observations, that enabled deep such insights to be gained, was applied. Using 
evidence from multiple sources enabled corroboration of findings (triangulation). This 
provided more credible findings for analysis and discussion (Yin, 2003).The following steps 
were taken in designing data collection tools to ensure the validity of the instruments by 
making sure that the interview and focus group guides related to the objectives of this study: 
(a) specific research questions were clearly defined at the beginning of the study in Chapter 
One; (b) for each objective and research question all associated questions to be answered 
through this study were listed; (c) the information required to answer the question in step (b) 
and achieve the research objectives was identified; and (d) questions were then formulated to 
obtain the required information. The study used interviews; focus groups; observations; and 
documents/material review as data sources (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2008). The next sub-
sections explain these data collection methods and how they were applied. 
4.4.5.1 Self-administered Questionnaire 
The self-administered questionnaire was used for selected technical staff who were not 
available to be interviewed. A number of questions were set from each independent variable 
of statement of comprehensive income, statement of financial position and statement of cash 
flows and also decision making with several set sections including performance, 
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sustainability and liquidity. This is available in appendix 2 at the end of this report. This 
instrument was used because it enabled detailed information which can be referred to in 
future to be collected. 
4.4.5.2. Interviews 
Interviews can be classified as structured, semi-structured, or in-depth. Structured interview 
questions are scripted or closed and require limited pre-determined answers. Semi-structured 
interviews have open-ended questions with a choice of answers from which respondents are 
expected to select the most appropriate (Wilmot, 2005; Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2007). 
Interviews that are classified as in-depth have questions that are open ended and give 
respondents to freely express views and opinion without any limitation. An interview guide 
was administered by the researcher to purposively selected political leaders and ordinary 
citizens who were key players in the local government budgeting process. The interview 
guides covered the study objectives, namely: how participatory budgeting works in actual 
practice, factors that enhance or inhibit participation by citizens, whether the desired 
objectives of citizen participation were achieved and policy recommendations required to 
improve the PB process for the benefit of the poor. Details of the issues included in this 
instrument are available in Appendix 2 at the end of this report.  
Data collection started in November 2011 with documentary review of WDLG public 
documents. The in-person interviews started in March after obtaining University Ethical 
Committee approval. The researcher did not want to impose pre-determined views on the 
participatory budgeting process and its outcomes; therefore, the interviews were semi-
structured, and were initially composed of rather broad questions. Gradually, a saturation of 
data appeared, usually after asking the same questions about three times. New issues that 
arose were included in the questionnaire, sharpening its focus. Before the interviews were 
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conducted, the researcher designed interview questions to guide the discussion. The 
interviewees were assured of confidentiality and encouraged to speak freely. Questions were 
added during the interview process as need arose. This enabled the researcher to further 
investigate those areas of interest that emerge during the interview process. On average, the 
longest interview lasted one and half hours and the shortest lasted for thirty minutes on 
average. 
Interviews were held with officials strategically selected from the District Technical Planning 
Committee, Budget Desk, District Council, District Executive Committee, civil society 
organisations and ordinary citizens. During each interview, in addition to recording, notes 
were taken, and immediately following the interview, the recordings were transcribed and 
notes typed. The in-person interviews were followed with additional telephone interviews 
were deemed necessary. 
4.4.5.3 Focus Groups 
The focus group method is defined by Krueger and Casey (2000) as a data and information 
collection method used by researchers for collecting data and information from more than 
one person at time. Kitzinger (1995) defines a focus group as comprising seven to twelve 
people who may have similar or different interests assembled together to respond to pre-
designed questions that are designed to generate designed data to meet set objectives of a 
researcher. The following benefits are associated with the focus group method: (a) it is 
economical, as participants are interviewed in a group setting, making it faster and cheaper 
for the researcher; (b) it increases the number of participants in the study; (c) it facilitates 
collecting social data in a social environment, thus making it relevant for qualitative research; 
(d) participants and their interaction during the process can be identified (Morgan, 1988); (e) 
it has high face validity, creating a conducive environment for a free flow of ideas; (f) 
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because it is interactive and open sharing of ideas, views , experiences and procedures can be 
recorded analysed and where applicable generalised (Morgan, 1996); and (g) it provides a 
forum within which conflicts among participants can be resolved. As recommended by 
Morgan (1997) and Vaughn et al. (1996), in this study two focus group discussions were 
conducted for one to two hours. The size of the groups was eight and eleven. As 
recommended by various scholars, the groups did not have more than six members from 
different backgrounds. This ensured diversity and gave confidence to all to talk and share 
their thoughts (Morgan, 1997). The researcher moderated the discussions, assisted by an 
assistant moderator to take notes. The group discussions were recorded on a voice recorder. 
The recordings were later transcribed into a written record of responses.  
To capture the views and experiences of the budgeting process and outcome, two focus group 
discussions were held; one at the beginning and a second one to the end of the budgeting 
exercise in Wamala LG. To obtain further information from district key stakeholders, two 
focus group discussions were held in May and September 2012 with mixed groups of 
politicians, civil society organisations and ordinary citizens representing two lower local 
governments (Asbury 1995; Krueger 1988; Ramirez and Shepperd, 1988; Morgan, 1997; 
Krueger, 1997a, b). Technical staff were excluded from the focus groups since the purpose 
was to extract the views of politicians, civil society organisations and ordinary residents. The 
most common arguments were written down, and the views of the politicians, civil society 
organisations and ordinary residents were analysed separately, but not quantified. The 
arguments presented were condensed and classified according to themes. Gradually, a 
saturation of arguments was achieved; few new arguments were heard in the final focus 
group discussion, and it was deemed unlikely that further discussion would generate 
additional information. The data analysis characterised above could be referred to as 
concentration of meaning. 
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4.4.5.4 Observations 
The unstructured non-participant direct observation data collection technique, where the 
researcher will be a complete observer, was also used. The researcher attended and 
documented budget meetings to get the natural setting of the budgeting process (Chesebro 
and Borisoff, 2007; Mays and Pope, 1995). Observing the budgeting process in its natural 
setting enabled the researcher to get greater depth of understanding of the PB process in its 
real context to supplement data collected in other ways. Data collected through observation 
was analysed to explore and describe the PB phenomenon (Harris et al., 2009). Direct 
observation of Sector Committees and Council meetings enabled the researcher to experience 
real evidence of power relations and lack of knowledge, skills and competence in financial 
management matters of political leaders and ordinary citizens, and how information 
asymmetry inhibits participation. 
4.4.6 Document analysis 
The techniques used above to collect data were supplemented with data collected from public 
documents such as budget manuals, annual reports, and private documents such as minutes of 
meetings, internal communications, etc. A field notebook was used to chronicle the 
investigator’s own thinking, experiences and perceptions throughout the research process.  
4.4.7 Data Analysis 
Data was analysed in a three-phase. The first phase focused at identifying and analysing areas 
that were similar and where interviewees had different views. This was followed with an 
analysis and examination of data and information collected from observations and documents 
both current and from archives was undertaken. The second phase involved analysing 
patterns of data from the lower local governments and district local government; and between 
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rural and urban areas was studied, in order to establish how PB is implemented in local 
government in a developing country. The final phase data and collected information was re-
examined to explore the relationships between the process and outcomes of the PB process 
the main objective of our study. 
All interviews were recorded and transcribed, continually coded and then analysed. This was 
done chronologically and thematically, in order to come up with issues relevant and 
pertaining to our research problem and question (Creswell, 2009). Data collected from the 
three lower local governments, two rural and one urban, was cross analysed. A list of major 
ideas that surfaced was chronicled (Creswell, 2008). Field notes and diary entries were 
reviewed regularly (as suggested by Creswell, 2009). Data were linked to themes that 
emerged during the field research. In analysing my written notes, we organised statements 
according to narrative stories told by different types of stakeholders. The idea was to 
visualise their different lines of reasoning. The data analysis process was conducted 
manually. Figure 4.5 below summarises the data analysis process: 
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Figure 4.4 Summary of Data Analysis Procedures 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2009:185). 
Discussion and analysis of themes and descriptions 
Themes Descriptions 
Manual coding of data 
Reading through all data 
Organising and preparing data for analysis 
Data collection: raw data (transcripts of interviews, 
observation summaries, field notes, etc.) 
Validating 
accuracy 
and 
reliability of 
information 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
97 
 
4.5   Validity Strategies 
The interpretive research paradigm adopted in this study comes with subjectivity challenges. 
This challenge was mitigated using internal and external techniques outlined below to ensure 
validity and reliability.  
4.5.1 Internal Validity 
As Wentling and Palma-Rivas (2000) point out, a research study should ensure internal 
validity. In this study internal validity was ensured by interviewing identified key informants 
and conducting focus group discussions using interview guides prepared well in advance to 
focus on our research objectives and questions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Second, data 
and information from various sources was examined, triangulated and used to build a 
coherent justification for themes. Thirdly, follow-up interviews were undertaken to cross-
check sources of information and confirm agreement. Fourthly, the researcher clarified the 
bias they brought to the study. Finally, peer review was undertaken to serve as an external 
auditing process.  
In summary, internal validity was addressed through the use of multiple sources of evidence, 
as illustrated in Table 4.2, which enabled us to triangulation of various findings and come up 
with convincing evidence for analysis (Yin, 2003).  
4.5.2 External Validity 
This was achieved through careful attention to the research question and criteria for selecting 
subunits within the case, and cross case analysis was undertaken (Baxter and Jack, 2008). 
Furthermore, as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989), evidence collected was analysed using 
replication logic across the case and case sub-units to further ensure external validity. 
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4.6   Reliability 
The researcher has provided a detailed methodology and methods applied in this study.  A 
combination of methods was used to collect data and information as a means of ensuring both 
internal validity and reliability of the study findings that formed the basis of our 
recommendations (Merriam, 1988; Croswell, 2009:200). The questionnaire and interview 
guides were pre-tested. This enabled the researcher to adjust and improve on the research 
instruments so as to obtain reliable information. The Supervisors are experienced in 
qualitative research and were supplemented by the internal and external examiners at the end 
of the study. 
4.7 Reporting Findings 
The findings are reported in a descriptive narrative form rather than as a scientific report 
(Croswell, 2009). The study report addresses the research objectives and includes answers to 
the research questions. 
4.8 Summary 
The underlying philosophical assumptions have been outlined in this chapter that led to the 
selected methodology. The case study research design adopted has been justified as a 
valuable appropriate tool for understanding complex phenomena of PB (Yin, 2003). Methods 
of data collection and analysis have also been described, explained and justification given for 
the selection. The next chapter provides the background for the study country and site. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Uganda Local Government System and 
Budgeting 
5.1     Introduction 
This chapter has two parts. The first presents the background of Uganda, the study country. 
We review literature on the Uganda environment, focusing on public sector reforms since 
1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came into power, focusing on reforms 
that affected the local governance system in Uganda. We explain the evolution of the 
Ugandan local governance system and public sector financial management, focusing on 
budgeting in local governments. The second part of the chapter provides a description of 
Wamala District Local Government (WDLG): the study site. The last section provides a 
summary. 
5.2.   The Political and Social Environment of Uganda 
The Republic of Uganda is located in East Africa with a population estimated at 33 million 
and a land area of 236,000 square kilometres (CIA World Factbook, 2007). Uganda is a 
former colony of the British Empire and obtained independence in 1962. Since independence, 
Uganda has experienced turmoil, including the rule of military dictator, Idi Amin, from 1972 
to April 1979. Thereafter Uganda went through a period of civil strife that ended with the 
coming to power of the NRM government in January 1986.  
The NRM governments have initiated a number of reforms that have shaped the present 
Uganda, including its local governance system. As stated by Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) 
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regarding NPM reforms in developing countries, these reforms were dictated to the 
government as a pre-condition for accessing aid and donor funds urgently required to 
rehabilitate the devastated country after over two decades of turmoil. One of the key reforms 
adopted by Uganda was the policy of decentralisation as a form of local governance. 
5.3   Decentralisation Policy and Public Sector Budgeting in Uganda 
Decentralisation is the most recent public sector reform adopted by many developing 
countries with the aim of improving the delivery of poverty-related services to the 
community. Decentralisation of government functions to lower local government is widely 
recognised as a strategy to increase local participation and ownership of the political and 
development process (Good Governance, World Bank, 1997). Following continuous demands 
for a federal system of governance by Buganda, the NRM government in 1993 adopted a 
decentralised system of governance as a way of bringing services nearer to the people so as to 
improve effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery (Awio and Northcott, 2001). 
“Although the term ‘decentralisation’ is as ambiguous and confusing as it is elusive and 
difficult to define” (Rhodes, 1992:316), it has rich conceptual and empirical meaning because 
it can signify “…static and dynamic processes as well as refer to pure idealistic and moderate 
incremental change” (Fesler, 1965:536) in governmental systems. Decentralisation is a 
governance system aimed at empowering local communities through local governments being 
in charge of their destiny for better service delivery. Budgetary participation refers to the 
extent to which stakeholders are involved with, and have influence on, the determination of 
their budgets (Brownell, 1982). One objective of Ugandan decentralisation was “to bring 
political and administrative control over services to the point where they are actually 
delivered” (MoLG, 1994:2). 
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According to Awio and Northcott (2001), decentralisation is about re-organising local 
government services into local offices serving small geographical areas with increased 
involvement of local people. They argue that decentralisation is a political and technical 
process. At the political level it involves leadership, participation, inclusion, representation, 
decision-making and power relations between central and local governments and between 
local governments themselves. On the technical plane it involves administration, planning, 
budgeting, financial and human resources management and development, monitoring and 
evaluation, supervision, mentoring - functions and activities that are the responsibility of 
technical staff. The political and technical elements must be well synchronised in order to 
realise its benefits (Aiwo and Northcott, 2001). Rubin (2005) argues that when 
decentralisation is undergone, local elites get most of the power, steer benefits to themselves 
and are less likely to target resources to the poor. 
Therefore, as Awio and Northcott (2001) state, decentralisation should lead to citizens getting 
more involved and appreciating the budgeting process as a way of addressing their priority 
needs. This would lead to better management of public resources, thus enhancing 
effectiveness and efficiency in utilising public resources which is one of the objectives of 
decentralisation. 
5.4    Local Government System 
5.4.1 The Legal Framework 
The mandates of local governments are well laid out in the 1995 Constitution in Chapter 11. 
The constitutional provisions were operationalised by an act of Parliament (the LG Act of 
1997) as the fundamental legislation governing local government. The Ministry for Local 
Government is responsible for national policy and legislation of local government in Uganda. 
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In Uganda the Mentoring Guide for Local Government on Financial Management (2004) 
defines a good budget as one that is realistically balanced and plan based and, most 
importantly, one that is understood by all users. 
Local governments can exercise their budgetary discretionary powers on locally raised 
revenues and unconditional grants. However in allocating local revenues and unconditional 
grants local governments must take into account priorities as identified by the central 
government (MoLG, 1997). It is a constitutional requirement under Article 193 (3) that 
conditional grants from central government can only be utilised on expenditure items outlined 
by central government (GOU, 1995). The purpose of these legal provisions was to remove the 
influence of technical officers and empower local citizens to determine their priorities and at 
the same time enhance accountability and democracy through their participation on matters 
that concern their welfare (MoLG, 1994). 
It is a legal requirement under Section 83(4) of the Local Government Act, that local 
government budgets must be presented to Councils and approved by 15
th
 June and 31
st
 
August each year respectively. Therefore, the technical officers together with the political 
leadership of the local government must take this in account in setting the timeframes for the 
budgeting process (MoLG, 1997). 
5.4.2 Local Government Organisational Structure 
During the NRM bush war, the NRM established a resistance council to cater for 
administrative and judicial duties in the areas they had liberated. On assumption of power, 
resistance councils were formalised by the Resistance Councils and Committees Statute of 
1987. There are five layers of local councils for rural areas and four for urban areas (Figure 
5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 Local Government Organisational Structure 
Source: Adapted from Steffensen, Tidemand and Ssewankambo (2004) 
 
The principal unit of local government is the district council and city council. The rural areas 
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Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
104 
 
councils. Urban areas consist of: village councils; ward councils; municipal or city division 
councils and a city council. The local government structure in Uganda is categorised into 
two: administrative units that include village council, parish councils and county councils; 
and local government that include districts, municipal councils, town councils and sub-
counties with powers to legislate.  
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the current local government structures in Uganda. 
Table 5.1 Local Government Structures 
No. Authority Type Number 
1 City Urban 1 
2 District Rural 111 
3 Municipality Urban 22 
 4 Sub-Counties Rural 903 
5 Town Councils Urban 174 
5 Divisions Urban 52 
6 Parishes Rural/Urban 5,225 
7 Villages Rural 57,691 
 
Source: MoLG, Ministerial Policy Statement Financial Year 2012/2013 
Each local government has an executive committee headed by a directly elected chairperson 
who appoints his/ her executive to form an executive committee of the local government with 
a responsibility of supervising technical officers and implementing Council decisions. 
Council members are assigned to specific standing committees that handle and monitor sector 
matters and report to the full council. At lower government level, only the chairperson/mayor 
is full time; other executive committee members are part time and are paid allowances.  
The Local Government Act 1997 under Section 48 spells out council members for each 
administrative unit. At the village levels the council is composed of all adult residents above 
the age of 18years irrespective of whether you are a citizen or not.  The executive members of 
village council constitute the parish council and the council members at sub-county level 
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constitute the County councils The village, parishes or wards have executive committee 
composed of nine people that include a representative of the youth elected by the youth; a 
representative of the women elected by women a representative of persons with disabilities 
elected by people with disabilities (Local Governments Act 1997, Section 48). 
Each district local government has a District Service Commission that is approved by the 
Public Service Commission appointed by the central government. District Service 
Commission are responsible for appointing and disciplining all local government staff in their 
respective districts other than the Chief Administrative Offers and their deputies. The 
structures and establishment for each district is determined by the central government. 
In Uganda, apart from the central and local governments, traditional authorities exist whose 
role is to mobilise their communities to preserve their cultural heritage and participate in 
community development programmes. By law cultural leaders are prohibited from partisan 
politics. The chiefdoms and kingdoms are headed by chiefs and kings respectively and some 
of the kings have a lot power and influence over their communities.  For example, the King 
of Buganda, where the capital city is located. 
5.5   Local Government Budgeting Process in Uganda 
In Uganda, incremental budgeting has been practiced over the years. Budgeting on local 
governments is guided by guidelines from MoFPED as well as MoLG (Awio and Northcott, 
2001).  
Local government are required to ensure that their budgets are aligned to the development 
plans and reflect what can be realistically achieved. Second, they have to ensure that clear 
objectives, targets and means of measuring performance are well laid out to facilitate 
monitoring achievement of intended results of the resource allocations. To ensure that this is 
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done, the central government issues guidelines to all local governments giving three pre 
conditions to guide the budgeting process. The first requirement is that the process of 
preparing the budget must involve all stakeholders to ensure that the final budget is owned by 
the people. Second, activities to be funded under the budget must be based on informed 
choices and this implies that stakeholders should be given the required information during the 
budgeting process. Lastly it is required that all activities in the approved budgets must be 
realistic and achievable (LGFC, 2005) 
5.6   Budget Participation Mechanism in Uganda 
Lower local governments are guided by the higher local government on the resources 
available for the coming year. And, based on the availed information lower local 
governments will determine their priorities taking into account priority areas as defined by 
the central government.  
Each village council convenes a budget meeting chaired by the chairman of the village. The 
village council meeting guided by the parish chief is expected to come up with a list of their 
priority items that they would like to be included and funded in the coming budget. The 
chairman of the parish council working together with the parish chief collects all village 
proposals from the parish and convenes a parish council meeting to discuss the proposals and 
come up with agreed activities for the parish that is forwarded to the Sub-county council. 
At the Sub-county level, the technical officers consolidate all parish proposals and forward 
them to the Executive Committee for their input. The executive committee then submits to 
the full council for their approval. The council forward the proposals to the relevant sector 
standing committees for detailed analysis. The recommendations of the sector standing 
committees are finally forwarded to the full council for debate and approval.  
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5.7   Wamala District Local Government 
This section provides the background of Wamala District Local Government (WDLG), the 
study site. The first sub-section outlines the profile of WDLG. The second outlines the 
political and social environment of the district. The third provides the structure and 
organisational setup. The fourth provides the documented practices of budgeting since its 
establishment in 2000. 
5.7.1Wamala District Profile 
The study setting is Wamala District Local Government, a local government that has both an 
urban and rural setting and whose performance in terms of PB is rated high (MoLG Report, 
2012). 
Wamala District shares borders with one district in the east, one in the north, two in the west 
and one in the south. According to the 2002 census (Uganda, 2002) Wamala, with a 
population of 907,988, had the largest population of all the 111 districts in Uganda (UBOS, 
2009). Currently the population is estimated at 1.5 million. About 92 per cent of the 
population live in rural areas. 
The district is divided into two counties: C1 and C2 (LC IV). It has one Municipal Council of 
MC1; six town councils: TC1, TC2, TC3, TC4, TC5 and TC6; two municipal divisions: MD 
A and MD B (LCIII); fifteen sub-counties (LC III); two town boards (LCII); 146 parishes 
(LC 11); and, 704 villages (LC 1) (Wamala District Report, June 2012). 
5.7.2 Structure and Organisational setup of Wamala Local Government 
a) Structure 
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The structure of WDLG is the same as for all local governments in Uganda, where counties, 
town boards, parishes and villages are administrative units with only judicial and 
administrative powers; municipal councils (MCs), municipal divisions (MD), town councils 
(TCs) and sub-counties are lower local governments (LLG) with political, executive powers 
and financial autonomy within their areas of jurisdiction, as per Section 30 of the Local 
Government Act 1997 and 2006 (Uganda 1997). The district local government, which is a 
higher local government, has supervisory and advisory powers over LLGs within its area of 
jurisdiction. WDLG, with 24 local governments and 854 administrative units, has the largest 
number of local governments and administrative units (WDLC Report, 2012). 
b) Organisational Setup 
The local government organisational structure is made up of two arms: political and 
technical. Their roles are well defined: the technical arm is expected to give technical advice 
and guidance to the political wing and implement all lawful policies approved by the political 
wing. The political wing is expected to represent its constituencies by formulating policies, 
and monitor implementation of decisions made by the council (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2 Organisational Setup of WDLG 
Source: Gleaned from literature (LGFC, 2005; LG Act, 1997). 
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5.8   Summary 
The Government of Uganda adopted decentralisation as its local government system where a 
district local government is the principle unit of governance. Through village councils all 
residents have an opportunity to participate in the planning and budgeting process 
The chapter has also provided background information on Wamala District, the study site. 
The chapter outlines the design of the participatory process, mechanism, political 
environment and expected outcomes of the entire process as per the Constitution (Uganda, 
1995), Local Government Act, 1997, Local Government Financial and Accounting 
Regulations (LGFAR), 1998, 2007 and other official policy documents. This leads us to 
Chapter Six, which presents the field findings that describe the real practice on the ground. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  Research Findings 
6.1   Introduction 
The primary objective of this study is to explore the process and outcomes of participatory 
budgeting in a decentralised local government system, using Uganda as a case study and 
Wamala District Local Government (WDLG) as a study site. Chapter Five provided the 
background of local government reforms in Uganda and the profile of WDLG. This chapter 
presents evidence collected from the field using the research methods discussed in the 
methodology chapter. The findings are presented following the key elements that influence 
the process of participatory budgeting, as identified by Franklin and Ebdon (2006) and the 
study research objectives outlined in Chapter One. This chapter also provides findings that 
are either consistent or contrary with the theoretical framework in Figure 4.2. So, this chapter 
gives the “story” of this study. 
The chapter has six sections. The second section presents findings regarding the government 
environment, the design and mechanism of the PB process. The third section provides 
evidence on how and why citizens participate in the budgeting process. In the fourth section, 
findings on achievement of desired outcomes are presented. The fifth section provides 
stakeholders’ views on how PB can be improved. The themes that emerged from the field 
findings are summarised in the last section. 
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6.2   The Government Environment, Process Design and Mechanism 
6.2.1 The Government Environment 
Uganda started getting funding from DANIDA in 1987 to support local governance (Lister, 
2006). According to the 2012/2013 budget, 31 per cent of Uganda’s budget is funded by 
development partners (MoFPED, 2012; The Monitor, 2012). Therefore, supranational 
agencies have a great deal of influence on budgetary practices in Uganda. As an officer 
interviewed from central government stated “… suspending bilateral aid has a lot of 
implications socially, financially and politically”. Thus, NPM reforms adopted by Uganda are 
well-documented in legal frameworks. One of the interviewees responded as follows to the 
question of whether the legal framework was a constraint to financial management in 
Wamala: 
The legal framework has never come up as an issue. The legal framework is very clear 
and well documented. The problem is: real practice. 
Similar views were expressed by interviewees from WDLG. This confirms that the legal and 
institutional frameworks as laid out provide a favourable legal basis and structures for citizen 
participation. The challenge is in actual implementation, as what is actually done in practice 
is very different from what the laws, regulations policies and guidelines say should be done. 
This was summarised by one NGO interviewee who said, “Uganda has excellent policies and 
plan that are never implemented but used for soliciting donor funds and for public relations 
only”. 
The adoption of the decentralisation policy and participatory budgeting practices by LGs was 
dictated by the central government. Local governments like WDLG had no choice but to 
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comply. In response to the question whether political factors had any influence on citizen 
participation in the budgeting process, an officer in the planning unit responded as follows: 
The stakeholders’ participation in the budgeting process was dictated by the ministry of 
local government, our role is to implement. We did not have any input in the way the 
process was designed. 
This was also confirmed by an officer from the Ministry of Local Government who stated: 
Decentralisation is our baby and it is a responsibility to nurture it. Though there are 
challenges, especially regarding the ability of local governments to raise local revenue. 
He also referred the researcher to the Ministerial Policy Statement for YF 2912/2013, which 
states: 
The Decentralisation Policy continues to provide an important anchor for the 
advancement of Government of Uganda’s overall political and socio-economic 
development agenda. The policy seeks to promote popular participation and empower 
local people to make decisions on important issues that affect their lives and enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. (MoLG, Policy Statement FY2012/13:iv) 
However, a technical staff member in WDLG, working in the Department of Finance, had 
different views regarding central government’s commitment to the implementation of the 
decentralisation policy: 
You cannot talk of decentralisation without decentralising finances. Wamala currently 
depends over 90% on central government transfers, much of which are conditional 
grants, and the district is just used as a conduit to the actual beneficiaries. 
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We also came across evidence that, in many cases, central government takes decisions 
without involving local government. A case was cited where Uganda Shillings 70 million was 
diverted by the central government to finance a presidential pledge that was not in the district 
budget. Most interviewees cited dependence on central government transfers as the major 
factor that has inhibited the achievement of the objectives outlined in the decentralisation 
policy. Table 6.1 illustrates this problem. 
Table 6.1 Sources of Finance as at the End of May 2012 for FY 2011/2012 
 Source Type Budget UGX  May Actual UGX %age 
1 Locally raised funds District 1,898,000,000 1,353,000,000 71 
Sub 
counties 
1,839,767,000 1,465,000,000 80 
2 Unconditional 
District 
Wage 1,694,959,000 1,421,912,522 84 
Non-wage 1,569,318,000 1,569,319,627 100 
3 Unconditional Urban Wage 887,061,000 417,295,675 47 
Non-wage 1,141,973,000 1,141,972,250 100 
4 Start up for  New TC 80,000,000 80,000,000 100 
5 Conditional Grant  30,470,664,000 28,104,016,558 92 
6 Other Central Govt.  Transfers 6,853,215,000 4,335,383,817 63 
 Total Revenue  46,434,957,000 39,887,900,449 86 
 
Source: Finance Directorate 
From the table above, WDLG contributed 7% of the total revenue collected over the eleven 
months of financial year 2012/2012. This was 1% below the budgeted local contribution to 
the budget. Funding from central government therefore represented 93% of the total funds 
collected during the same period. 
Responding to the question: What changes in the budgeting process has taken place in 
Wamala District since its inception? Interviewees from civil service organisations (CSOs), 
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non-government organisations (NGOs) and ordinary citizens were of the view that the 
budgeting process as well as decentralisation had lost track, as it now represents decentralised 
corruption to the benefit of political leaders and technical staff. An interviewee from an NGO 
stated “they [government] never decentralised power and resources, they decentralised 
‘eating’ to the politicians and civil servants. What we have in local governments is massive 
corruption; political and technical staff award themselves contracts and steal money and 
drugs from hospital”. This was in agreement with a report in The Monitor newspaper (21st 
November 2012) regarding a monitoring exercise carried out in Arua local government 
hospital: “We discovered that malaria drugs are the first to get finished. Once these drugs 
arrive, all the relatives of the health workers fall sick and each is given about 10 doses of the 
medicine which ends up in their clinics”. This goes further to confirm that corruption is a 
major issue in implementing NPM reforms in Uganda. 
6.2.2 Process Design 
The PB process was designed to start with central government sending indicative planning 
figures (IPF) to local governments. This is supposed to be done by mid-October, but in the 
current financial year they were not provided until mid-January. Given the dwindling local 
revenues, whereby local governments depend on central government transfers, this has 
greatly undermined one of the cardinal objectives of decentralisation: making local 
communities determine their needs and priorities. During the interviews with various 
stakeholders, it emerged that the IPFs limit local government in the range of activities they 
can embark on, resulting in them leaving out many key priority areas in the development 
plan. 
The process design guidelines state that development plans from the village councils are used 
as an input into the next level of LG. The logic behind this planning cycle is to implement a 
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bottom-up approach to planning and budgeting, by involving the citizens in the planning and 
budgeting process as per the decentralisation policy. In this way, the National Development 
Plan would reflect the needs and priorities from the ordinary citizen that are assumed are 
captured in the district plans. From the findings, it was clear that WDLG did not follow the 
guidelines for developing the district plan, and no attempts were made to ensure that the 
process was participatory. The implication is that citizens’ needs and priorities were not 
captured in the district development and subsequently also missed out in the budget. Budget 
conferences that are supposed to provide an opportunity for participation were dominated by 
political leaders and technical staff. One member of a community based organisation (CBO) 
who responded to the question regarding the effectiveness of the mechanisms for 
participation, and whether their contributions are taken into account in the final budget as 
follows; 
During budget conferences we are not given time to air our views and contribute our 
ideas. The exercise is done in a rush, technical staff present their documents and no 
copies are given to us. They do not get back to us to tell us the outcomes of budget 
conferences. The whole exercise is just a circus. 
Field findings indicate that the design of the PB process in Uganda is appropriate. However, 
the challenge is that the design does not take into account how to enforce participation, and, 
ensure that political leaders and government officers enforce the existing legislation and 
policies that have been created for this purpose.  
6.2.3 Mechanisms for Participation 
Regarding the question of the participation mechanism available for citizens’ involvement in 
the budgeting process; the respondents came up with two distinct mechanisms (a) public 
hearings through village and parish councils, and (b) budget conferences at lower 
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governments and district local government level. However, according to the MoLG 
budgeting guidelines (2003a), mechanisms of participation include village council planning 
meetings moderated by parish chiefs and the Community Development Officer from the sub-
county; parish development committee moderated by the Parish Chief and Community 
Development Officer from the sub-county, sub-county budget conferences moderated by the 
Senior Assistant Secretary (SAS); and the district budget conference moderated by the 
Chairman of the district. In practice, village councils and parish councils are no longer 
functional. This is attributed to lack of legal legitimacy for their existence, as their term of 
office expired in 2006, having been elected in 2001. Village and parish council meetings in 
many areas no longer take place. Those few that are still operating are working on a 
voluntary basis and are not protected by the law. As one LC 1 chairman stated in response to 
the question on how citizens participation can be enhanced: 
Since we are not protected by the law, we do not get involved in activities that are not 
rewarding because if you make a mistake the government will not be on your side. You 
will be left to suffer alone with your family. We therefore handle issues where we know 
we are safe or the benefits are worth the risk. 
Similar views were echoed by one of the political leaders of WDLG in responding to the 
same question:  
Village and parish councils lack political and legal legitimacy. Their term expired six 
years ago! Therefore we have no input that genuinely comes from the village council and 
parish development committee. Whatever is indicated as an input from village and parish 
councils are an innovation from the technical staff who want to convince central 
government that the district is following laid down procedures in preparing the budget. 
Failing to do so, the district may not access resources from the centre. 
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6.3  Citizen Participation in the Budgeting Process 
This section presents findings on who participated and how they participate in the budgeting 
process. The first sub-section presents findings on who participates; and the second sub-
section, on how in practice they participate in the following six stages: a) preparation; b) 
formulation; c) approval; d) implementation; e) monitoring and control; and f) evaluation.  
6.3.1 Who Participates? 
Uganda is governed under a multi-party democracy. Currently five political parties (NRM, 
FDC, DP, JEEMA and CP) have elected representatives at all levels of government. There 
are also political leaders who are independent with no party affiliation. WDLG has forty 
councillors belonging to four different political parties. The majority of the councillors (22 
out of 40) are from the National Resistance Movement, the ruling party in Uganda. The 
Chairman of the district is from the Democratic Party, an opposition party. In the five-
member executive of the Council, including the Chairman, there is only one member from 
NRM, the main opposition party. The Speaker of the Council and chairpersons of the sector 
committees are all from the opposition parties. However, in spite of the fact that the 
opposition has the majority in the council, the power struggle in the council is between the 
executive and non-executive councillors and cuts across the political divide. In response to 
the question of: Which factor (political social, economic or environmental) has the greatest 
influence on the effectiveness of citizens’ participation? One of the councillors interviewed 
responded as follows: 
Budgeting is politics. We are all politicians but these members of the executive think that 
they are special. They do not think about us. All the money, they want to eat it up with the 
technical staff, when we all spent money to become councillors. Our only chance to make 
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them know that we also exist is during the budget process. We will not pass the budget 
unless our interests are catered for. 
The researcher also observed that during the Finance Committee meeting, the proposal by 
technical and executive members to maintain councillors’ allowances at the current level of 
funding was opposed by all of the other councillors, irrespective of their party affiliations, 
and could not be resolved in a meeting that went on until 9.00pm without any agreement 
being reached. This further confirms that rent-seeking interests rather than political affiliation 
may be a critical inhibitor in the PB process. The statement further shows how the elective 
politics of Uganda is monetised, which may compromise the effectiveness of political leaders 
as peoples’ representatives. 
By law, one third of council members of local government should be females. The youth and 
people with disabilities have two representatives each on the council, one male and one 
female. CSOs and NGOs participate during budget conferences. Thus we can conclude that 
the design of the PB process is inclusive.  
Findings from the field also provide evidence that communication is one-way, contrary to the 
guidelines. Budget documents in all cases are distributed late, including to members of the 
executive, who might be given the budget documents two hours before the meeting. 
Communications of Indicative Planning Figures (IPF) from the central government that form 
the basis of preparing budget framework papers for local government come late. For example 
they can be communicated on a Friday when the deadline for submission is on the Monday of 
the following week. The review report by LGFC also pointed out that delays caused by late 
issuance of budget guidelines by central government encumber the proper implementation of 
the budget cycle, thus limiting the time available to local governments for consultations 
during the budget formulation stage. The report further stated that LGs have limited funds to 
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comprehensively engage in participatory planning in the budget process, and this weakened 
the bottom-up concept in the local government budget process (LGFC, 2012). With a ban on 
recruitment (currently the Wamala staffing level stands at 60%), Wamala finds itself 
constrained to meet set deadlines and at times depends on interns to go through the budgeting 
exercise, and this has an impact on the quality of the output. In the last budget conference, out 
of 21 sub-counties that were supposed to attend, only five attended, because of poor 
communication, as most of the chairpersons got to know about the budget conference on the 
very day of the conference. 
6.3.2 How Citizens Participate 
a) Preparatory Stage of PB Process 
This stage covers the development of the three-year District Development Plan from which 
the annual budget is derived. The key players in the process are the technical staff led by the 
Head of the Planning Unit. The District Planning Unit is responsible for the development and 
preparation of the District Development Plan from which the district budget is derived. Heads 
of departments are responsible for initiating the development of plan and budgets for their 
departments. However, as one head of department stated in response to the question 
regarding whether their contributions are taken into account in the final budget:  
Our contribution to the planning and budgeting process is on paper, our views are never 
taken into consideration, what is considered is only what the Chief Administrative 
Officer and the Chief Finance Officer want.  
It was established that this failure to make budget conferences participatory has created a 
negative impression among citizens which affect their participation in future. As one member 
of an NGO stated: “NGOs are just invited to show how much they will contribute to the 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
121 
 
district budget”. While there are provisions in the budgeting guidelines and legal framework 
for NGOs and CSOs to participate in the budgeting process, evidence from the field indicates 
that it is only those NGOs that have mainstreamed their activities in the district development 
plan that are invited to attend planning and budgeting meetings. By virtue of their setup, 
NGOs and CSOs are closer to the people, and their participation in the planning and 
budgeting process is expected to influence the allocation of resources, especially to 
marginalised groups and the poor. Unfortunately, evidence from the study indicates that this 
is not the case. There was also evidence that those NGOs and CSOs that do participate in the 
budgeting and planning purpose do so expecting to be allocated funds for their activities, and 
their expertise in effectively engaging in the budgeting process is lacking. Their 
ineffectiveness was explained during the focus group discussion by a political leader:  
NGOs and CSOs are very active in the district and greatly supplement district services, 
but the district does not make any contribution to them, for example, one NGO that is 
very active in the district wants an office, but we cannot provide it because it is not a 
government institution. 
The above explains why their participation is of no consequence to the process, as they 
cannot influence the prioritisation and allocation of resources. 
b) Formulation  
This stage involves extracting programmes and activities from the development plan 
developed in the preparatory stage that will be funded during the year under consideration. 
The process of allocating resources to needs and priorities starts with this stage. 
In Uganda, citizens of a local government are expected to be involved at this stage of the 
budgeting process through the budget conference. The budget conferences are moderated by 
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the chairpersons of LGs. Evidence from the case study shows that these conferences are used 
as a political platform by the chairpersons to communicate what they have been able to do 
and what they intend to do, rather than as a mechanism for collecting input from participants 
to inform budget decisions. The Chairman of Wamala District responding to the question of 
regarding the effectiveness of the mechanisms for participation said that: 
District budget conference is not reflective of district stakeholders, this is because: i) 
Poverty of citizens - they need facilitation to attend. However due to resource constraints 
the district cannot afford to facilitate participants apart from giving them lunch and 
refreshments. An example was given that all LC I Chairpersons collected their 
allowances from the district but never attended the Budget conference; ii) the poor and 
uneducated are keener to participate in the budgeting process; and iii) most of the funds 
from central government are conditional. Thus meeting stakeholders’ needs  depends on 
local revenue collected and the first call on local revenues is Councillors’ allowances.  
The observations by the Chairman of the district were confirmed by the Director of the Local 
Government Inspection Directorate, who stated in his address to the 8th Joint Annual Review 
of Decentralisation that: 
Planning and budgeting still takes a very straight course that lacks innovations and 
flexibility to effectively touch the core poor. Unique livelihood groups, deprived 
geographical poverty pockets persistently remain poor. (Walala, 2012:45) 
Uganda being known for its conservatism, the researchers explored the effect of cultural 
norms and values on PB. Women, according to Ugandan culture, are expected to take a back 
seat in society. However, the researcher as a non-participant observer saw that women 
councillors were in some cases more vocal than men councillors. There are a number of 
community based organisations (CBOs), especially women’s groups. Most of the CBOs have 
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social welfare as well as economic objectives. It was established that these women’s group 
CBOs have a great deal of influence during elections and most political leaders rely on them 
to mobilise voters. As one councillor said in response to the question regarding how social 
factors influence citizens’ participation: 
If you have these women’s groups on your side, you are assured of winning an election. 
They are reliable unlike men and the youth who just eat up the money and vote for your 
opponent. 
Ordinary citizens interviewed did not regard themselves as part of government or as people 
who can influence government, as one said in the local language “Gavumenti zabasoma” 
(literally translated as: The government is for those who are learned or educated). This 
evidence shows that citizens do not see themselves as part of government and view 
corruption in whatever form as an acceptable norm. The perception of an ordinary citizen is 
that public funds belong to no one, so whoever has access to them is free and it is normal to 
misuse public resources, and those who do not are ridiculed. How one amasses wealth is not 
an issue to the wider society. 
c) Approval 
The Council has the legal mandate to approve local government budgets and this 
responsibility cannot be delegated. In Uganda, all LGs complied with this legal requirement, 
following set budget guidelines issued by central government. In WDLG, the budget was laid 
before the Council on 11th June 2012 (the set deadline is 15th June). Thereafter the budget 
was referred to the relevant sector committees. WDLG has five sector committees: Works, 
Water and Roads; Health and Education; Production, Marketing and Natural Resources; 
Gender and Community Development; and Finance and Planning. Sector committee meetings 
are moderated by the chairperson of the sector committee. All councillors are free to attend 
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but only members of the committee are entitled to allowances. It was observed that although 
all councillors are free to attend sector committee meetings, none attended.  
The approval stage is moderated by the District Speaker, as required by law. The Chairperson 
of the Finance Committee presents the committee recommendation. Thereafter, the Secretary 
of Finance moves a motion to approve the budget and, if seconded, the budget is considered 
approved. 
The researcher was a non-participant observer of the sector committee meetings. The main 
observations made were: 
i. Documents to be discussed were presented on the very day of the meeting and 
some of the documents, for example those of the Health and Education 
departments, were not ready until very late in the afternoon when the meeting 
had already started. 
ii. Meetings that were scheduled to start at 9.00am started at the earliest at 11.25 
am. The full Council that approved the budget did not start until 4.00pm after 
resolving the issue of increasing allowances for the councillors. This was not 
unique to WDLG alone, but was the same across all local governments in 
Uganda. The MoLG had to issue a circular (see Appendix 7.1) reminding all 
local government councillors of their role and the laws and regulations 
regarding their emoluments. 
iii. Meetings are scheduled to end at 5.00pm, but in most cases meetings extended 
well beyond the official time. An example is the meeting for budget 
integration, composed of members of the Finance Committee and chairpersons 
of all other sector committees, which did not conclude business on the first 
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day and ran until 9.00pm on the next day again the contentious issue was that 
of councillors’ allowances. One of the councillors was open and said during 
the debate, “We will mobilise councillors to block the budget if we are not 
involved in monitoring the budget where we get political capital”. 
iv. The budgets in all sector committees were presented by technical officers 
instead of the secretaries, who as executive political leaders have a statutory 
mandate to provide political oversight over their respective sectors. In a 
number of instances, secretaries were asking questions during committee 
discussions instead of presenting and defending what had been presented to 
the sector committees of their respective portfolios. 
v. There was clear evidence that members of the Executive Committee did not 
know the contents of the budget they had presented to Council. As an 
example, at the lower local government level an executive member was 
against approving the budget the executive had presented to Council. 
vi. In one of the sector committee meetings, the budget for the sector could not be 
approved because there was no quorum to raise a motion passing the budget, 
but the room was full of technical officers. The discussion of the budget was 
between the chairperson of the committee and technical staff, so no one had 
realised that other members of the committee had already left. 
vii. The role and function of the Integration Committee was not clear to members, 
as most of them during the full Council meeting saw it as an opportunity to 
open up fresh debates on the reports they had agreed on during their sectoral 
committee meetings. 
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viii. The budget approval for lower local governments is not coordinated with that 
of the district. An example is where a new tax on cyclists was introduced at 
the district level, but lower level local governments were not aware of this.  
ix. The capacity of the district to monitor and provide guidance to lower local 
government was also evidently absent. A case can be cited where a Sub-
County Senior Assistant Secretary (SAS) did not actually convene a council 
meeting to approve the budget, but approached individual councillors at their 
places of residence or places of work to sign an attendance register and 
minutes approving the budget. 
x. Communication to councillors to attend budget meeting is effective, as all 
councillors interviewed agreed that they had received notices for the budget 
meeting on time. However, their complaint was that there were given short 
notice for the budget conference: as one councillor stated, “we were 
ambushed, therefore our contribution was limited”. Methods of 
communication used include telephone calls, courier services and sending text 
messages (SMS). 
xi. Communication during sector committee and council meetings is a challenge, 
as some councillors cannot speak English, which is the official government 
language and had to use the local language (Luganda). However, all budget 
documents are in English.  
The technical planning committee harmonises the development plan and the input from 
budget conference and heads of departments is chaired by the Chief Administrative Officer 
(CAO). The key players in the technical committee meeting are the Chief Finance Officer 
(CFO), the Chief Planning Officer and the CAO. At the executive level the meeting is chaired 
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by the Chairperson of the district, who this year was not able to chair, so responsibility was 
delegated to the Vice Chairperson, who is also the Secretary for Finance. The focus of the 
meeting was stated by one member of the executive as being “to ensure that our political 
agenda is well catered for”. 
Contrary to the budget guidelines, the contribution of the executive committee members, who 
are expected to play a key role, was not visible. The executive is expected to approve the 
budget prepared by the technical committee before it is presented to the council, but evidence 
collected from a member of the executive indicated that they never had a chance to look at 
the final document, as it was given to them on the very morning the budget was presented to 
the full council. Discussions during the sector committee meetings also indicated that sector 
secretaries were ignorant of what was being presented for their sectors by the technical staff. 
Moreover, according to the guidelines each secretary should have presented their sector 
budget to the sector committee, which was not the case. The non-participant observer noted 
that in some cases some secretaries did not know what was in the budgets of their sectors. It 
was further observed that councillors reviewed the proposed budget at the line item level and 
this was a common practice in budget reviews.  
d) Implementation 
There is no mechanism for citizen participation at this stage. Implementation is the exclusive 
responsibility of technical staff. After budget approval, implementation of the budget as per 
the workplans is the responsibility of the technical staff. However a number of activities 
approved in the budget to be funded from locally raised revenue end up unfunded. An 
example came from the Department of Education under the sports section where a member 
stated, “Over the last three years we have never got any funding from the district, we depend 
on donations”. Similar comments were made by the Internal Auditor during the sector 
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committee meeting when he stated, “In the last quarter of the year we never received any 
funding at all”. 
Unavailability of funds constrains implementation of the budget as planned. An example was 
given where in financial year 2011/2012, the central government reduced funds remitted for 
roads by Uganda Shillings 600 million. Similarly, in the current year, the district had 
expected to receive funds for the first quarter of financial year 2012/2013 by 15th July, but by 
the end of August, the district had not yet received funds from central government. A senior 
technical officer on implementation had the following comment:  
Local revenue is most unreliable due to political and economic factors beyond the 
control of the district. Delay in release of funds also affects implementation. In some 
cases money is released towards the end of the financial year and funds uncommitted by 
30th June are expected to be returned to the Consolidated Account of the central 
government in the central bank.  
Evidence collected from the field on budget implementation indicates that dependence on 
central government transfers has a negative effect on the PB process and this is compounded 
by the selfish interests of both technical and political leaders at the expense of ordinary 
citizens. It was also established that implementation of the central government also depends 
on donor funding. This was confirmed by a government minister in the Ministry of Finance 
who was quoted in the Monitor of 24th November: 
The issue of development partners withdrawing their budget support has had an impact 
on the management of revenue inflows hence making it difficult for us to implement the 
planned budget. (The Monitor, 2012). 
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This followed the suspension of aid to Uganda by five donors, including Ireland, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and the UK over massive corruption at the Office of the Prime Minister. 
It has also been established that the audit function which is critical in ensuring transparency 
and accountability is not given priority in resource allocation. 
e) Monitoring and Control 
The legal and institutional frameworks are very clear on the roles of political leaders, citizens 
and technical staff as regards budget monitoring. Political leaders who are members of the 
executive committee have a responsibility to supervise and monitor the implementation of the 
budget by the technical officer. Other political leaders have a responsibility to monitor 
activities in the approved budget within their constituencies and their assigned sectors. 
Evidence from the case study, at both the district and lower government level, shows that 
monitoring by political leaders other than those on the executive is not given priority. 
Citizens are expected to be involved in monitoring the health and education sector through 
the management committee. Evidence on the ground, unfortunately, shows that these 
management committees are not operational owing to lack of funding. Monitoring expenses 
for political leaders are supposed to be funded from locally raised revenues. As stated earlier, 
local governments in Uganda have a challenge in collecting local revenue, and whatever is 
collected goes into paying councillors’ allowances. This leaves almost nothing for other 
expenses that are expected to be funded locally. One member of the School Management 
Committee had this to say regarding this issue: 
We cannot do work for government for free when others are being paid. Let those who 
are paid monitor. If they want us to monitor they should pay us like they pay councillors. 
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Councillors at both levels of government expressed similar views regarding the facilitation of 
monitoring activities. At the lower local government level (sub-counties and town councils), 
only the chairperson is a full time employee of the local government, thus responsible for 
supervising and monitoring technical staff. During all the sector committee meetings, the 
issues of budgeting for councillors’ monitoring expenses emerged as a key determinant in 
approving sector budgets. Unfortunately this was not on the basis of ensuring better service 
delivery, but for rent-seeking motives by councillors to obtain allowances. 
f) Evaluation 
The design of the process provides for citizen participation on an annual basis during the 
budget conference. The people interviewed stated that the selection of participants for the 
budget conferences was based on partisan support. Individuals and groups known to be 
critical of the technical officers and executive are not invited and those who attend are never 
given a chance to contribute. This makes the evaluation stage of the PB process a symbolic 
exercise to comply with guidelines. The researcher observed that during the budget 
conference the focus was on the new budget, rather than evaluating past performance. 
6.4.   Achievement of Desired Outcomes 
This section has three sub-sections. The first presents findings on how participants’ input 
influences budget decisions. The second presents findings on transparency and 
accountability, and the last findings on how the process contributes to the education of 
citizens and enhances their capacities to identify their need and priorities so as to have an 
influence on the allocation of public resources.  
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6.4.1 Influence over Budget Decisions  
The outcomes that emerge from Uganda local government participation processes show 
results that are less than desired. While the lower local government of the SC1 sub-county 
council incorporated the desired funding for roads maintenance, as demanded by the 
councillors, it was established that the concerns of citizens were never captured in the 
development plan and subsequently were not budgeted for in the approved budget. This is not 
only unique to Wamala District Local Government, the study site: even at national level, the 
desired outcomes are not realised. This is evidenced by an article published in the Sunday 
Monitor newspaper of 30th September (2012:1) stating: 
On Thursday, MPs ignored the Shs6.5 billion in budget cuts proposed by the government 
to break a standoff over the health sector that had held up the passing of this year’s 
budget. Parliament did not change anything in the original figures submitted by the 
government even after Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi promised that some cuts would 
be made to find more money for the health sector. Jinja East MP Paul Mwiru tried to 
remind Speaker Rebecca Kadaga that the figures the House approved did not include the 
money for health, but his fears were talked down by the Budget Committee Chairperson, 
Tim Lwanga, and the Bukedea Woman MP, Ms Rose Akol. Passing the Budget without 
the proposed cuts means that the Shs800 billion for health sector will not be increased as 
expected and if the planned appropriation fails to capture the figures, the planned 
recruitment of health workers could face financial difficulties. 
It was also established that in WDLG, citizen participation is treated as a ritual and has never 
been taken seriously by either the technical or political leaders. One member of the executive 
in response to the question: To what extent are citizens’ contributions during the budgeting 
process taken into account in the final budget?  
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Budgeting in Wamala is a formality to meet government requirements. For example, one 
sub-county (SC) local government passed their budget before the district budget. The 
twenty-one million Uganda shillings allocated to the sub-county under the community 
development programme in the district budget was not reflected in their budget because 
they had not benefited from the programme the previous year. 
6.4.2 Enhancing Transparency and Accountability 
Transparency and accountability are key pillars of the decentralisation policy, as measures of 
good governance. In WDLG, it was established that both the political and technical leaders 
agree that there are adequate legal and institutional frameworks to ensure that the district is 
transparent and accountable in all its operation. However, in practice, transparency and 
accountability are below expectations. Evidence from the fieldwork about participation as a 
mechanism to enhance transparency and accountability shows that there are no clear 
guidelines for participation. Participation is voluntary, and there are no sanctions for non-
participation and no feedback mechanism. A budget conference is held once a year during the 
budget formulation stage. This is where an attempt is made to give an account of what has 
been done, and what is proposed to be done in the coming year. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the budget conference is a one-day meeting lasting at most five hours, and during 
those five hours participants have to listen to presentations from five sectors covering more 
than fifteen departments. 
A radio programme which is run on a weekly basis is the only structured channel used to give 
political accountability to stakeholders. As one resident of Wamala stated, in response to the 
question of: Does citizens’ participation in the budgeting process address local priorities? 
“Councillors no longer represent us, they represent their stomachs”. Therefore, the outcome 
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of citizen participation in the budgeting process is rated negatively in terms of influencing 
budget decisions, accountability and transparency. 
A study commissioned by the Local Finance Commission came out with the following 
findings: 
Table 6.2 Performance of FDS 
Main Objectives of FDS Performance 
Harmonising annual planning and budget process Satisfactory 
Improving the funds transfer system Satisfactory 
Setting up a strong framework for financial accountability Satisfactory 
Local participation especially of lower local governments Moderate 
Use of Output Budgeting Tool (OBT) for reporting Moderate 
Reducing the number and conditions for grants Poor 
Giving more flexibility to local government during budgeting Poor 
Source: LGFC Review Report August 2012  
The report recommended that “the Government should pursue increase in discretion in grants 
to widen participation; push autonomy in budget decision; and strengthen local accountability 
to improve effectiveness of local programmes” (LGFC, 2012:4). 
Accountability in currently a national challenge, as reported in the Monitor newspaper of 
15th October 2012: 
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As a wave of inquiries into suspected financial malpractice sweeps through many 
government departments, a new internal audit which closed two months ago suggests 
there has been a break down in accountability across all public offices. (Accessed on 
15th October, 2012). 
6.4.3 Educating Citizens 
As argued by Turner and Bryan (1990), civic education is an instrument that can be used to 
empower powerless groups and individuals with knowledge and skills which are 
indispensable if citizens are to effectively participate in the budgeting process.  Evidence 
from the field shows that, there is no structured system to educate stakeholders on their 
responsibilities in the budgeting process. 
6.5   Summary 
This chapter has presented the findings on how participatory budgeting is conducted in actual 
practice in Uganda using Wamala District Local Government, the study site. Evidence 
collected has been presented based on our research objectives. From the field data and 
information collected, the findings can be summarised in the following themes: 
a) Power Relations 
Power relations, especially between the technical officers and political leaders, emerge as a 
key factor in citizen participation in the budgeting process and achievement of desired goals 
and outcomes. The central government controls the structures and processes of participation. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of citizens’ participation and the extent to which they can 
influence local government budget decisions depend on central government decisions. Thus, 
central governments can be catalysts or can become barriers to effective citizen participation 
in the budgeting process of local governments. As Schönwalder (1997) argues, those local 
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governments in Latin America which never paid enough attention to the question of power 
relations have had minimal success in involving citizens in the budgeting process. 
Although budget guidelines and legal requirements state that citizens should be involved in 
planning and budgeting exercises, the reality on the ground is different. In practice, decisions 
on who to invite are taken by technical officers. According to one head of department, the 
allocation criteria used by the CAO and CFO are based on the question “What does the 
district lose if ‘your’ activity is not funded?” Civil society organisations that are considered to 
be critical in the budget meeting are black listed. Even at the technical level, there is evidence 
of power struggles in resource allocation. 
b) Participatory Skills 
Lack of knowledge and skills in budgeting and in public sector financial management 
emerged as a common factor that has affected the effectiveness of participatory budgeting in 
WDLG throughout. As Gaventa and Valderrama (1999) observe, analysing financial 
information and planning data requires particular skills, technical knowledge, experience, and 
managerial capabilities which most political leaders and citizens in Wamala lack. The 
problem of poor public financial management skills at both levels of local government runs 
as a common theme in the interviews and observations conducted as well as the studies 
reviewed. 
c) Corruption, Cultural Norms and Values 
The issue involved in mobilising citizens to participate and demand transparency and 
accountability of elected leaders and public servants against a cultural background of lack of 
democracy emerged as one of the challenges of participatory budgeting. The question that 
emerges is: How do we enforce participation and ensure that political leaders and 
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government officers do not use their access to public resources for selfish gain? This is 
currently a national challenge, as The Monitor newspaper of 15th October 2012 reported: 
As a wave of inquiries into suspected financial malpractice sweeps through many 
government departments, a new internal audit which closed two months ago suggests 
there has been a break down in accountability across all public offices. (The Monitor 
Newspaper, 2012). 
d) Structures for Participation 
Strengthening of citizen participation in local governance has to do with strengthening 
structures and institutional organs that will make contributions of groups and individual 
participants influence final decisions of public affairs. The majority of the current 
mechanisms have a consultative character. The current direct citizen participation is 
associated with the planning development stage.  
e) Locally Raised Financial Resources 
Lack of financial independence by LGs emerges as a key constraint in achieving the desired 
goals and outcomes of the participatory budgeting process in a decentralised local 
government system. 
The themes emerging from the findings have been summarised. The analysis and discussion 
of these findings follow in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Discussion and Analysis 
7.1   Introduction 
This chapter discusses and analyses the findings from the study, drawing on the empirical 
evidence presented in Chapter Six, the literature review in Chapter Two and the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter Three. The theoretical framework is particularly useful in 
making sense of the data collected.  
Following this introductory section, the next section discusses the influence and impact of 
NPM reforms on the budgeting practices of the case organisation. The third section, using 
Citizenship theory, discusses and analyses how participatory budgeting as part of the NPM 
reforms is implemented in the case organisation and how the participation of citizens in the 
budgeting process and their practices are influenced by both external and internal factors. The 
fourth section presents an analysis of how external pressures and citizens’ participation in the 
budgeting process influences and is influenced by the outcomes. The final section presents a 
summary. 
7.2   Institutional Pressures and their Influence on Budgetary Practices  
In this section the Neo-Institutional Sociology (NIS) strand of Institutional Theory is used to 
discuss and analyse how the adoption of NPM reforms and decentralisation policy by Uganda 
have influenced budgeting practices in WDLG. The first sub-section analyses how the 
influence of NPM reforms and adoption of the decentralisation policy in Uganda impacted on 
WDLG. The second sub-section presents an analysis and discussion of how these external 
pressures impacted on its budgeting practices. The focus in this sub-section is on the design 
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of the participatory process and mechanisms for citizen participation at each stage of the 
budgeting process, as identified in Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four.  
7.2.1 Influence of NPM Reforms and Decentralisation policy 
Various scholars have questioned the appropriateness of reforms advocated by supranational 
agencies to developing countries in addressing their development agenda (see for instance, 
Wampler, 2007; Baiochi, 2001; Robinson, 2006; Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). Changes in 
budgeting practices in Uganda were adopted from the Danish local government system. The 
decentralisation secretariat that was at the centre of these policy reforms was also funded by 
donor countries, led by the World Bank and Danida (World Bank, 2003; Danida, 2003). 
Therefore, it is argued that the adoption of NPM reforms and the decentralisation policy were 
imposed on the Ugandan nation state as a condition to access international funding. The 
NRM government which took over power in 1986 after the civil war needed external support 
to implement its reconstruction programme and also establish its political legitimacy. NRM 
adopted the same strategy as New York State in the USA, which adopted Generally 
Acceptable Accounting Principles (GAAP) following their financial problems of 1979 as a 
“symbol of legitimacy” (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992:637). New York’s need for legitimacy 
was “coupled with organised pressure from powerful interests in the institutional 
environment” (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992:637). As noted by Carpenter and Feroz, the 
adoption of GAAP did not solve the financial management problems of the state but, “New 
York needed a symbol of legitimacy that could be easily recognised by the public … GAAP 
[became] the recognised symbol of legitimacy” (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992: 638).  
In Tanzania, NPM reforms were adopted in the 1990s after an economic crisis following the 
abolition of all local governments in 1972 (Devas, 2005). Similarly, countries such as 
Zimbabwe that were facing political challenges, took a strategic decision to adopt 
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decentralisation as a strategy to counteract pressure from civil society and private sector 
organisations. The adoption enabled the political leaders to gain political legitimacy among 
black nationals who previously were racially segregated and discriminated against in the 
distribution of national resources (Devas, 2004). In Mozambique, NPM reforms were adopted 
as a tool to neutralise and as a solution for political stability. As argued by Crook (2003), 
decentralisation was adopted in Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe as a strategy for 
mobilising and maintaining traditional leaders whose political support is critical for central 
government legitimacy and nation building (Crook, 2003; Kiwanuka, 2012).  
In this study, it is argued that NRM as a new government that had gained power through an 
armed struggle, like the cases cited above, adopted NPM reforms and decentralisation in 
particular, because they needed a symbol of legitimacy that could be easily recognised by the 
public. As our theoretical framework indicates, institutional pressures from supra-national 
agencies like the World Bank and Danida (World Bank, 2000, 2006; Danida, 2003) pushed 
for NPM reforms as a condition for accessing funding which Uganda badly needed for her 
recovery programmes. It is therefore argued in this study that Uganda adopted 
decentralisation and participatory budgeting as a symbol of legitimacy that could be 
recognisable by an ordinary citizen at the lowest level. Decentralisation was thus adopted as a 
form of governance because of its pro-people objectives of empowerment, democracy and 
people’s participation in making decisions on issues that affect them.  
Evidence from the case study supports the argument that decentralisation, and participatory 
budgeting in particular, was never intended to give citizens their rights and responsibilities 
from the economic and financial perspectives, but was meant to be a political tool for 
political legitimacy. This confirms the observation by Sharpe (1976) that participatory 
planning as part of the decentralisation policy was not adopted to empower and involve 
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stakeholders but was a political tool used to gain legitimacy. The inclusion in the Constitution 
of Uganda 1995 of the belief that ‘good governance’ can be achieved through a participatory 
approach in Local Government affairs to achieve transparency and accountability (Uganda, 
1995, 2005), was a manipulation strategy adopted by Uganda to satisfy the supranational 
agencies that funded the Constitution-making process (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This 
formed a basis on which local governments were, through an Act of Parliament, coerced to 
adopt participatory budgeting as a budgeting methodology and practice (Local Government 
Act, 1997, 2006).  
By the time the case study District Local Government came into existence in the early 2000s, 
the Government of Uganda was already implementing NPM reforms, and decentralisation 
had already been embedded into the Uganda Constitution (Uganda Constitution, 1995) and 
operationalised through an Act of Parliament (Local Government Act, 1997) as a form of 
governance in Uganda. Thus, WDLG adopted these reforms, having given in to what 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) referred to as ‘coercive isomorphic’ pressures. The fact that 
participatory budging practices did not emerge on their own merit in WDLG partly helps to 
explain why they are ineffective and highly politicised. As one respondent commented, 
“Budgeting in the local government is a formality to meet government requirements”. Similar 
findings were made by Uddin and Tsamenyi (2005) in their case study of the Ghana Food 
Distribution Corporation (GFDC), which adopted World Bank reforms for purposes of 
accessing funding. The central government, after adopting decentralisation as a symbol of 
legitimacy, used regulatory mechanisms (through the Constitution, where decentralisation 
was entrenched as a form of local governance in Uganda, and through the Local Government 
Act 1997, where decentralisation was operationalised), to coerce local government to 
implement budgetary changes. Because decentralisation was adopted as a political symbol of 
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legitimacy, resources in WDLG are allocated based on political legitimacy rather than 
technical feasibility (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005; Lukka, 2007; Shapiro and Matson, 2008).  
The challenges faced by developing countries in implementing policies imposed by 
supranational agencies, being undertaken in many developing countries for the purpose of 
accessing donor finances, have been articulated by various scholars (Hood, 1991; Uddin and 
Tsamenyi, 2005; Lukka, 2007; Wampler, 2007). The findings from WDLG on implementing 
participatory budgeting re-affirms the earlier arguments that reforms in developing countries 
should not be measured on the basis of compliance with international standards; rather they 
should be considered in terms of the extent to which they add value to the overall process of 
addressing the priority needs of the ordinary citizens within their environment. However, the 
case study has shown that political leaders and a few technical staff allocate resources for 
their personal benefits in the form of emoluments and allowances (Wampler, 2007). 
Advocates of participatory budgeting cite Porto Alegre as an example of what can be 
achieved when citizens are involved in resource mobilisation and allocation decisions 
through the budgeting process (Navarro, 1998). However, it must be noted that in Porto 
Alegre the process was demand driven, unlike in Uganda, where participation was dictated 
by the state as the result of adopting NPM reforms that were donor driven to promote 
democracy (Philips and Stewart, 2009).  
The NIS theory posits that organisations may copy practices from other organisations within 
their sector that are considered or perceived to be successful (mimetic isomorphism). As 
pointed out in Chapter Two, the decentralised form of local governance adopted in Uganda 
was imported from Denmark, which was considered to be a success story in delivering public 
services. As noted by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in reference to mimetic isomorphism, 
the case study has provided evidence in Chapter Six that local governments in Uganda 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
142 
 
conformed to external pressures by adopting similar modes of behaviour, practices and 
structures. Conformity by local governments was for the purpose of securing resources from 
the central government that are critical for their survival, as all local governments in Uganda 
depend on 95% of their funding from central government transfers (LGFC, 2012).  Evidence 
from the field does not show that professional associations exerted pressure (normative 
isomorphism) on local governments to adopt NPM reforms. 
In summary, in Uganda, citizen participation in the budgeting process did not emerge on its 
own merit. It can therefore be regarded as a state-imposed policy intended to achieve the state 
objective of political legitimacy, rather than empowering citizens to participate in the 
allocation of national resources based on their needs and priorities. This confirms Oliver’s 
hypothesis that organisations “respond to institutional pressures that affect them” (1991:145) 
by employing acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate strategies. It is asserted in 
this study that institutional pressures exerted on the citizens of Uganda influenced their 
social, political and legal rights in the adoption of NPM reforms. The NPM reforms were 
never adapted to the Uganda environment of diverse cultural norms and values. This has had 
an impact on the extent to which stakeholders are involved in the process budgeting, and 
budgeting as a management control tool within a wider management control system. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
7.3   Citizen Rights and Responsibilities in the Budgeting Process 
This section discusses and analyses evidence and literature on how citizens exercise their 
rights and responsibilities in the budgeting process in Wamala District Local Government 
(WDLG). The focus is on how residents of WDLG as citizens participate in the budgeting 
process and hold those in public office accountable. The section attempts to answer the 
following three questions: i) does the government provide a conducive environment for 
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citizen participation? ii) is the design of the process at different stages conducive to 
participation? and iii) are the mechanisms for participation suitable? The next sub-section 
addresses the first question. 
7.3.1 Government Environment  
The form of government and political will are key factors for effective citizen participation in 
a budgeting process (Franklin and Ebdon, 2006; Wampler, 2007; Steiner, 2006; Goldfrank, 
2006; Heimans, 2002). Evidence from the field suggests that Uganda is a multi-party 
democracy and that political will in theory exists to involve citizens in budget decision-
making. One officer from the MoLG responded as follows to the question on: What should be 
done by government to improve participatory budgeting in local governments.  
Decentralisation is our baby and it is our responsibility to nurture it. Though there are 
challenges especially regarding the ability of local governments to raise local revenue. 
The Ministerial Policy Statement for YF 2012/2013 also re-affirms government commitment 
to the decentralisation policy and states that: 
The Decentralisation Policy continues to provide an important anchor for the 
advancement of Government of Uganda’s overall political and socio-economic 
development agenda. The policy seeks to promote popular participation and empower 
local people to make decisions on important issues that affect their lives and enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. (MoLG, Policy Statement FY2012/13:iv) 
Findings from the case study indicate that what takes place in reality is quite different. As one 
respondent said in response to the question: How do citizens of Wamala District participate in 
the budgeting process under decentralisation? 
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Theory and practice are two different matters: the government [central] says things to 
please donors. Government is now moving away from decentralisation to centralisation. 
If we accept that the government has created a favourable environment and has the political 
will for citizen participation, the question emerges: Why do citizens view participation as a 
political ploy? A plausible explanation is that given by Carpenter and Feroz (1992) who 
discussed how New York State used the adoption of GAAP practices following its 1979 
financial problems to gain legitimacy. 
How the government environment promotes citizen participation is analysed using the 
Citizenship Theory as our lenses. Citizens of WDLG have, as individuals and as a group, 
rights and responsibilities that are bestowed to them in the Constitution (Uganda 
Constitution, 1995; Marshall, 1997; Monfardini, 2005). The two main responsibilities of a 
citizen are to participate in all matters of public administration, and to hold accountable those 
charged with the management of public affairs (Monfardini, 2005). As Mann (1986) and 
Downing (1998) argued, citizenship developed from below will generate active citizen 
participation, whereas citizenship developed from above is most likely to take on a passive 
and negative form. When the NRM came into power in 1986, its governance structure was 
based on resistance councils (RCs) that had proved successful during the civil war. These 
were popular councils that empowered ordinary citizens to exercise their rights and 
responsibilities as a citizen in affairs that concerned them. Therefore, the concepts of 
citizenship were embedded in these grassroots organisations, similar to the powerful trade 
unions in Latin America and Brazil in particular, where the concept of participatory 
budgeting is cited as a success story (Sterling, Grunfelder and Borges, 2006).  
The RCs were home-grown citizen organisations that followed and practised democratic 
governance principles not imposed from above. However, on the NRM’s assumption of 
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power, the Western donor countries viewed these resistance councils as grounded in a 
Communist ideology that needed to be dismantled. This led to the changing of the title from 
resistance councils to local councils (LCs). Herzer and Pirez (1991) based on Latin America 
experience, reached the same conclusions, that political will together will organisations that 
are acceptable to local citizens are necessary for participatory budgeting to be effective and 
achieve desired outcomes.  
The change of RCs to LCs affected the grassroots organisations in the case study local 
government. This has been made worse by the failure to have elected legally recognised LCs 
since 2006.This has undermined the ability of WDLG residents to effectively exercise their 
citizenship rights and responsibilities. This also illustrates how donor-lead reforms can 
undermine and kill local initiatives that are suitably tailored to the norms and values of the 
local environment. 
As argued by Bryan and Turner (1990), in designing a PB process it is important that policy 
makers take into account the fact that different historical circumstances give rise to different 
forms of citizen participation. What is applicable in a developed country may not apply in a 
developing country, and what may work in an urban environment may not be applicable in a 
rural setting. Thus there is a need to adapt policies to the local environment. The case study 
findings have shown that reforms adopted as a result of institutional pressures will not 
achieve the expected outcomes, and having an enabling government environment as well as a 
good legal and institutional framework are essential, but not the only necessary conditions for 
citizen effective participation. 
Political Environment 
Participation of citizens in the process of budgeting is influenced by the political environment 
within which the local government is operating (Wampler, 2007; Steiner, 2006; Goldfrank, 
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2006; Heimans, 2002). Uganda, up to independence in 1962, was governed under kingdoms 
and chiefdoms and thereafter, dictatorships including the military dictatorship of  Idi Amin up 
until 1986.The culture of a multi-party democracy is just emerging, unlike in other countries 
where participatory budgeting has been successful. Therefore, the introduction of NPM’s 
reforms for the purposes of enhancing democracy and good governance was likely to face 
challenges, as the culture of democracy is somewhat alien to the citizens. The concept of 
electing political leaders is not taken seriously. One respondent in the interviews said in 
response to the question of: which factor (social, economic, political or environmental) has 
the greatest influence on the effectiveness of citizens’ participation? 
If you have these women groups on your side, you are assured of winning an election. 
They are reliable unlike men and the youth who just eat the money and vote for your 
opponent. 
 
The statement implies that political leaders are not elected on the basis of their programmes 
for the electorate but on the basis of bribery. They buy votes, and, once they assume office, 
they have no obligation to serve the people but their own interest to recoup the money spent. 
As one councillor put it: 
We are all politicians but these members of the executive do not think about us. All the 
money, they want to eat it up with the technical staff, when we all spent money to become 
councillors. Our only chance to make them know that we also exist is during the budget 
approval process. We will not pass the budget unless our interests are catered for. 
The Chairman of WDLG is from an opposition party and the majority of the council 
members are from the ruling party in central government. However, during budget meetings, 
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party politics did not appear to play a major role; the key consideration is how the interests of 
the councillors, in terms of allowances and emoluments, are catered for in the budget. The 
researcher observed that the actual power struggle was between the political leaders on the 
executive and those who are not; on how to share the 20% of locally raised revenues 
available for political leaders’ emoluments and allowances. 
The government has also put in place a legal framework and structures for citizen 
participation: as one respondent commented, “The legal framework has never come up as an 
issue. The legal framework is very clear and well documented. The problem is the application 
in real practice”. 
It was also observed that the central government has not enforced budget guidelines that 
require citizen participation in the budgeting process. Evidence was not also found that 
participatory budgeting was negatively affected by one-party democracies or weak opposition 
parties (Mukandala, 1998; Makumbe, 1998; Ddungu, 1998). On the contrary, citizen 
participation was more effective when Uganda was a one-party state. 
Social and Economic Environment 
Lack of financial independence has been identified as one of the key constraint in making 
contributions from stakeholders influence the final allocation of resources by lower local 
governments (Mutizwa-Mangiza et al., 1996; Blair 1998). This has been compounded by the 
negative impacts of structural adjustment programmes promoted by the IMF that have 
worked to the advantage of only the elites, widening the gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have 
not’. Access to resources under local government control was identified by the several 
residents interviewed as a key constraint to citizen participation in the budget process. As one 
technical officer commented regarding factors influencing participation, 
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You cannot talk of decentralisation without decentralising finances. Wamala currently 
depends over 90% on central government transfers, much of which are conditional 
grants, and the district is just used as a conduit to the actual beneficiaries. 
 
Citizenship is not all about exercising political rights and responsibilities; it also includes 
economic and financial rights and responsibilities (Marshall, 1977). As Wildavsky (1975, 
1986) pointed out, budgets in the context of public sector financial management are a means 
of sharing financial resources through political processes and procedures to serve different 
human needs. This study argues that political rights are not sustainable without financial 
resources. Various scholars have alluded to this idea by asserting that budgeting in the public 
sector is a highly political process (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1986; Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 
1997). Therefore, a power struggle between central government and local government is 
inevitable, and access to and control of resources is at the centre of this struggle. Whoever 
controls the resources has the power. In this regard, the central government is very cautious 
in financially empowering local government, as it may lead to loss of control. This 
undermines the status of budgets as tools and standards of effectiveness and efficiency 
(Otley, 1978). Flexibility for local governments to allocate resources based on their needs and 
priorities started in 2002, when the government came up with the Fiscal Decentralisation 
Strategy (FDS). 
In the 2011/2012 budget, 93 per cent of WDLG revenue was from central government and 
only 7% came from locally raised revenues. This makes the district dependent on central 
government support for resources to undertake their mandate. This, as Collier (2001) and 
Modell (2001) noted, makes central government’s role, which is exercised through legislation 
and policy guidelines, powerful. WDLG adopted a ‘manipulation’ strategy to minimise 
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central government pressure to comply with the decentralisation policy (DiMaggio, 1983). 
An officer from the planning unit had this to say in response to the question of how political 
factors influence participation 
The stakeholders’ participation in the budgeting process was dictated by the ministry of 
local government, our role is to implement. We did not have any input in the way the 
process was designed. 
In summary, election of representatives to political offices is not based on rational choices 
presented by candidates to the electorate but on the personal benefits a voter gets from the 
candidate. Thus, voters demand to be paid for their votes, as they believe that whoever is 
elected caters for their personal interests: as one resident put it, “Councillors no longer 
represent us, they represent their stomachs”. 
The citizens’ perception of government is that it belongs to nobody and public resources are a 
privilege of the very few.  
7.3.2 Design and Suitability of the Process for Citizen Participation 
The most important features of process design that would lead to an effective participatory 
budgeting process have been debated in the literature. In this section we analyse and discuss 
the participatory budgeting process in Uganda and its suitability for achieving the desired 
goals and outcomes. The argument of this study is that the suitability of a process design 
should be evaluated on the basis of its ability to achieve the desired objectives efficiently and 
effectively. As one resident interviewed said in response to the question of what should be 
done by government to improve participatory budgeting in local governments:  
I believe that the process is as good as the end. But if you look at the way some of my 
colleagues are operating, I see that their philosophy is: the end justifies the means. I 
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don’t believe in that philosophy. Government should sensitise people on the importance 
of participation in the budgeting process. 
The participation process in Uganda was designed to apply to all local governments, rural and 
urban, without taking into account the cultural diversity and unique characteristics of 
different LGs. The process has two clear outputs: a Development Plan and an Annual Budget. 
Our theoretical framework in Chapter Three identified five stages of the participatory 
budgeting process. This sub-section discusses and analyses the process design of each stage 
and its suitability for citizen participation. The focus of our analysis is on who participates 
and why they participate, and the challenges experienced in real practice based on the 
literature and the evidence collected in Chapter Six. 
Preparation Stage 
It is at this stage that citizens’ direct participation in the budgeting process is supposed to take 
place. As stated by Bland and Rubin (1997:104), 
It is especially important, however, to involve citizens when community goals are being 
developed and to seek their opinions on key policy decisions related to taxation and 
expenditures. With few exceptions, however, public involvement in local budget making 
is superficial and undertaken only to satisfy legal requirements.  
Forums for citizen participation in Uganda are very clear: the process starts from the village 
council, in which all residents above the age of eighteen (eligible to vote) are expected to 
participate. Unfortunately, as the evidence from WDLG has shown, this is no longer the 
practice, as the public forums for participation at the village level are not effective owing to 
the lack of a legal mandate, which elapsed in 2006. As one chairperson of a village council 
stated:  
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Since we are not protected by the law, we do not get involved in activities that are not 
rewarding because if you make a mistake the government will not be on your side. You 
will suffer alone. We therefore handle issues where we know we are safe or the benefits 
are worth the risk. 
Similar sentiments were echoed by the Chairman of the district in response to the question of: 
From your experience what needs to be done to ensure that local communities especially the 
poor benefit from PB?  
Village and parish councils lack political and legal legitimacy. Their term expired six 
years ago! Therefore we have no input that genuinely comes from the village council and 
parish development committee. Whatever is indicated as an input from village and parish 
councils are an innovation from the technical staff who want to convince central 
government that the district is following laid down procedures in preparing the budget. 
Failure to do so, the district may not access resources from the centre. This needs to be 
addressed if budgeting is to be meaningful and of benefit the local community. 
The implication of the above statements is that Wamala residents have been deprived of their 
rights and responsibilities as citizens to participate in the budgeting process. Annual budgets 
are derived from a three-year development plan. Thus, non-participation in the planning 
process by village councils implies non-participation in the budgeting process. This leaves 
the whole concept of participatory budgeting a farce. Because these reforms are donor driven, 
the government and local governments have to show that they are compliant with the budget 
guidelines and various legal frameworks. In WDLG, evidence collected indicates that a 
manipulation strategy as advanced by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) has been adopted to 
ensure that central government continues to remit funds to the district. The central 
government also uses the same strategy to convince donor partners that Uganda is 
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successfully implementing NPM reforms and citizens are involved in decision making on 
matters that concern them. 
In summary, the field evidence and literature review show that the participation process was 
well designed as a bottom-up approach that gives ordinary citizens the opportunity to express 
their needs and priorities. The problem, as stated by one respondent, is that the budgeting 
process is regarded as: 
 …an annual ritual that we have to comply with since we are civil servants. We continue 
to recycle activities year after year because they have never been funded over the last 
five years.  
This problem is not unique to Uganda or local governments: similar challenges were also 
identified by Tsamenyi et al. (2002) in their study of four organisations in Ghana, where they 
found that senior managers were not fully involving junior managers in budget decisions, 
undermining some of the objectives of the budget as a planning and control tool.  
Formulation Stage 
This stage is also referred to as the budget development phase: the main activities involve 
agreeing on the activities and projects from the District Development Plan to be undertaken 
during the year under consideration. Budget formulation is the responsibility of the budget 
desk, headed by the Chief Financial Officer, and all of its members are technical officers. It 
can be argued that technical officers are also citizens, who by virtue of their knowledge and 
skills are put in these positions to serve the interests of other citizens efficiently and 
effectively. What is important is that they behave in a transparent and accountable manner 
(Monfardini, 2005). Unfortunately the evidence collected from the case study indicates that 
public servants regard themselves as external technical experts hired to serve the citizens, 
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who are represented by their political leaders. They look at themselves as the agents, first, of 
central government that provides the funding; second, of political leaders on the executive 
who monitor their activities on a daily basis; and lastly of other political leaders with whom 
they interact during quarterly and annual budgeting exercises.  
Although Williamson (2012) observed that Uganda has had a credible budget process in 
budget formulation and implementing reforms in public expenditure management since 1990, 
evidence from Wamala shows the contrary. Findings in WDLG show that budgeting has 
become more routine and less strategic than it was when the decentralisation policy was 
introduced. The introduction of the Output Budgeting Tool (OBT) has also made it more 
technical, as it now requires a certain level of education for someone to participate in the 
process effectively. Since no educational qualifications are required to be a councillor, the 
findings are that many councillors lack the required competences, knowledge and skills to 
actively participate in the budgeting process. This brings to question the added value brought 
by political leaders to the process. 
The budgeting process is about the allocation of public resources that are mainly raised 
through taxation. Thus the budget has two main components: revenue and expenditure. 
Unfortunately, all of the local governments visited and budget meetings attended focused 
only on one component of the budget, that is, expenditure. Taxation is a sensitive issue with 
which political leaders do not wish to be associated, as it touches the voters whom they claim 
to represent. In one local government, the issue of taxation came up as a result of councillors 
realising that increasing their allowances depended on generating more local revenue.  Thus 
their motive to discuss revenue generation was for personal rent-seeking motives. 
In summary, key players expressed their disappointment in the way this stage is managed, as 
input from the budget conferences and heads of departments is not taken seriously. One head 
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of department questioned its relevance and addition of value to the process. As one technical 
staff member put it in response to the question: To what extent are your contributions during 
the budgeting process taken into account in the final budget? 
Our contribution to the planning and budgeting process is on paper, our views are never 
taken into consideration, what is considered is only what the Chief Administrative 
Officer and the Chief Finance Officer want. (Field Work, 2012) 
The budget desk, according to the guidelines, is expected to present the draft budget to the 
Executive Committee before it is presented to the Council. As explained by the Chairman of 
the district, the executive received the budget documents just hours before the council 
meeting. We can conclude from the Wamala experience that budgeting is still being 
performed by the technical officers, as was the case before the NPM reforms were 
introduced. This further re-affirms the assertion made earlier that participatory budgeting was 
adopted as a symbol of legitimacy (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). However, the researcher 
found that budget discussion and participation takes place at the approval stage, discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
Approval Stage 
In the above sub-section we discussed and analysed how the draft budget is prepared by the 
budget desk, composed of technical officers, based on the draft development plan that is 
developed after the budget conference. The key activity at this stage is the examination of 
sector budgets and workplans by the sector committees. The findings in Chapter Six show 
that most interviewees described sector committee meetings to discuss budgets and work 
plans as a matter that is not taken very seriously by the political leaders who are the key 
players. As one respondent stated, “Budgeting in Wamala is a formality to meet government 
requirements”. 
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Similar findings were made by Kasumba (2012:152) in his study of budgeting practices in 
Kampala City Council, 
… technocrats at the administrative level … had stocks of knowledge and skills to 
implement the changes in the budgeting practices. However, at the approval level, for 
which local politicians were in charge, the linkage between the development plans and 
annual budgets seemed to be ignored. 
A case in a lower local government where the technical officer never convened a council 
meeting to approve the budget but solicited approval from individual councillors from their 
places of residence and work gives credibility to the above statement. This is not unique at 
local government level: similar experiences are noted even at the national level. For example, 
the Sunday Monitor newspaper of 30
th
 September 2012 reported that: 
Parliament on Friday bent rules of procedure to pass this year’s Shs11.4 trillion Budget 
amid protests from some members that the figures were not tallying. (2012:1) 
If this happens at the national level, perhaps we should not expect much at the local 
government level.  
Implementation Stage 
The issues in this stage revolve around ensuring that the technical officers effectively 
implement approved activities in the budget to achieve the desired goals and outcomes. 
Budget implementation is in theory supposed to be guided by workplans that are approved by 
sector committees. However, the researcher found that a number of workplans remain on 
paper due to lack of funds. An example is the sports section, where a member stated, “Over 
the last three years we have never got any funding from the district, we depend on donation”. 
Similar comments were made by the Internal Auditor during the sector committee meeting 
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when he stated, “In the last quarter of the year we never received any funding at all” (Field 
Notes, 2012). 
Implementation of local government budgets depends heavily on central government 
transfers. This undermines citizens’ rights and responsibilities, as many of the activities 
identified to meet their needs are side-lined and the few that make it to the final budget are 
not assured of funding. There are many instances when funds released by central government 
have been much lower than what was expected in the approved budgets. This was confirmed 
by the CAO who stated in response to the question regarding failure by WDLC to meet 
expectations of stakeholders who participate in the budgeting process: 
Local revenue is most unreliable due to political and economic factors beyond the 
control of the district. Delay in release of funds also affects implementation. In some 
cases money is released towards the end of the financial year and funds uncommitted by 
30
th
 June are expected to be returned to the Consolidated Account of the central 
government in the central bank. 
As Monfardini (2005) argued that, public servants should be transparent and accountable, to 
enable all citizens to participate in matters of public affairs which they conduct on behalf of 
citizens. Monfardini (2005) also argued that public administrators are under obligation to 
meet the expectations of citizen who have certain rights and duties bestowed on them by 
virtue of being citizens. The findings in Wamala show that technical officers do not meet 
these obligations as they are not transparent, and accountability is done selectively. 
The designers of the budgeting process wanted separation of powers as an internal control 
measure. Thus, as technical officers implement, political leaders and citizens are expected to 
monitor and evaluate budget implementation. The next sub-section analyses this stage.  
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Monitoring and Evaluation Stage 
The Monitoring and Evaluation phase issues resolve around ensuring that: activities being 
undertaken are as planned and agreed on during the budgeting process; stakeholders are given 
accountability on the progress of set goals and objectives; and where necessary corrective 
action is taken and communicated to all stakeholders. 
Political leaders and residents are expected to play a role in this stage through management 
committees, according to the process design. Effective monitoring and control depends on 
three main inputs: i) information; ii) resources; and iii) power to enforce decisions. A classic 
example was found in sub county number three (SCIII) Lower Local Government, where 
even the Executive did not have access to financial information, resources for monitoring 
were never released and councillors failed to have the SAS transferred for failure to comply 
with policy guidelines. Power relations and cultural norms and values came into play and 
explain how practices that can be successful in one environment may not work in another 
cultural environment. Much as councillors wanted to be facilitated to monitor budget 
implementation, the researcher could not find any monitoring reports made by councillors on 
their monitoring visits. This reinforces the argument that the demand for monitoring 
allowances was not to ensure the delivery of quality services, but was for personal rent-
seeking motives, as value addition at the evaluation stage was not evident.  
Evaluation of the budget process is undertaken once a year during the budget conference. The 
challenges faced during the budget conference have been covered in the preparatory stage 
discussed above. 
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7.3.3 Appropriateness of Mechanisms for Citizen Participation 
In this sub-section we discuss the question: Are citizen participation mechanisms 
appropriate? Scholars have argued that methods of participation to be effective should be 
aligned to the desired objectives (Thomas, 1995; Franklin and Ebdon, 2005). Proponents of 
NPM reforms argue that by involving citizens in deciding on their needs and priorities, 
quality and access to service delivery can be enhanced. The study has identified three 
categories of stakeholders in the budgeting process: (i) ordinary citizens including NGOs and 
CSOs; (ii) political leaders; and (iii) technical staff. This sub-section analyses the 
mechanisms and their suitability for participation for each category. 
Ordinary citizens, NGOs and CSOs 
The mechanisms for this category are in the form of public meetings at village council level 
and budget conferences at both the lower local government and district local government 
levels.  
a) Village Councils 
Participatory budgeting is about citizens’ participation in the budgeting process. Benjamin 
Barber defined citizen participation as: 
[…] self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of 
citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level 
and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are 
being decided and when significant power is being deployed (Barber, 2003: 151). 
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Devas and Grant (2003:309) define citizen participation thus: “Citizen participation is about 
the ways in which citizens exercise influence and control over the decisions that affect them”. 
Goldfrank (2006) specifically defines PB: 
… as a process by which citizens, either as individuals or through civic associations may 
voluntarily and regularly contribute to decision-making over at least part of a public 
budget through an annual series of scheduled meetings with government authorities. 
According to the above three definitions, village councils form the basis of participatory 
budgeting. The main objective of NPM reforms, and decentralisation in particular, is to make 
public sector organisations more effective and efficient, by involving citizens in decision-
making on matters that concern them (Hood, 1992). The budget is the legal instrument that 
authorises taxation and public expenditure. It is therefore a ‘basic’ policy document in public 
sector financial management and fits into Barber’s (2003) definition. As Monfardini (2006) 
observed, citizen involvement is one way of increasing the accountability and transparency of 
public sector organisations, because it allows citizens to enter and see how the ‘black box’ 
works.  
Manor and Crook (1998), in their case study on India, illustrate how control over 
participatory procedures affects the opportunity of citizens to participate. They noted that, by 
law, local councils hold twice yearly meetings (Gram Sabha) in each village. The meetings 
are used to provide accountability to citizens and to identify priority target populations for 
assistance.  
The study has established that in Uganda, local governments local governments do not have 
the capacity to effectively involve and engage with the communities. Budgeting guidelines 
are deliberately delayed resulting in local governments not having enough time to fully 
engage in the long process of citizen participation. This greatly undermines the participatory 
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budgeting process as little time is available for extensive consultation with all key 
stakeholders. The second challenge found in actual practice is that of information asymmetry. 
Unavailability of information and failure in some cases to disclose information to all 
stakeholders in the budgeting process undermines accountability to the public (Bovens, 2005; 
Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
Village councils are appropriate mechanisms of citizen participation and can produce the 
desired results on the condition that citizens exercise the political rights and responsibility of 
electing their leaders periodically. However, as Robin et al. (2008) stated: 
 … those who are motivated or have the time to do so are most likely to attend these 
forums. Come one, come all forums do not provide information about overall community 
preferences, but they may provide an important civic (feel-good) or public information 
function. They are also inexpensive and might satisfy legal public hearing requirements. 
(2008:567) 
The village council as a mechanism for citizen participation is undermined by the inability of 
some lower local government officers to translate local needs into technical proposals. This 
has provided an excuse for bureaucrats in higher levels of the administration to disregard 
local citizens input. In summary, although village councils are an ideal mechanism for citizen 
participation, they have not been utilised. 
b) Budget Conferences 
The criteria determining who actually participates in the budget conference are not clear. 
Invitation is undertaken arbitrarily by technical officers, and general invitations are also made 
through radio announcements. The case study has confirmed the observation made by 
Gurwitt (1992) that active participation by citizens depends on whether the issues being 
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discussed concern the participants. During the budget conference, it was observed that the 
presentations were made by technical officers and the focus was on what had been done and 
the challenges faced. This is in contrast with the expectations of the participants as one 
respondent said in response to the question regarding the effectiveness of mechanisms for 
citizen participation : 
This meeting is a waste of time and they just invite us to justify the big amount they have 
allocated to themselves. Whatever we say is never done or taken into consideration. 
As stated by Mark and Shotland (1985), budget conferences discuss wide issues. In Wamala 
during the budget conference, fourteen heads of departments made presentations within less 
than five hours. This implies that each sector has less than an hour to make a presentation, 
have it discussed and solicit the views of the participants. The budget conference as a 
mechanism for engaging citizens in the budgeting process has not been successful in WDLG. 
Evidence from the case study shows that local residents, business communities, NGOs and 
CBOs are not given an opportunity to participate, as budget conferences are dominated by 
technical officers and political leaders at both the district and lower levels of local 
government. This finding is in agreement with observations made by Francis and James 
(2003) as well as Hickey and Mohan (2005), that the mechanism of participation using 
budget conferences is not effective. The mechanism is subject to manipulation by key 
participants who are more vocal (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974; Francis and James, 2003; 
Callanan, 2005; Harare Communiqué, 2007; Wampler, 2007; Hickey and Mohan, 2005). 
It was also established that there was a limited number of participants in budget conferences. 
This was attributed to lack of resources to facilitate participants in the form of transport 
allowance, refreshments and meals. This is similar to findings by Mimba et al. (2007), in 
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their study on Tanzania, that those who take part in budget conferences are very often the 
same group of people each time. 
The case study has also come up with evidence that technical officers, as argued by Irvin and 
Stansbury (2004), can also lock out participants whom they believe will interfere with their 
rent-seeking interests and political legitimacy. The end result is that political leaders and 
technical officers end up allocating and utilising the resources of the district for their personal 
benefit, thus defeating the objectives of the NPM reforms (Wampler, 2007). 
Technical Staff 
Technical officers, by virtue of their expertise, are at the centre of the budgeting process. 
There are two mechanisms for participation: the technical planning committee and the budget 
desk. Participation at this level is expected to involve all staff from the lowest to the heads of 
departments. The study has established that staff of the lower cadre are not involved in 
preparing budgets in their departments. The findings also show that the same sentiments were 
also raised by the heads of department, who expressed the same frustration because their 
input is side-lined, as the CAO and CFO decide what to include and what to leave out.  
Technical staff are subjected to coercive pressures and have adopted various strategies to 
cope with these institutional pressures. A ‘compromise’ strategy is adopted as a way of 
complying with central government requirements to implement reforms in budgeting 
practices. The same strategy was used by members of the Finance Committee which resulted 
in resolving the issue of councillors’ allowances. Technical officers at lower local 
government level adopted ‘defy’ and ‘manipulate’ strategies. The defy strategy was noticed 
in the lower sub-counties, as evidenced in one sub-county where the Chief Technical Officer 
refused to attend a council meeting and some council members walked out of the meeting 
because of disagreements with technical officers.  
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In summary, much as technical officers claim that they try to balance competing interests, 
people and organisations, evidence on the ground shows the contrary. Improvement in the 
budgeting to effectively engage all stakeholders in the process of resource allocation is not 
visible. What is visible is that WDLG has competent technical staff who have complied with 
central government timelines at the expense of citizens’ participation. 
Political Leaders 
Three mechanisms exist for political leaders to participate in the budgeting process: (i) 
Executive Committee meetings; (ii) Sector Committee meetings; and (iii) full Council 
meetings. 
a) Executive Committee Meetings 
The Chairperson chairs the executive committee of the local government is responsible for 
the budget and its presentation to the council. The executive is expected to discuss the draft 
budget drawn up by the budget desk to ensure that the needs and priorities as identified by the 
budget conference have been taken into account in the budget. However, it was established at 
both the district and lower government levels that executive committees never had a chance 
to discuss the draft budget that they presented to Council. In one lower local government, the 
Secretary for Finance prepared his own draft budget that he presented to Council, and the 
technical officers had their own budget. This illustrates the political and cultural environment 
in which policies are implemented. What may appear abnormal in a developed country is 
quite normal in a developing country, owing to cultural differences and perception in 
managing public affairs.  
b) Sector Committee Meetings 
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The study has established that this forum provides the real opportunity for participation and 
influencing budget allocation. It is in sector committee meetings that political leaders and 
technical staff share information on how resources are to be allocated in the coming budget, 
based on identified priorities of the community. Elected officials also hold the belief that, 
since they serve the interest of the people who elected them, therefore as elected 
representatives they make decisions on behalf of the communities they represent. However, 
the case study has presented evidence that political leaders do not represent the interests of 
their electorate, but their personal interests. This was evident when it came to the issue of 
their emoluments and allowances. All councillors, irrespective of their political affiliation, 
were in agreement and very active during the meetings. As an example, in one sector 
committee meeting, councillors extended the meeting up to 9.00pm., discussing their 
allowances. The political leaders used ‘acquiesce’ as a strategic response to achieve their 
rent-seeking motives. 
c) Council Meetings 
Final approval of the budget is the responsibility of the Council. This is a ceremonial 
mechanism once the councillors’ issues have been resolved at the sector committee level. The 
Council’s role is not to debate the merits and demerits of the budget, as this is supposed to 
have been done at Sector meetings, but to pass a resolution. In WDLG, the council that was 
scheduled to sit at 9.00am could not sit until 4.00pm after agreeing on increasing the 
councillors’ allowances. In lower local government there were no actual budgets to be 
approved. This is also reflected at national level, as the Executive Director of the Anti-
Corruption Coalition Uganda observed in the New Vision newspaper of 4
th
 October 2012: 
Budget is a serious matter and for MPs to just rubber stamp the figures is very 
dangerous. There is a possibility that figures can be tampered with.  This is another form 
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of corruption. If they can’t stand by their rules, how will they hold others accountable? 
MPs should lead by example. They are just being intimidated by the other arm of the 
government. 
In summary, the mechanisms for citizen participation are in place, but implementation is the 
challenge. The process design assumed that citizens would exercise their citizenship rights 
and responsibilities by electing their leaders periodically at all levels from the Village 
Chairman to the President of Uganda. However, the evidence from Wamala is that local 
council elections have not been held since 2001 and the current leadership at the village and 
parish levels, which are supposed to be the bedrock for the participatory process, have no 
legal mandate from the citizens. Thus, village and parish councils no longer meet. As one 
official stated: 
Because of very many demands by all departments, the most vocal people are the ones 
who get the money for their programmes and activities.  
However, as various people interviewed observed, the saying that ‘the squeaky wheel gets the 
grease’ is very evident in WDLG budget decisions. This study has confirmed other scholars’ 
findings (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Wampler, 2007; 
Harare Communiqué, 2007) that the final decision on allocation of resources is made by 
technical officers and political leaders on the executive committee. Contributions from other 
stakeholders are never taken into account in the final budget (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Harare Communiqué, 2007; Moynihan, 2007).  
7.3.4 Desired Outcomes of Citizen Participation 
This research focuses on factors that are considered to provide evidence of outcomes. First, 
the information from participants will influence budget decisions. Second, transparency and 
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accountability will be enhanced. And, third, the participants will learn from the process and 
enhance their knowledge, competence and skills to exercise their rights and responsibilities as 
citizens. When these outcomes are achieved, future participation by stakeholders is more 
likely to be realised as participants will be motivated and convinced that their participation 
has an impact on how resources are allocated (Franklin and Ebdon, 2006). 
7.3.4.1 Influencing Budget Decisions 
Contrary to Baiocchi’s (2001:61) observation that:  
… it is crucial that reforms actually deliver goods in a timely fashion to overcome 
cynicism and convince persons who have limited  amount of time that participation is 
worthwhile. 
Evidence from the case study indicates that citizen’ participation which is minimal, does not 
influence budget decisions. For example, in WDLG, money was diverted to meet a 
presidential pledge, which was not in the district plan or budget, and this was explained by 
the fact that the President’s Manifesto takes priority. In her study of Nsangi Sub-County local 
government in Wamala district, Babirye (2009:8) also noted that 
… only 32% of the respondents agreed that projects they had identified were 
implemented. The majority noted that different projects were instead implemented in the 
villages contrary to what they demanded.   
She goes on to state, “it is only priority projects of the district and central government that are 
actually implemented” (Babirye, 2009:70). This illustrates again how institutional pressures 
determine the priorities of local governments. And by doing this, the citizens’ rights and 
responsibilities are undermined, as their needs and priorities are hijacked by outsiders. 
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Even at the national level, citizens’ contributions to the budget do not influence the final 
decisions. For example, in the national budget of 2012/2013 the chairperson of the Social 
Services Committee had this to say regarding their efforts to have more money allocated to 
the health sector: “For the last 10 years, Parliament has been asking the executive to increase 
the salaries of health workers” (Lyomoki, New Vision newspaper 04/10/2012). 
7.3.4.2 Transparency and Accountability 
The NPM reforms are meant to address an increasing demand for performance accountability 
to citizens. The need to disclose information and the citizen’s right to transparency are key 
outcomes of PB as a way of controlling the discretionary powers allotted to non-elected 
public servants. Citizen participation and accountability are considered to be the key concepts 
of citizenship theory, because they call back democratic principles in their traditional shape.  
Although there is a clear accountability mechanism, the evidence collected has demonstrated 
that there is financial accountability, but political accountability is lacking. The consequence 
of this lack of political accountability is that citizens do not get to know what has been 
financed and why and how much has gone into financing it. This negates one of the NPM 
objectives, that adoption of a decentralisation policy improves good governance and makes 
both technical and political leaders accountable to the citizens. The argument by Cartiz 
(2010) that incorporating donor funding into government budgets will enable donors to take 
greater interest in transparency and accountability is not supported by the findings in this 
study. The evidence available shows that CSOs are denied access to information, and when it 
is made available, it comes in very late, when decisions have already been taken. 
Ackerman (2004) argued that both vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms are 
plagued by structural and contextual problems that limit the ability of citizens and their 
representative institutions to hold government to account. In light of these difficulties, he 
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advocates a third way: “societal actors can directly oblige government actors to answer for 
their actions and sanction them for wrongdoing” (Ackerman, 2004:449). Devas and Grant 
(2003) also stated that: 
“Of course, diligent elected councillors may consult their constituents in a variety of 
ways, but such consultations may be haphazard and biased. Less diligent councillors 
may make no attempt to consult anyone, and may in any case be more interested in 
pursuing personal gains” (Devas and Grant, 2003:308) 
However, evidence collected in Wamala indicates that budget information is not provided to 
participants in a timely manner, as was the case in most of the sector committee meetings, 
when budget documents to be discussed were not available and at times were provided when 
the meetings were about to end. Unless information is reliable and provided in a timely 
manner, the PB process will not be transparent and defeats one of the objectives of NPM 
reforms and principles of good governance. Second, it undermines citizens’ rights and 
responsibilities to participate in governance matters and to hold public officers accountable. 
7.3.4.3 Educating Citizens and enhancing their capacities 
According to Stiver (1990), participation by citizens, plays a role in educating them to 
improve their capacities to engage in constructive debates regarding public affairs. The 
second local government development programme included a capacity building component 
for both the technical and political leaders, to enhance their capacities to plan and budget 
better for improved service delivery (World Bank, 2003; Ministry of Local Government, 
2003; Danida, 2003). The government of the United Kingdom, through its Department for 
International Development (DFID) provided resources that enabled the revision of the Local 
Government Finance and Accounting Regulations (LGFAR) of 1998 to the current ones of 
2007. This, we argue, is another example of normative pressure.  
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Evidence from the case study does not show that the budgeting process educates citizens to 
appreciate the importance of budgeting. This is contrary to what Stivers (1990) posited, that 
budgeting should be used as an educational tool to educate citizens to develop their capacities 
for effective involvement. In support of this argument, Mukandala (1998:46) in his study of 
Tanzania found that:  
…[al]though populists clearly far outnumbered the technical-administrative groups, who 
also do not vote, many councillors had very poor educational qualifications. Many found 
it difficult to contribute meaningfully to the discussions. They had special difficulty 
countering the technical presentations of the departmental technical staff. These are 
invariably more educated, very well known, and more self-confident.  
It was also observed by Manor and Crook (1998) that where experience and skills in planning 
are lacking, disadvantaged stakeholders will not effectively participate on local government 
affairs that affect them  
Evidence in the case study and literature show that, the NPM reforms, included a component 
of capacity building funds for both political and technical staff to enable them to acquire 
skills in budgeting in order to provide appropriate and timely accountability to stakeholders. 
As observed by Bryn and Turner (1990), for citizens to effectively participate in issues that 
concern them, civic education is necessary to reduce information asymmetry and reduce 
inequality. The case study has given us evidence that contribution from elected 
representatives during the budgeting process is constrained by the low educational standards 
of councillors, who cannot understand and appreciate the technical language used in the 
budget; some do not even understand English, which, according to the Local Government Act 
1997, is the official medium of communication (Uganda, 1997, 2006). Therefore, inability to 
understand the language in which the budget and other information are communicated is a 
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major constraint to citizens’ participation that can only be addressed through the civic 
education of individuals and groups to reduce information inequality. As Franklin and Ebdon 
(2002:2) state: 
Designing a participation process that provides the information necessary to educate 
and inform the participants, in language they understand, is an important first step for 
gathering their preferences. 
Lack of budgeting skills, competences and knowledge in public sector financial management 
was identified as one hindrance to effective budget participation by councillors. At the 
national level, the Budget Act 2001 established the Parliamentary Budget Office, whose main 
objective and role is to provide Parliament and its committees with the technical and 
independent analysis of economic and financial data needed for national economic and 
budgetary legislative decisions (Monitor Newspaper, 2012). Similar arrangements could be 
made for local governments, to address the skills and competence gaps that inhibit effective 
participation of councillors in the budgeting process.  
Information asymmetry emerges as one of the key constraints to participation. Local 
governments in more rural areas had a greater challenge then those that were more urbanised. 
In his study of the link between local governments and local developments in six rural 
Bolivian municipalities, Nijenhvis (2002) noted that rural people did not participate as much 
as urban people. He attributed this to the knowledge and skills gap between the two groups, 
as urban people were more informed and had a greater capacity to participate compared to the 
rural residents. This further demonstrates that education has an impact on the ability of 
participants to participate during the budgeting process. This was also evident in Wamala, 
and people who could not express themselves in English did not make any contribution 
during the debate about the budget at committee and council meetings. This is also in 
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agreement with Poppe’s (1992) observation that lack of information for key players in the 
planning process constrains participation. Having leaders who are poorly educated but insist 
on making decisions on issues where they have no competence is likely to create problems 
which can be counterproductive to the whole concept of decentralisation and the concept of 
citizen participation (Mawhood, 1983).  
In summary, there have been efforts to educate citizens and enhance their capacities to 
exercise their right and responsibilities. The challenge is lack of transparency and information 
asymmetry between technical and other stakeholders. 
7.4   Summary 
The importance of this chapter lies in its analysis using the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter Three, the perceived relevance and contribution of PB in a decentralised local 
government system, and the reality in practice collected from the actual practitioners in their 
operating environment. Institutional pressures on citizens influence the implementation of 
NPM reforms. The decentralisation policy adopted by Uganda as a strategic initiative has had 
an impact on local government budgeting processes and practices. This has affected 
management control system practices in LGs in the way in which residents, as citizens, 
exercise their political, social, economic and financial rights and responsibilities. Studies that 
investigate the immediate effects of NPM reforms as strategic intervention, without taking 
into account political, social and financial practices, may not give a clear picture of the reality 
in practice. There is also evidence that the design and mechanisms of participation are not 
tailored to the local environment and norms of society.  
The study has identified unidirectional and bidirectional relationships between the outcomes 
and citizens’ participation. Achieving the desired outcomes of participation not only 
motivates citizens but also empowers them to participate in future budgeting meeting and to 
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seek accountability from both political and technical staff, who are the key players in the 
budgeting process. The chapter has set grounds for conclusions and recommendations that are 
provided in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1   Introduction 
This final chapter, which provides conclusion and recommendations, is divided into five 
sections. Following this introductory section, the next section provides a summary of key 
findings guided by the research objectives. The third section provides the study’s contribution 
to knowledge and practice. The fourth reflects on the methodology used in the study and 
presents the limitations of this study. The last section presents areas for future research. 
8.2   Summary of Key Findings 
The study objectives were to establish: (1) factors that enhance or inhibit PB in a 
decentralised LG system in a developing country; (ii) how the participatory budgeting 
process operates in practice, focusing on who participates, and why those who participate do 
so, given evidence that in most cases their contribution is not taken into account in the final 
budget (Ebdon and Franklin, 2006); (iii) whether citizen participation in the budgeting 
process achieves the desired goals and outcomes; and (iv) to make policy recommendations 
for the PB process that will enhance benefits to local communities, especially the poor. To 
achieve the above objectives, the study set out to explore the following question: How does 
PB work in a decentralised local government system in a developing country? In order to 
contribute to both knowledge and practice, the question was broken down into empirical, 
theoretical and policy relevant sub-questions. The results of the study are summarised in this 
section around the research questions and reflect the extent to which the study objectives 
have been achieved.  
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8.2.1 How is the PB process conducted in a decentralised local government system in 
Uganda? 
The study has provided evidence that in practice it is only technical officers in key positions 
who participate in the budgeting process and influence resource allocation. Political leaders’ 
participation is limited to catering for their selfish interests, with little regard to the ordinary 
citizen they represent. Contrary to existing literature claiming that Uganda is a success story 
in practising PB, the findings from the case study show that in Uganda the budgeting process 
is a ritual and can be better defined as being ‘consultative’ rather than participative. This is in 
conformity with the findings by Kisakye (1993) that in Africa, political leaders base their 
decisions on their vested interests. They do not put people first as they claim to do. Thus it 
can be concluded that Uganda is practising Consultative Budgeting (CB). The claim that PB 
is practised in local governments obscures the crucial distinction between consultation and 
participation; and decentralisation and delegation may lead to unrealistic expectations of 
outcomes. 
8.2.2 Is the design of the process and mechanisms for participation appropriate for effective 
citizen participation? 
The study, consistent with the existing literature, has established that the design and 
mechanisms for citizen participation are well designed to operate in a democratic and well 
informed society. The village councils and budget conferences used as mechanisms for 
citizens’ participation is what Robin et al. (2008:567) described thus: 
Come one, come all forums do not provide information about overall community 
preferences, but they may provide an important civic (feel-good) or public information 
function. They are also inexpensive and might satisfy legal public hearing requirements.  
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The study has also established that the mechanisms for citizens’ participation are not tailored 
to the local environment, values and norms of society. The design of the process and 
mechanisms for participation requires financial resources to be effectively implemented. The 
design and mechanism assumed that technical officers in developing countries are transparent 
and accountable. The study findings have revealed that technical officers are not transparent 
and accountable, and this has negatively affected citizen participation in the budgeting 
process. However, the notion that public servants cannot articulate the interest of the citizens 
has also been proved inaccurate, as the case study has shown that in Wamala Local 
Government, technical officers were more committed to meeting the needs of the ordinary 
citizen than political leaders, who were only interested in pursuing their own rent-seeking 
agendas.  
8.2.3 What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of citizen participation? 
The following factors have been found by the study to positively influence citizen 
participation in the budgeting process in a decentralised local government system: (i) 
democratic governance at the grassroots level, that is, village councils; (ii) availability of 
financial resources to support the process of participation and also cater for the needs and 
priorities identified by participants; (iii) availability of timely, reliable and understandable 
information; (iv) quality of participants in terms of knowledge and skill in public 
management affairs; (v) local revenue contribution to total budget; (vi) competence of 
technical staff; (vii) understanding of cultural norms and values; and (vii) verifiable outcomes 
of participation. 
Factors that negatively affect citizen participation in the budget process include: (i) 
inappropriate participation mechanisms adopted without adapting them to the local 
environment, thus treating citizens’ participation as ‘homogenous’ and rolling out ‘blanket’ 
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participation mechanisms despite evidence that cultural norms and values in local 
governments vary across and within countries; (ii) dependence on central government 
funding; (iii) failure of participants’ input to influence budget allocations; (vi) lack of 
transparency and accountability, which leads to information asymmetry; (v) political leaders’ 
selfish interest and rent-seeking tendencies; (vi) ineffective and poorly funded internal audit 
function to monitor compliance with laws, policies and guidelines and ensure the existence of 
effective internal controls; and (vii) poverty, which leads to tendencies towards corruption at 
all levels. The study has revealed that political leader in rural local governments have limited 
education to fully appreciate the technical and financial dynamics of budgeting. Therefore, in 
developing countries, involving citizens in management control systems may remain a 
mystery unless individuals and groups are empowered through civic education to exercise 
their rights and responsibilities (Turner and Bryan, 1990) 
8.2.4 Does Citizen Participation in the Budgeting Process Achieve the Desired Outcomes? 
 The study has provided evidence that ordinary citizens do not participate in allocating public 
resources. Consistent with the existing literature, the study has established that failure to 
influence budget decisions has led to cynicism on the part of citizens that participation is not 
worthwhile. The achievement of objectives is by coincidence rather than design. Citizen 
involvement in the budgeting process is limited to the preparatory stage of the process, when 
the development plan is being formulated. Even at this stage, citizens’ input does not 
influence the final development plan, as the final document is prepared by the planning unit 
and the technical planning committee. The study has also confirmed that NPM reforms 
advocated by donor countries are adopted by developing countries to legitimise their 
existence. Contrary to claims in some studies that developing countries cannot influence 
donor supported reforms, evidence has also been provided that the desired outcomes can be 
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achieved if public sector organisations  recognise the rights and responsibilities of citizens 
and allow them to be directly involved in decision-making processes though effective 
participation. The study has confirmed what Rodrik (2013:8) observed that where 
“ Politicians [become] income-maximising suppliers of policy favours; citizens [become] 
rent-seeking lobbies and special interests; and political systems [become] market places in 
which votes and political influence are traded for economic benefits”, policy reforms are 
unlikely to achieve desired outcomes. 
8.3   Contribution of the Thesis to Knowledge 
This section discusses the contribution of the thesis to knowledge in terms of literature, 
theory, policy and practice. 
8.3.1 Contribution to Policy and Practice  
The study makes a number of policy and practice contributions. The study findings have 
revealed that the citizenship theory concepts of accountability and transparency have been 
undermined by the political system that has been revealed to be a market place where votes 
and political influence are traded for economic benefits. The study has also shown that vested 
interests of key stakeholders in the budgeting process work against economic rationality that 
NPM reforms are meant to promote. The study further contributes to policy and practice by 
identifying factors that enhance and inhibit successful implementation of NPM reforms in a 
developing country and in a rural setting.  
Therefore, we can discern from the case that for PB to achieve its desired goals and outcomes 
the following policy initiatives need to take place: (i) during the design of the process it is 
necessary to articulate the goals and outcomes desired from the process of PB; (ii) the 
mechanisms used must be selected based on their ability to reach all stakeholders and collect 
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their needs and priorities at a minimal cost to the stakeholders in terms of time and other 
resources; (iii) the information necessary for participants to express their sincere preferences 
must be provided and communicated on time in a language that participants understand; (iv) 
there must be careful consideration of the cultural norms and values of participants, taking 
into account political and environmental factors that may have an impact on the PB; (v) 
technical officers together with political leaders should constitute teams that collect needs and 
priorities from village and parish councils, rather than the current mechanism where technical 
officers undertake the exercise without involving political leaders; (vi) NPA should include 
assisting and building the capacity for local government to make development plans; (vii) 
NPA should sensitise people about the usefulness of planning and budgeting and their rights 
and responsibilities as citizens; (viii) accountability to lower levels of  should be enhanced; 
(vx) NGOs and CSOs should be involved in sensitising and empowering local citizens to 
effectively participate in the planning and allocation of resources through the budgeting 
process; and (x) as in  the case of the National Parliament, a District  Budget Office should be 
established whose main objective and role is to provide the Council  and its committees with 
technical and independent analyses of the economic and financial data needed for economic 
and budgetary legislative decisions.  
In summary, the study findings indicate that PB is more political than technical, and power 
relationships amongst key players in the process are important in understanding the outcomes 
of the PB process. Evidence from the study shows that decentralisation has led to a 
reasonably accepted governance framework in Uganda. The study has also shown that 
decentralisation is one of the most popular state reforms, but it has not widened and deepened 
space for citizens’ participation at the local level (Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999).  
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This study offers ample lessons for developing countries on how the process of PB can be 
improved to achieve the desired goals and outcomes in developing countries that are coerced 
into adopting reforms by supra-national agencies. Thus, the value of the study lies in clearly 
identifying factors that enhance or inhibit donor driven policy reforms by relating these to a 
concrete case. Second, the analysis of a case in Uganda considered to be a success story if 
implementing donor supported reforms (Shah, 2007) could be of immense value to policy 
decision makers in Uganda and other countries with similar political, social and economic 
standings. Implementation mechanisms to enhance the contribution of PB to the benefit of 
local communities, especially the poor, have been proposed based on the study findings. This 
will benefit policy makers, allowing them to gain an insight into the actual practice of PB in 
local governments. In this regard the study has contributed in raising awareness among policy 
makers and supranational agencies of the need to ensure that reforms are adapted to the local 
context, and involve local citizens to ensure ownership, commitment and sustainability. 
8.3.2 Contribution to the Literature 
The study has provided empirical knowledge about the outcomes of citizen participation in 
the budgeting process in a decentralised local government system in a developing country in 
a rural setting. Previous studies focused on urban authorities and Municipalities. Second, the 
study has identified factors that enhance or inhibit donor driven policy reforms, thus 
contributing to both knowledge and professional practice. Goldfrank (2006) also observed a 
theoretical gap in the literature that explains the link between the process and outcomes of 
PB. This study has attempted to fill part of this gap. The study has interesting implications for 
the theoretical framework, in that an indirect effect of the outcomes of PB has an influence on 
the levels of future citizen participation in the budgeting process, thus implications on 
management control systems of organisations. In other words, evidence suggests that PB 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
180 
 
outcomes practices mediate the relationship between the budgeting initiative and 
accountability at the horizontal and lower levels and this has an effect on management control 
systems. Management accounting studies reviewed do not clearly state if budgeting 
approaches should be taken into account when designing internal control systems. The focus 
is on the importance of participatory budgeting in performance measurement systems, 
governance and motivation. A rich, thick, detailed description of PB has also been provided 
for scholars to use in future research (Merriam, 1988). 
 8.3.3 Contribution to Theory 
The contribution to accounting theory from this study is that institutional pressures (coercive, 
mimetic and normative) can be mitigated by empowering citizens to exercise their civil, 
social, political and economic/financial citizenship rights and responsibilities effectively. 
This could lead to strengthening management accounting systems, and result in policy 
reforms (that are donor drive) achieving desired outcomes. 
Second, the study has contributed a theoretical framework combining the NIS and citizenship 
theories based on extant literature that can be used and tested in future research. Thus studies 
that investigate the effectiveness of reforms adopted by developing countries should examine  
a phenomenon from multiple variables instead of focusing on isolated variables or bivariate 
relationships.    
Third, by triangulating institutional theory with citizenship theory, the thesis has established 
that if citizens effectively exercise their rights and responsibilities, they can enhance 
transparency and make public officers and political leaders accountable.  
Finally, the thesis advances an argument that economic and financial rights are distinct from 
social and political rights and ought to be regarded as one of the components of citizenship 
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theory. The study also argues that negative coercive isomorphic pressures from development 
partners can be mitigated if citizens are aware of their rights and responsibilities. 
8.4   Reflection on the Methodology 
The main objective of this thesis was to explore how participatory budgeting works in a 
decentralised local government system using Uganda as a case. The case study was the 
preferred method as the focus was “… on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context” (Yin, 2003:1). Therefore the researcher adopted a case study method to provide 
evidence on the process and outcomes of the participatory budgeting phenomenon in its 
natural setting (Yin, 2003; Creswell, 2007). The case method in this study has enabled us to 
develop a rich insight into the budgeting practices of local governments in a decentralised 
framework. This approach enabled the researcher to be part of the studied case site, as ten 
months were spent at the study site. As recommended by Yin (2003), data was collected from 
various sources through documentary evidence, observations and interviews. Through these 
various sources of evidence and interactions, the researcher was able to gain an in-depth 
contextual exploration and understanding of the process and outcomes of participatory 
budgeting in a decentralised local governance system. This would not have been possible if a 
survey approach was adopted that would have disconnected the researcher from the real-life 
context under which participatory budgeting takes place. The researcher adopted a qualitative 
methodology and an interpretive paradigm for the purposes of interacting with key players in 
the budgeting process. The subjective approach enabled the researcher to explore and 
understanding the social, political and economic dynamics underlying the adoption of NPM 
reforms and the various factors that enhance and inhibit their successful implementation. This 
enabled us to build a theoretical framework that can be used in future large studies. 
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A single case and a cross-sectional study design were used in this study, and this posed some 
challenges (Creswell, 2007). Much as this enabled the researcher to undertake an in-depth 
exploration of the phenomenon, a multi-case study and a longitudinal study would have 
provided a richer insight into factors that enhance and inhibit the processes of participatory 
budgeting developing countries. The major challenges faced were the fact that the process of 
collecting data through interviews and observations were time consuming and costly.  On a 
number of occasions, the interviewees cancelled a scheduled interview when the researcher 
was already at the agreed venue. Scheduled meetings for observations would in most cases 
not start on time and in some cases extended into the late evening. 
On reflection, although the researcher faced some challenges using the case study approach, 
the approach provided was the most appropriate to address the research question set out in 
Chapter One. In summary, the case study approach enabled the researcher to explore the 
process and outcomes of PB in its natural setting. 
8.5   Study Limitations 
The limitations of this research are outlined in this section. 
Like all research using a case study approach, the first limitation of this study is that the 
results may not be generalised to other contexts. Although every effort was made to obtain 
views from a variety of stakeholders, there is a possibility that that we may have missed some 
perspectives owing to the selection method and number of interviews. Even though the 
findings of this case may not be generalisable, a number of lessons have been drawn from the 
experiences of the case in Uganda that add valuable knowledge on how participatory 
budgeting works in actual practice in a developing country under a decentralised system of 
governance. 
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The second limitation is that the study focused on the government environment, the design of 
the process, mechanisms for participation and desired outcomes of the PB. The social and 
economic environment within which PB takes place was overlooked. However, through 
interviewing key players who are well informed and involved in the budgeting processing, 
deep and important insight was obtained that make the study findings valid and reliable. 
The third limitation is that the list of interviewees did not include staff from supranational 
agencies like the World Bank, DANIDA, IMF, etc. This was overcome by extensively 
reviewing documents that are easily accessible in both hard and soft copies. 
8.6   Areas for Further Future Research 
The limitations above provide an opportunity for future research. First, a cross-sectional 
study that provides empirical evidence using the framework developed in the thesis would 
further this line of research. Second, empirical work could be undertaken to provide evidence 
on the underlying linkages and relations that our model advances. A longitudinal study 
research that examines the implementation and monitoring process after budget approval may 
enhance the effectiveness and value of management control systems in public sector 
organisations using citizenship and new institutional theories. Future research could also 
build on the responses in this study and determine their relevance in enhancing effective 
participation in the budgeting process in order to improve public sector management control 
systems. 
Finally, those who subscribe to the quantitative research paradigm could undertake a rigorous 
statistical testing of the findings corroborated by the case evidence in this study. Thus, this 
study has identified variables and relationships that can be tested in large-scale empirical 
studies. 
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Appendix 1: Letter of Introduction from Uganda Management Institute (UMI) 
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Appendix 2:   Research Instruments 
 
Research Data Collection Tool Political Leaders and Ordinary Citizens 
Section 1: The Process of Participatory Budgeting (PB) 
Question: 
i) What changes in the budgeting process have taken place in Wamala District since it was 
established? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
ii) At what stage in the budgeting process do citizens get involved in the budgeting process? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………… 
iii) Explain whether social, economic, political or environmentalfactors have any influence on 
citizen participation in the budgeting process? 
 
a) Social e.g. education level, social status, gender, age, religion,etc 
b) Economic e.g. poverty levels 
c) Political e.g. party affiliation 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
iv 
 
d) Environmental i.e. rural vs. urban 
 
iv) Which of the above factors has the greatest influence on the effectiveness of citizen 
participation?  
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
Section2: How and why citizens participate in the budgeting process 
Questions: 
i) How do citizens of Wamala District participate in the budgeting process?  
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
ii) Why do you think citizens participate in the budgeting process? 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
iii) What are the participation mechanisms? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
iv) How effective are these mechanisms? 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
v) How can participation be enhanced? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Section 3: Achievement of desired goals and outcomes;  
Questions: 
Saturninus Kasozi-Mulindwa DBA 
v 
 
i) What do participants in the budgeting process expect at the end of the exercise? 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
ii) To what extent are citizens’ contributions during the budgeting process taken into account in 
the final budget?  
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
iii) Does citizen’s participation in the budgeting process address local priorities? 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 
Section 4: Policy recommendations  
Questions: 
i) What should be done by government to improve PB local governments? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
ii) From your experience what needs to be done to ensure that local communities especially the 
poor benefit from PB?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
Section 5: General 
Question 
Do you have any other comment on PB that has not been covered above? 
Conclusion 
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Thank you very much for your time. I will try to give you feedback at the end on my research. Let us 
keep in touch. 
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RESEARCH TOOL 2: Technical Officers 
1) Are there any possibilities of citizen participation? 
                          Yes                                     No 
 
2) Where is localised citizen participation?  
a) In the overall planning process: 
b) Only in certain activities: (where?) 
c) In the budgeting process: 
d) Others: (Please specify) 
3) Which instrument of participation do you use? 
a) Public hearings 
b) Public Forums 
c) Others; (Please specify) 
4) Who participates? 
Men                  Women                All adults   
5) Is there any process of selection of participants? 
    Yes  No 
6) If yes, how does it work? 
7) Do you have public meetings to explain the planning and budgeting activities? 
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Yes     No       
 
8) Do you distribute to the citizens the budgeting documents 
Yes     No       
 
9) If yes, how and in what format? 
10) Are planning and budgeting documents understandable for a medium educated citizen? 
11) Yes     No       
 
12) How  are the citizens’ in puts used 
13) Are these inputs binding for the decision making process? 
14) Yes     No       
 
15) How do you deal with conflict interests from different citizens? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
16) What are in your opinion the main outcomes of the citizen participation? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
17) Has citizens’ participation benefitted the local communities? 
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………………………………………………………………………………………. 
18) If yes, to what extent has citizen participation benefitted the poor? 
19)  If no, explain why? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
20) What are in your opinion the main disadvantages of the citizen participation? 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 3: University of Birmingham Ethical Review Process 
 
Ethical Review Process at the University of Birmingham 
Source:http://www.rcs.bham.ac.uk/ethics/review/Ethical-Review-Process.jpg 
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Appendix 4: Letter of Approval from Ethical Review Committee 
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Appendix 5: List of Interviewees by Designation 
Location Interviewee Category  No. 
Intervie
wed 
Role in PB 
District Hqs. Chairperson Political 1 Chairs DEC 
CAO Tech. Staff 1 Chairs TPC 
Chairperson of Sector 
Committees 
Political 5 Recommend budgets 
Heads of Departments Technical 5 Preparation and 
implementation 
Councillors Political 10 Approval, monitoring, 
evaluation 
Junior Technical staff  10 Preparation and 
implementation 
Sub-County Chairperson Political 5 Chairs EC 
 SAS Tech. Staff 5 Chairs TPC 
 Chairperson of Sector 
Committees 
Political 5 Recommends budgets 
 Heads of Departments Technical 3 Preparation and 
implementation 
 Councillors Political 10 Approval, monitoring, 
evaluation 
 Junior Technical staff Technical 10 Preparation and 
implementation 
 NGOS Civil Society 2 Formulation 
 CBOs Civil Society 2 Formulation 
Parish Chairpersons Political 5 Chairs PDC 
( Formulation) 
 Executive Council Members Political 5 Formulation 
Village Chairperson Political 5 Chairs VC 
Formulation 
 Executive Members Political 5 Formulation 
 Residents Political 10 Formulation 
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Appendix 6: The National Planning and Budgeting Cycle 
Timing Activity/event Responsib
ility 
Centre 
Output 
 
September 1. Local Governments Budget Committee 
agrees the rules, conditions and flexibility of 
the coming planning and budgetary process 
LGBC Agreement about the overall 
planning and budgetary 
framework before start of 
budget process 
October 2. National Budget Conference 
 
Ministry of 
Finance, 
Planning & 
Economic 
Develop-
ment 
National priorities, resources 
and inter sector allocations 
communicated to local 
governments 
October 3. Regional Local Government Framework 
Paper Workshops 
 
Ministry of 
Finance, 
Planning, & 
Economic 
Develop 
ment, sector 
ministries 
Recurrent and development 
grants ceilings communicated 
to local governments, 
alongside changes to sector 
policies and guidelines 
 
Early 
November 
 
4. Executive Committee meets to determine 
intersectoral priorities as identified in previous 
DDP and to fix intersectoral allocation % 
Executive 
Committee 
Intersectoral priorities 
identified for potential budget 
reallocations and flexibility 
Early 
November 
 
5. Budget Desk prepares Local Government 
Budget Call and circulates it to Heads of 
Department and Lower Local Governments 
 
Local 
Government 
Budget 
Desk, 
Executive 
Committee 
Draft activity and time 
schedule for the entire budget 
process, and indicative 
budget allocations for LLGs 
and HoDs, etc. 
 
November 6. Sectors start preparing input to budget 
framework paper, reviewing performance and 
prioritising planning and budgeting for future 
programmes 
 
Heads of 
Depart-
ments & 
lower local 
Govern-
ments 
Draft inputs to budget 
framework paper to be 
presented to sector 
committees and development 
plans to be considered by 
LLG councils 
November 7. a: LLGs identify investments and prepare 
draft development budgets and plans. b: 
Planning Unit compiles LLG development 
activities into DDP, and presents them to 
HODs who propose district level Sector 
investments which are compiled in sector 
BFPs. These include full and complete 
workplans and budgets for all district level 
activity linked directly to DDP 
Planner 
District 
Technical 
Planning 
Committee 
 
Draft District/Municipality 
Development Plan and 
detailed workplans and 
budgets for each and every 
activity LG intends to 
undertake, no matter how it is 
funded 
December 8. Draft Sector BFPs and development plans 
complete. Sector committees examine sector 
inputs to the budget framework paper 
 
Sector 
committees 
Sector priorities and draft 
workplans and budget 
estimates ready for 
compilation by the Budget 
Desk  
December 9. Budget Desk compiles/prepares draft budget 
framework paper, and the Planning Unit the 
development plan. The District Technical 
Planning Committee reviews them. 
Budget Desk Draft budget framework 
paper and development plan 
ready to be presented to 
Executive Committee 
December 10. Meeting of the Executive Committee, 
Chairpersons of Sector Committees and HoDs 
Executive 
Committee, 
Draft budget framework 
paper and development plan 
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to examine draft budget framework paper, and 
prioritise sector expenditures and programmes. 
 
Chair-
persons of 
Sector 
Comm-
ittees, 
HoDs 
ready for Budget Conference 
 
December 11. Budget Conference Full council, 
NGOs, Civil 
Society 
 
Budget input (i.e. priorities, 
re-allocations and 
preliminary budget estimates) 
ready for incorporation in 
draft budget by the Budget 
Desk 
December 12. Budget Desk incorporates input from 
budget conference in budget framework paper 
and draft budget. Executive Committee 
approves budget framework paper and draft 
budget 
Budget Desk 
Executive 
Committee 
 
Final budget framework 
paper and draft budget ready 
to be presented to Finance or 
Executive Committee. Draft 
budget ready for submission 
to MoFPED 
January to 
May 
 
13. MoFPED and line ministries examine local 
government budget framework paper and draft 
budgets 
Central 
Govern-
ment 
Revised grant ceilings and 
comments ready to be 
communicated to LGs 
May 14. Budget Desk incorporates grant ceilings 
and comments received from 
MoFPED in annual workplan and draft budget 
 
Budget Desk Final draft budget and 
workplan ready to be 
presented to sector 
committees 
Beginning of 
June 
 
15. Sector committees review final annual 
workplan and budget 
 
Sector 
Comm-ittees 
Final input from sector 
committees to annual 
workplan and budget 
Beginning of 
June 
16. Committee examines final draft budget 
 
Finance 
committee 
or Executive 
Committee 
Final draft budget (including 
Committee annual work plan) 
ready to be read by council 
 
Before the 
15th of June 
 
17. Reading and approval of budget 
 
Full council Approved budget to be 
signed by chairperson and 
submitted to MoFPED 
/MoLG/LGFC and Auditor 
General 
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Appendix 7: Local Government Planning and Budget Cycle 
Timing Activity/event Responsibility 
Centre 
 
Output 
 
September 1. Local Governments Budget 
Committeeagreeswith the rules, 
conditions and flexibility of the coming 
planning and budgetary process 
LGBC Agreement about the 
overall planning and 
budgetary framework 
before start of budget 
process 
October 2. National Budget Conference 
 
Ministry of 
Finance, 
Planning & 
Economic 
Development 
National priorities, 
resources and inter sector 
Allocations communicated 
to local governments 
October 3. Regional Local Government 
Framework Paper Workshops 
 
Ministry of 
Finance, 
Planning & 
Economic 
Development, 
sector 
ministries 
Recurrent and 
development Grants 
ceilings communicated to 
local governments, 
alongside changes to 
sector policies and 
guidelines 
Early 
November 
 
4. Executive Committee meets to 
determine inter-sectoral priorities as 
identified in previous DDP and to 
fixinter-sectoral allocation % 
Executive 
Committee 
Inter sectoral priorities 
identified for potential 
budget reallocations and 
flexibility 
Early 
November 
 
5. Budget Desk prepares Local 
Government Budget Call and circulates 
it to heads of department and lower local 
governments 
 
Local Govern-
ment Budget 
Desk, 
Executive 
Committee 
Draft activity and time 
schedule for the entire 
budget process, and 
indicative budget 
allocations for LLGs and 
HoDs, etc. 
November 6. Sectors start preparing input to budget 
framework paper, reviewing 
performance and prioritising planning 
and budgeting for future programmes 
 
Heads of 
department & 
lower local 
governments 
 
Draft inputs to budget 
framework paper to be 
presented to sector 
committees and 
development plans to be 
considered by LLG 
councils 
November 7. a: LLGs identify investments and 
prepare draft development budgets and 
plans. b: Planning Unit compiles LLG 
development activities into DDP, 
andpresents them to HODs who propose 
district level Sector investments 
whichare compiled in sector BFPs. 
These include full and complete 
workplans and budgets for all district 
level activity linkeddirectly to DDP 
Planner 
District 
Technical 
Planning 
Committee 
 
Draft District/Municipality 
Development Plan and 
detailed workplans and 
budgets for each and every 
activity LG intends to 
undertake, no matter how 
it is funded 
December 8. Draft Sector BFPs and development Sector Sector priorities and draft 
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plans complete. Sector committees 
examine sector inputs to the budget 
framework paper 
committees workplans and budget 
estimates ready for 
compilation by the Budget 
Desk 
December 9. Budget Desk compiles/prepares draft 
budget framework paper, and the 
Planning Unit the development plan. 
The District Technical Planning 
Committee reviews them. 
Budget Desk Draft budget framework 
paper and development 
plan ready to be presented 
to Executive Committee 
December 10. Meeting of the Executive 
Committee, Chairpersons of Sector 
Committees and HoDs is held to 
examine draft budget framework paper, 
and prioritise sector expenditures and 
programmes. 
Executive 
Committee, 
Chairpersons 
of Sector 
Committees, 
HoDs 
Draft budget framework 
paper and development 
plan ready for Budget 
Conference 
 
December 11. BudgetConference Full council, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
 
Budget input (i.e. 
priorities, re-allocations 
and preliminary budget 
estimates) ready for 
incorporation in draft 
budget by the Budget Desk 
December 12. Budget Desk incorporates input 
from budget conference in budget 
framework paper and draft budget. 
Executive Committee approves budget 
framework paper and draft budget 
 
Budget Desk 
Executive 
Committee 
 
Final budget framework 
paper and draft budget 
ready to be presented to 
Finance or Executive 
Committee. Draft budget 
ready for submission to 
MoFPED 
January to 
May 
 
13. MoFPED and line ministries 
examine local government budget 
framework paper and draft budgets 
Central 
Govern-ment 
Revised grant ceilings and 
comments ready to be 
communicated to LGs 
May 14. Budget Desk incorporates grant 
ceilings and comments received from 
MoFPED in annual workplan and draft 
budget 
Budget Desk Final draft budget and 
workplan ready to be 
presented to sector 
committees 
Beginning 
of 
June 
15. Sector committees review final 
annual workplan and budget 
Sector Comm-
ittees 
Final input from sector 
committees to annual 
workplan and budget 
Beginning 
of June 
16. Committee examines final draft 
budget 
 
Finance 
committee or 
Executive 
Committee 
Final draft budget 
(including Committee 
annual work plan) ready to 
be read by council 
Before  
15 June 
 
17. Reading and approval of budget Full council Approved budget to be 
signed by chairperson and 
submitted to MoFPED 
/MoLG/LGFC and Auditor 
General 
Source: Local Government Finance Commission. 
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Appendix 8: Map of Uganda District Local Governments 
 
Source: Wikipedia, encyclopaedia (2010) 
 
Central (Red)  Eastern (Green) Northern (Yellow) Western (Blue) 
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Map District Map District Map District Map District 
27 Kalangala 4 Amuria 1 Abim 10 Bulisa 
29 Kampala 7 Budaka* 2 Adjumani 11 Bundibugyo 
36 Kayunga  Bududa 3 Amolatar 12 Bushenyi 
38 Kiboga 8 Bugiri 39 Amuru 18 Hoima 
48 Luwero  Bukedea 5 Apac 19 Ibanda 
 Lyantonde 9 Bukwa 6 Arua 26 Isingiro 
51 Masaka 13 Busia 16 Dokolo 23 Kabale 
56 Mityana 14 Namutumba 17 Gulu 24 Kabarole 
59 Mpigi 15 Butaleja 22 Kaabong 31 Kamwenge 
60 Mubende 20 Iganga 42 Kitgum 32 Kanungu 
61 Mukono 21 Jinja 43 Koboko 34 Kasese 
63 Nakaseke 25 Kaberamaido 44 Kotido 37 Kibale 
64 Nakasongola 28 Kaliro 47 Lira 40 Kiruhura 
70 Rakai 30 Kamuli 50 
Maracha-
Terego 
41 Kisoro 
72 Sembabule 33 Kapchorwa 57 Moroto 46 Kyenjojo 
76 Wakiso 35 Katakwi 58 Moyo 52 Masindi 
  45 Kumi 62 Nakapiripirit 55 Mbarara 
  49 Manafwa 65 Nebbi 66 Ntungamo 
  53 Mayuge 67 Oyam 71 Rukungiri 
  54 Mbale 68 Pader 
  69 Pallisa* 77 Yumbe 
  73 Sironko 
  74 Soroti 
  75 Tororo 
 
 
 
